THE ATTITUDES OF THE PRINCETON THEOLOGIANS TOWARD DARWINISM AND EVOLUTION FROM 1859-1929

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION 1

Objectives of the Study 3

Scope of the Problem 4

Plan of the Dissertation 5

Sources 7

II. CHARLES HODGE 11

Biographical Data and Literary Productions 11

Philosophical Background 14

Theological Background 23

Theological Method 25

Knowledge of God 35

Relation of God to Natural Law 40

Science and Theology 46

Hodge's Concept of Species 61

Hodge on Antiquity of the Earth and Human Race ... 72

III. HODGE AND DARWINISM 79

Complacency about Darwinism 79

Hodge's Understanding of Darwinism 82

Hodge on Providence and Material Forces 91

Hodge on Providence and Living Organisms 95

CHAPTER PAGE

God, Providence, and Evolution 100
Darwin's Denial of Design in Evolution 109
Darwinism is Tantamount to Atheism 112
IV. A. A. HODGE AND EVOLUTION 123
Biographical Data and Publications 123
Early Views of Relation of Theology and Science .. 127
Later Views on Theology and Evolution 137
Review of Asa Gray's Science and Religion 147
Brief Reviews 155
Introduction to Theism and Evolution 156
Popular Lectures 160
Evolution of Man 168
V. B. B. WARFIELD AND EVOLUTION 186
Background 186
Education 187
Attitude toward Evolution 189
Evolutionary Theology 202
The Compatibility of Evolution with Theism 206
Absolute Creation, Mediate Creation, and Evolution 211
Origin of the Soul 213
Morality, Probation, and Fall 219
Origin of the Human Body 222
Criticism of the Biblicist 234

CHAPTER PAGE

The Unity of the Human Race 237
Evolution and the Bible 239
Antiquity of the Human Race 243
Conclusions 245
VI. C. W. HODGE, JR. AND EVOLUTION 249
Education and Publications 249
Bible and Science 250
Creation, Mediate Creation, and Evolution 255
Scientific Evidence for Evolution 260
Scientific Evidence for Evolution of Man 265
The Scriptural View of the Mode of Man's Origin .. 268
Conflict on the Mode of Man's Origin 270
Conflict on Antiquity and Unity of Man 273
VII. CONCLUSION 281
BIBLIOGRAPHY 293

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In England, November, 1859, Charles Darwin published his epoch making work, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. This began a controversy between theology and science which was to reach its peak in the United States some fifteen years later but which has continued with greater or lessor intensity until our own day.

At the time of the publication of the Origin of Species, Princeton Theological Seminary, the first and leading seminary of the American Presbyterian Church founded in 1812, was approaching its fiftieth anniversary. As with most theological schools of the Reformed tradition it had a strong doctrinal emphasis. During the first fifty years of the Seminary its first two theological professors, Archibald Alexander and Charles Hodge set the pattern of vigorously defending their version of Calvinism against divergent theologies and against philosophies which seemed to undermine Christian doctrine. These theologians and their successors at Princeton were instrumental in the training of thousands of ministers of the Presbyterian and other churches. Many of them became teachers in colleges and other seminaries. Through their teaching and their writing they came to influence at least indirectly a significant portion of the ministers and laity in the United States.

After the Civil War, the development of various movements which caused pressures without and ferment within the churches and its seminaries, especially in the north, resulted in many changes in theology. Among these developments were the higher criticism of the Bible, the study of comparative religions, philosophies which had their origin in Kant and Hegel, the industrial revolution, and the developments of science, especially the biological theory of evolution. As a result of these challenges most of the seminaries with whose professors those of Princeton had had verbal battle over the years had modified their theologies. Typically, the Princeton professors resisted these pressures, defended their historical position, and vigorously attacked those positions which seemed to threaten it.

Although the theory of evolution and Darwinism claimed to be only a theory of science and not a philosophy and although Charles Hodge and the Princeton school generally were sympathetic with the scientific method, Hodge felt that Darwinism at points merged into a philosophical viewpoint which seemed to undermine Christian theology.

This study is primarily concerned with the way in which the professors of Princeton Theological Seminary who held the chair of theology from the first publication of the

Origin of Species (1859) until the reorganization of Princeton Theological Seminary (1929) viewed Darwinism and evolution. Besides Charles Hodge who succeeded Archibald Alexander (1871-1851) in 1840, and held the position until his death (1878), these men are his son Archibald Alexander Hodge who taught theology at Princeton from 1877 until his death (1886); and Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield who taught from 1887 until his death in 1921. The last man included in this study is Caspar Wistar Hodge, Jr., grandson of Charles and son of Princeton's New Testament professor of the same name. He began teaching theology at Princeton in 1901, succeeded Warfield in 1921, and continued teaching there after the reorganization of the seminary in 1929.

These four men, Charles and A. A. Hodge, B. B. Warfield, and C. W. Hodge, Jr., successively taught theology at Princeton from 1840 until the reorganization of the seminary in 1929, a period of nearly ninety years, seventy of which were post-Darwinian.

Objectives of the Study

In the study of these theologians over this period of time, its purpose is:

(1) to find out the attitudes toward Darwinism and the theory of evolution in general taken by these professors of Princeton Theological Seminary;

(2) to find out what they believed to be the important problems concerning Darwinism and evolution as an

explanatory theory of the origin of species, of the origin of man, and of his physical, mental, moral, and spiritual characteristics;

(3) to find out what they believed were the conflicts between their understanding of the theory of evolution and Darwinism on the one hand and their Princeton tradition of Reformed theology and the authority of Scripture on the other;

(4) to find out what modifications they demanded in the theory of evolution and Darwinism to make it compatible with their theology and with their doctrine of authority of Scripture;

(5) to find out whether and to what extent each theologian differed from his predecessors on any of the above points.

Scope of the Problem

No attempt has been made to evaluate the truth or falsity of Darwinism, the theory of evolution, or of any of the views held by the theologians discussed in these pages. Neither does this study attempt to evaluate the correctness of theology nor the interpretations of Scripture held by these men. The chief concern of this work is neither exegetical nor theological but historical. It is to determine as accurately as possible the attitudes toward Darwinism and evolution held by these theologians. With one exception it has not even been concerned with the correctness of the understanding which the theologians had of Darwinism and evolution. This exception is Darwin's denial of design or teleology in the mechanism of the evolutionary process. In view of the fact that this is the crux of the elder Hodge's case against Darwinism, it was felt necessary to examine this issue to see what Charles Darwin actually said about it and to see whether Charles Hodge was mistaken in his evaluation. With this notable exception this study has been primarily concerned with Darwinism and evolution only as it was viewed through the eyes of each of the theologians and the way in which this understanding raised problems in relation to their tradition of Christian theology and their interpretation of Scripture. Occasionally a clarification has been attempted when it was felt that any of the theologians were misunderstood in issues involving theology and science.

Although the attitude of the writer is undoubtedly revealed by this study, and a few suggestions have been made, yet there has been no attempt to present an adequate theory or even the best available theory on the relation of evolution to Christian theology.

Plan of the Dissertation

The dissertation has been divided into six chapters including the Introduction as Chapter I.

Chapter II is concerned with Charles Hodge's religious and educational background; his theological and philosophical views relevant to the problems of the relation of Christianity to science; and his attitude toward, and preferred methods of dealing with these problems in his pre-Darwinian days.

Chapter III is concerned with his confrontation with Darwinism, his objections to it, and his attempt at refutation of both Darwinism and evolution.

Chapter IV is concerned with Archibald Alexander Hodge, the first son and successor of Charles Hodge. Since his first book was nearly completed before the publication of the Origin of Species (1859), his second, early in the controversy, and the rest of his works some ten years later near the end of his life, this chapter consists of a study of change in his attitude toward evolution and a delineation of his final position as to the extent to which evolution could be accepted without conflict with Christian theology.

Chapter V is concerned with Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, the successor to A. A. Hodge in 1887. Although he was raised in a devout Presbyterian family, he developed an early interest in science and planned to make it his life work until he changed his mind while in Europe for postgraduate study. He considered himself a Darwinian before he entered college at Princeton but later came to question the adequacy of its proof. Still he made a careful study of the implications of evolution and attempted to show the extent to which a Christian could accept evolution while remaining orthodox in the ordinary sense of the word.

When Warfield died in 1921, his position was taken by Caspar Wistar Hodge, Jr., who had long been his junior colleague. Chapter VI contains a study of C. W. Hodge on evolution and Darwinism and the extent to which he followed his immediate predecessor Warfield or was influenced by the anti-evolution literature of the period.

Sources

In addition to historical studies of the period and of the topic under discussion, the author has had access to a complete set of The Princeton Review (1826-78) as well as other periodical literature of that time. Some other relevant Presbyterian periodicals were located at Montreat, N. C. The Speer Library of Princeton Seminary contributed greatly to the development of a bibliography of each of these men. Significant portions of otherwise inaccessible books, periodicals, and unpublished manuscripts of lectures and sermons were discovered there. The writer was also able to obtain a fairly complete set of The Princeton Review after 1867, The Presbyterian Review (1880-1889), The Presbyterian and Reformed Review (1890-1902), and The Princeton Theological Review (1903-1929). Various dissertations which in whole or in part are concerned with these men have been obtained by way of inter-library loan or on microfilm.

Charles Hodge.--All of his books, his articles, reviews, and notices in the Princeton Review have been surveyed and the relevant ones carefully read for information pertinent to the subject. Since he was the chief and for a time the only editor of the Review from its inception until 1868, articles and reviews by other men on problems involving science and theology were studied to find his views as reflected by his editorial policy. His confrontation with Darwinism and evolution is so clearly expressed in his Systematic Theology and What is Darwinism? that it was felt unnecessary to delve into his manuscript sermons or lectures for additional information.

A. A. Hodge.--All of his books have been surveyed and the relevant portions carefully studied for his views on evolution and the changes in his thinking which took place over a span of more than twenty-five years. Although he was not so prolific a periodical writer as his father, he did write several brief notices and a very significant review of a book by Asa Gray who was both a theist and a promoter of Darwinism in the United States. He also wrote an introduction to a book on evolution and theism. These, along with a series of lectures given to a lay audience toward the end of his life, reveal his later views on the subject. Some of his manuscript lecture notes which were relevant to the subject were surveyed but since these paralleled his published works which were more complete, no attempt has been made to incorporate them into this thesis.

B. B. Warfield.--He wrote no books on the subject of evolution and theology, nor did any significant chapter deal with them. For information about his views on the subject, the writer has been entirely dependent upon his periodical literature and upon his manuscript lectures. Most of the articles were published in the *Presbyterian Review*, the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* and the *Princeton Theological Review* over a thirty year period from 1887-1916, but a few have been located elsewhere. Although many of his more important articles and critical reviews were collected after his death and published by the Oxford University Press and later by the Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, several which were significant for this study were not included. His most extended and significant discussion of the subject of evolution and theology occurs in his manuscript lectures on "Anthropology." All of these have been carefully studied and an effort has been made to distinguish between what Warfield believed to have happened in regard to evolution, and the extent to which he believed evolution was compatible with Christianity.

Caspar Wistar Hodge, Jr.--He published several articles and reviews in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, the Princeton Theological Review, and in other periodicals and in dictionaries. Few of these are directly related to evolution, but he did develop a series of manuscript lectures on "Anthropology" which deal directly with evolution and Christian theology. These have been used to determine the extent to which he followed Warfield or departed from his teaching.

CHAPTER II

CHARLES HODGE

Biographical Data and Literary Productions

Charles Hodge's paternal grandfather had come from north Ireland to Philadelphia about 1730. His family was sympathetic with the Great Awakening and joined the Second Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia which was founded as a result of the revival. Charles Hodge was born in 1797 but his father died the next year leaving his mother to raise two boys less than two years of age. The family later moved to Princeton so that the boys could attend the College of New Jersey.[1] After graduation Charles Hodge entered Princeton Theological Seminary (founded in 1812) and came under the tutelage of Archibald Alexander (1772-1851), whom he came to consider his intellectual and spiritual father. After graduation from seminary (1819), he studied Hebrew a year before returning first as instructor and two years later as professor of Oriental and Biblical Literature. A few years later he spent two years (1826-28) studying in Europe where he met H. F. W. Gesenius and August Tholuck and heard Schleiermacher, Johann Neander, and Ernst Hengstenberg.[1]

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[1] Archibald Alexander Hodge, The Life of Charles Hodge (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1880), pp. 1-14.

Contrary to the fears of his elder colleagues, Hodge's studies in Germany, rather than enticing him to follow some new theological trend, had the effect of making him suspicious of all such movements. Tholuck told him of the effects of rationalism in Germany during the eighteenth century, and Hodge, himself, became suspicious of pantheism because their leaders, "Hegel and Schleiermacher both deny the personality of the Deity and the individuality of the soul of man."[2] Since he had seen the effects of pantheism at its source, Hodge became sensitive to the least hint of it in any theological or philosophical writing. When he returned to Princeton to take up the task of teaching biblical literature to future ministers, he warned them again and again of the dangers of German philosophical thought.

Hodge's first book was a commentary on Romans (1835). Shortly after he replaced Dr. Alexander in the chair of Exegetical and Didactic Theology, he published the Way of Life (1841), a popular statement of the doctrines of evangelical protestantism. Later he published commentaries on Ephesians and First and Second Corinthains. His magnum opus, a three volume Systematic Theology (1871-73), was published after thirty years of teaching theology. The second volume of this work and his last book, What is Darwinism? (1874), contain his views on evolution and Darwinism.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 119, 148-155.

[2] Ibid., p. 119.

The crowning point in Hodge's long career occurred in the semicentennial celebration (1872) of his appointment to professorship at the seminary. He continued to teach until 1878 when death concluded his life-long labor of presenting and defending his understanding of the Westminster interpretation of reformed theology.[1]

During 1825 Hodge began the Biblical Repertory which in its early years consisted mostly of reprints and translations.[2] After his return from Germany, it was reorganized to include as editors all the professors of the seminary and several from the college. According to his son, Hodge remained the actual working editor most of the time and in addition contributed one hundred and forty-two articles and innumerable book reviews throughout his lifetime.[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 579-583.

[2] Ibid., p. 250. Biblical Repertory: A Collection of Tracts in Biblical Literature (New York: G. and C. Corville, 1825-28). In 1829 it was reorganized with the title of The Biblical Repertory and Theological Review, new series. Later the last part of the title was changed to Princeton Review. Since it is listed in Union List of Serials as Princeton Review, it will, hereafter, be cited as PR.

Philosophical Background

When John Witherspoon (1723-1794) arrived to take over the presidency of the College of New Jersey (1768), he introduced the Scottish realism of Thomas Reid (1710-1796). The impetus to idealism given by Jonathan Edwards was stopped,[2] and Scottish realism was to dominate the American academic world for about a century as it also came to be taught at Harvard, Yale, and Andover.[3]

Hodge's mentor in theology, Archibald Alexander, had studied in none of these schools, but his teacher, the Rev. William Graham, had studied at the College of New Jersey. Thus Alexander used the same textbooks as were used at Princeton and studied the lectures of Dr.

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[1] A. Hodge, pp. 249-251.

[2] James Leon McAllister, "The Nature of Religious Knowledge in the Theology of Charles Hodge" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1957), p. 116.

[3] Sidney Ahlstrom, "Scottish Philosophy and American Theology," Church History, XXIV (September, 1955), pp. 262-265.

Witherspoon.[1] Later Alexander wrote Outlines of Moral Science of which Hodge thought highly, but Ahlstrom wrote that a reader who was ignorant of the background of its author "would assume . . . that it was written, perhaps, by some mild English Latitudinarian bent on mediating the views of Butler, Reid, and Price."[2] Through Alexander and through his own study of Witherspoon's lectures in Moral Philosophy in college,[3] it is apparent that Hodge had early contact with the principles of Scottish philosophy which he later used to support and explain his theology.

When Hodge was in Germany, Tholuck told him of the blighting effects of rationalism on theology and on the appreciation and interpretation of the Scriptures when the dictates of reason, though considered in harmony with the teaching of the Scriptures, were believed to be so much more firmly established than Scripture that reason ultimately determines what Scripture can teach.[4] Their discussion of the current systems of pantheism revealed that:

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[1] James Waddel Alexander, The Life of Archibald Alexander (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1854), pp. 23, 108.

[2] Ahlstrom, p. 266.

[3] A. Hodge, p. 23.

[4] Ibid., p. 136.

> Hegel and Schleiermacher both deny the personality of the Deity and the individuality of the soul of man. The universal principle with them is God, and, according to Hegel, the world itself is the Realität of the Deity, and all that it contains, the different races of men, and the animals in their various orders, are all modes of existence of this one universal principle.[1]

Tholuck, however, felt that the pantheistic philosophy, especially that of Schleiermacher, was doing much good because it led men to entertain "deep religious feelings."[2] Hodge believed that he could detect much of this same philosophizing spirit in Tholuck himself.[3]

On his return from Europe, Hodge gave his "Introductory Lecture" to the students of the seminary in which they were warned of the dangers of "indulgence in metaphysical speculation on divine things" because it deadens the delicate sensibility of the soul to moral truth.[4] Throughout his life he remained sensitive to the dangers of speculation in others but seemed to have been unaware of the effects that philosophy was having upon his own theology. Somehow he felt that his philosophy was based upon the Scriptures.[1] William Paxton, his former student and professor of homiletics at Princeton, probably reflected Hodge's attitude when he wrote of him: "He did not teach a philosophy, but a theology. Neither his system as a whole, or any part of it, was based upon philosophical principles apart from the Word of God."[2] Paxton continued:

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 119.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 120.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 119.

[4] Charles Hodge, "Introductory Lecture," _PR_, I (January, 1829), 96.

> There was nothing in science or philosophy which he did not strive to master, . . . [He could exhibit] the hollow pretenses of every philosophy, falsely so-called. It was just because of this mastery that he was able to keep philosophy in its proper place. He never sought to ally it with Gospel truth. Every student remembers, . . . with what a simple confidence, he rested upon the Word of God for every proof, and that he never asked us to accept any one point of doctrine simply on the ground of rational demonstration. He was not a rationalist in any sense of the word. His sole authority for everything was the teaching of Scriptures.[3]

While Hodge tended to be non-speculative, and tried to avoid going beyond the Scriptures or the creeds of the church, he rested heavily upon philosophy for arguments to support many of the doctrines in theology which, he felt, the Scriptures taught.

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[1] Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: William B. Erdmans Publishing Co., n.d.) I, 14. The three volumes of this work were originally published from 1871-73 and will, hereafter, be cited as ST.

[2] A. Hodge, p. 594, letter from William Paxton.

[3] *Ibid*., pp. 594-95.

The first part of this section has shown Hodge's philosophical heritage in Scottish philosophy. McAllister in his careful work has shown that Charles Hodge was dependent on the philosophy of Thomas Reid at several crucial points.[1] Convinced, in opposition to Hume's skepticism, that man did have knowledge, Reid based his epistemology on the supposition that God had so constituted the universe that it has a rational structure which corresponds with the structure of the human mind. Man is so created that he is able to know immediately and intuitively the primary qualities of objects and the first principles of all knowledge.[2] This gave rise to a long list of first principles which are known intuitively and about which there could be no dispute.[3]

Hodge followed the same line of thought in holding that there are three kinds of intuitive knowledge:

> Our senses give us immediate knowledge of their appropriate objects; the understanding perceives

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[1] McAllister, pp. 59, 98.

[2] Ibid., pp. 112-13.

[3] Ibid., pp. 81-85.

> intuitively primary truths; our moral and aesthetic nature gives us the immediate cognition of things right or wrong, and beautiful or deformed.[1]

Hodge followed Reid in holding to the following propositions as intuitive first principles: that there is duality of subject and object in the intellectual apprehension of truth;[2] that every effect has an efficient cause; "that design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred, with certainty, from marks or signs of it in the effect"[3] and that a man may have "a clear and certain knowledge of the operation of his own mind."[4] Hodge extended these intuitive truths of reason to the existence of God, to his providence, and to the immortality of the soul.[5] All of these: the intuitions of the reason, the a priori judgments of the moral nature, and the immediate apprehensions of the religious consciousness are, Hodge affirmed, "absolutely infallible and of paramount authority."[6]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, I, 393.

[2] McAllister, p. 113; C. Hodge, ST, I, 393; II, 43.

[3] McAllister, p. 85; cf. C. Hodge, ST, I, 216.

[4] McAllister, p. 60.

[5] C. Hodge, ST, II, 10.

[6] Ibid., III, 697.

The criteria for these first principles or intuitions are universality and necessity. Reid held that they are "commonly, because necessarily, acknowledged by all mature men of understanding" who, without prejudice, reflect on the operations of their own minds.[1] In both Reid and Hodge, there was a tendency for these criteria to degenerate into the determination of first principles by majority vote. In Hodge this is indicated by his frequent assertions concerning "commonly acknowledged teachings of mankind" and "common doctrines of the church." For example, he held that belief in God is the common opinion of all ages because all languages have some name for God.[2] Frequently he claimed universality for a doctrine when this was far from the truth. When others denied first principles, he held this to be due to the influence of some metaphysical theory upon their thinking, but Hodge was confident that, when the speculative reasons for their disbelief were absent from their minds, they would of necessity revert to their original and natural convictions.[3]

"Universality and necessity," Hodge's criteria of first principles, are so difficult to control that they are readily extended far beyond their proper limits. The Scottish philosophical concepts of intuitional knowledge, its dualism and its criteria of truth form philosophical foundations of Hodge's epistemology, and with it he was able to assert very high claims for man's natural knowledge of God.[1] While being very sensitive to the influence on theology of German philosophy, whether rationalistic or pantheistic, Hodge did not seem concerned about the influence of his own inherited Scottish common-sense philosophy upon the development of his theology. Probably this was because Christian theology had long been interpreted in the light of a dualism of mind and matter.

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[1] McAllister, pp. 115-116.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, I, 196.

[3] Ibid., p. 198.

Arguments for the immortality of the soul had been largely adapted from Platonic or Neo-Platonic thought and were reinforced by Cartesian metaphysical dualism. As these were held as integral parts of Christian doctrine in the nineteenth century, they were not new to Hodge or his contemporaries. Hodge was not sensitive to this type of philosophical influence on doctrines which had long been incorporated into the body of Christian theology, but he was sensitive to innovations in theology which were brought about by change in the philosophical climate.

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[1] McAllister, pp. 67, 289.

In Europe Hodge had become aware of the effects of a rationalism which eliminated biblical doctrines which are not conformable to reason. To avoid this danger he insisted that some doctrinal problems, such as those of free will and predestination, cannot be resolved by the theologian. If either doctrine is taught in Scripture, then, according to Hodge, it may not be denied because of rational difficulties, but is to be accepted.

While he denied the right of rationalism to excise any Christian doctrine, he was willing to accept its help when it came to developing rational support for traditionally held Christian doctrines. It was in this area that Scottish philosophy had the most influence on Hodge. By means of its epistemology of intuitions or first principles, he sought to provide rational grounds for support of the doctrines which he believed to be taught by natural theology as well as by Scripture. In his case it was not a matter of eliminating Christian doctrines because they lacked rational support, but of developing extra-biblical evidence from man's reason and moral nature for support of certain doctrines. Because Hodge believed that such an effort was a contribution rather than a threat to Christian theology, he did not hesitate to make use of Scottish common-sense philosophy.

Theological Background

Hodge's religious background was strongly influenced by the Great Awakening. Not only had the local church of his youth been founded to support that revival but the College of New Jersey had grown out of it. Hodge himself dated his conversion from a revival that had occurred among the students of the college.[1] His theological professor, Archibald Alexander, had in his younger days been a revivalistic preacher in the mountains of Virginia. When Alexander began his work as the first professor of Princeton Seminary, he could find no text in English which suited him, so he used the Latin Institutes of Francis Turrettin.[2] He did not, however, bind himself to the text but encouraged his students to original investigation by assigning them topics on which to report. As a student Charles Hodge had gone through this discipline and then, after teaching exegesis and biblical literature for twenty years, had himself used Turrettin for thirty years until his own Systematic Theology was published.

Although Hodge claimed to stand in the Augustinian tradition, his intellectualistic conception of faith has more in common with Turrettin's scholastic rationalism than with Augustinian voluntarism.[1] Hodge's understanding of the representative headship of Adam (federal theology) led him to reject the realistic theory which Augustine held.[2] His memorization of the seventeenth century Westminster catechism and his study of Turrettin, both as a student and teacher, gave him his theology. At the fiftieth anniversary of his professorship, he proudly claimed that the professors at Princeton never originated a new idea to be added to this theology.[3] He did, however, use his logical powers to systematize it and to defend it from competing theologies. By the use of Scottish realism, he was able to give it a broader philosophical and epistemological basis with which to defend it against skepticism and other secular challenges.[4] This brought into his theology, as one Calvinist critic has put it, "the stains of Humanism,"[5] and it made his conception of natural theology that of Reid rather than Calvin.[6]

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[1] A. A. Hodge, pp. 7-10, 30.

[2] J. W. Alexander, p. 368.

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[1] McAllister, p. 245.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, II, 163-64.

[3] A. A. Hodge, p. 521.

[4] McAllister, p. 358.

[5] Ralph John Danhof, Charles Hodge as a Dogmatician (Goes, Netherlands: Oosterbaan and Lecointre, [ca. 1930], p. 192.

[6] Ahlstrom, p. 266.

Theological Method

Charles Hodge recognized the crucial importance of method in the development of any science. Science, he held, is more than knowledge or even than the orderly arrangement of the facts. For science to be achieved, the laws which determine the facts must be understood so that the facts can be seen in their causal relations. Because theology is, to Hodge, a science, it must include more than mere knowledge of facts but "must embrace an exhibition of the internal relation of those facts, one to another, and each to all."[1]

The methods of science are classified under two broad categories, the a priori which argues from cause to effect, and the a posteriori which argues from effect to cause.[2] Hodge, who had nothing but praise for Francis Bacon, obviously preferred the latter method. While various methods have been used in the sciences, there are three general methods which, according to Hodge, have been applied to theology.

The first is the speculative method under which Hodge included the deist, the rationalist, the dogmatist, and the transcendentalist. The first two were rejected because they accept no source of theological knowledge outside of the nature and structure of the human mind.[1] Although the dogmatist may accept supernatural revelation as contained in the Bible, he seeks to reconcile the scriptural doctrines with reason, to reduce them to the forms of some philosophical system, and to "rest their authority on rational evidence."[2] This method, in so far as it is successful, changes faith into knowledge, modifies the biblical doctrines, and leads men to accept them on the authority of reason rather than on that of God.[3] In spite of his awareness of the dangers, Hodge himself came perilously close to this very method of which he was so critical.

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, I, 1.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 3.

Although Hodge realized that the transcendentalists' view of reason differed from the rationalists, he still held that they were guilty of using the speculative method because they admitted as authoritative revelation only what is found in man and in the history of the race. He classed the theological followers of Schelling and Hegel in this group.[4]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, I, 4.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 5.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 6.

Hodge's second general class included the mystical method which he divided into the natural and supernatural forms. In the former, the natural religious consciousness of men is the source of religious knowledge. The latter holds that God or his Spirit enters into communion with the soul and, through the excitement of religious feelings, gives it intuitions of truths available in no other way. If this meant that the illuminating influence of the Holy Spirit "gives believers a knowledge of the truths objectively revealed in the Scriptures which is peculiar, certain, and saving," then Hodge would admit the method, but he felt that those who held it intended an immediate communication of God to the soul apart from the Scripture.[1] This, Hodge rejected, because he believed the source of religious knowledge to be the Holy Scripture.

Hodge was always wary of any new philosophy for it would often suggest a new theological method which could easily lead to major changes in views of the nature of man, of God, and of his relation to the world. These changes, in turn, could lead to modifications in other doctrines, which could become influential even among those who neither knew nor assented to the new philosophy.[1] He, therefore, felt it his duty to warn the church where he could discern the influence of a philosophy alien to its theology in the religious and philosophical literature of his day.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 7.

To the theological method that he favored, Hodge gave the rather surprising title "inductive" because he believed that, in everything essential, it agreed with the inductive method as applied to the natural sciences.[2] By drawing parallels between his method and that of science he perhaps captured for his method some of the prestige which the natural sciences had been building for themselves since the time of Bacon and Newton. Reid and the Scottish realists had extended the method from the physical to the mental world,[3] and now Hodge extended it to theology.

The theologian like the scientist assumes the trustworthiness of his sense perceptions, his mental operations, and innate truths, such as causality, which are given in the constitution of man's nature.[4] The theologian also accepts some first principles which have no direct application to the natural sciences but are directly involved in the moral realm. Examples of such truths which Hodge gave are "the essential distinction between right and wrong; that nothing contrary to virtue can be enjoined by God; that it cannot be right to do evil that good may come; that sin deserves punishment, . . ."[1] Hodge warned that only those propositions may be considered as first truths or laws of belief which meet the criteria of universality and necessity. Here we see Hodge's dependence upon Scottish realism for the concept of first principles and its criteria.

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[1] C. Hodge, "Inspiration," PR, XXIX (October, 1857), 687.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, I, 9.

[3] Thomas Reid, The Philosophy of Thomas Reid as contained in the "Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense", ed. E. Hershey Sneath (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1892), p. 72.

[4] C. Hodge, ST, I, 9.

As it is the task of the natural scientist to examine the facts of nature and to ascertain the laws which determine them, so, according to Hodge, it is the task of the biblical theologian to ascertain and state all the facts in the Bible, and that of the systematic theologian to collect these facts and to determine their relation to each other and to other cognate truths, as well as to vindicate them and show their harmony and consistency. All the facts which God has revealed concerning himself and his relation to man, whether or not they are revealed in nature or in the constitution of man, are also contained and authenticated in Scripture. Since Hodge was aware of the danger of attributing to the teaching of the Spirit one's own opinions, these must be tested by Scripture so that the Bible becomes, in fact, the norm and standard of all religious experience.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 10.

In developing a doctrine, the content of the whole Bible must be carefully considered, omitting nothing relevant to a given topic. Because religious truths often impinge on the conscience, there is, according to Hodge, a much greater temptation in theology than in ~~science~~ for a person to ignore or pervert unwelcome data in order to avoid their implications. The theologian must, therefore, exercise special care to avoid such results by considering *all* the relevant data.[2] Thus Hodge is opposed to the selection of proof texts to support a doctrine while ignoring relevant portions of Scripture which tend to negate it.

Once the data have been collected, in theology as in natural science, Hodge insisted that the principles should be derived from the facts and not impressed upon them. It is the peculiar temptation of the theologian who accepts the authority of the Bible to assume a theory and then to explain the facts of Scripture in accordance with that theory. The unbelieving exegete who frankly does not accept the authority of Scripture may, according to Hodge, be able to present the teaching of an Old Testament prophet or an apostle more faithfully than the theologian who accepts as binding the authority of Scripture. The latter is more subject to the temptation of forcing the data of Scripture into line with his preconceived doctrines.[1]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 11.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 12.

Because of this ever-present danger, Hodge drew a sharp line between facts and theories. Facts, whether natural or revealed, are determined by the wisdom and will of God. Theories are only human speculations, which can have only the authority of their own inherent probability.[2] Since the facts of Scripture are God-given, the Christian is bound both by the facts and by what he himself infers from them. However, such inferences and interpretations, as distinct from facts, have, according to Hodge, no binding effect on others who do not so interpret them.[3]

The theologian, according to Hodge, ought to derive his philosophy from the Bible rather than following the dogmatic method of explaining the Bible by a philosophy derived from another source. He should take the facts of the Bible, see what principles they imply and what philosophy underlies them, rather than force the facts of Scripture into the mould formed by the theories derived from his philosophy.[1]

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 14.

[2] C. Hodge, _ST_, I, 57.

[3] A. Hodge, pp. 447-48.

While this view of Hodge's may be commendable in that it warns the theologian of the danger of forcing the biblical data into the procrustean bed of theories provided by his own philosophy, the insistence that he has no philosophy of his own but has discovered the philosophy of the Bible could, it seems to the writer, so blind the theologian as to lead him into the very trap that Hodge is warning him to avoid. Whether or not one has ever studied philosophy, he still has a philosophy, inconsistent though it be, unconsciously impressed upon him by his family, his religious, and educational background. Because he lacks formal training in philosophy, he is likely to think that he uses no philosophy as he interprets the Scripture. This tempts him to feel superior to others who frankly use a philosophy in their hermeneutics. If he claims, instead, to have discovered the philosophy of the Bible, the results are similar. Whatever philosophy can be discovered in Scripture will, at best, be a truncated one which will have to be completed from external sources. It would seem preferable to this writer for the theologian to admit openly that he has a philosophy while, at the same time, being careful to preserve the doctrines of Scripture. This would make it easier for him and others to evaluate his work in order to determine the influence of his philosophy.

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, I, 14.

In comparing theology with science and in calling the method of both "inductive" in that the one gathers all the data of Scripture relevant to a certain topic and the latter gathers all the data of nature relevant to a certain subject, Hodge failed to make distinction between the kind of data found in Scripture and that sought by science. In criticism of Hodge, it should be noted that while Scriptural data are propositional, the data of nature are not. Nature must be observed, judgments made, and propositions stated. When studying Scripture, while in a sense one must observe the printed page in order to get the data, yet the propositions are already there, formulated by another mind, as they are not in nature. Logical deductions can be made from Scriptural propositions in order to determine what was intended by the author, whereas this can never be done with the raw facts of nature. On the other hand, if the materials of theology had their source in religious consciousness, as they do for the mystical method which Hodge rejects, then there would be a far more significant similarity.[1] As it is, there seems to be no more similarity between natural science and theology than there is between science and a careful study of the writings of some historical character in order to determine his views on various subjects.

The term "inductive," however, does emphasize the need of thoroughness, of considering all relevant data which are necessary both for theology and natural science, and, thus, it stands as a contrast with those who seek to prove doctrines by using one or more proof-texts apart from context and by ignoring or distorting others which seem to militate against their preconceived doctrine.

The method also points to the need of making a clear distinction between facts and interpretations in the study of Scripture, and would, if followed, render it less tempting for the theologian to be dogmatic in his interpretation. He could then hardly claim for his own conclusions the same authority which is due to Scripture itself.

Calling theology an "inductive science" appears to be a striking, but not very accurate, way of calling attention to these parallels between theology and natural science. It perhaps gained for Hodge's theology some of the prestige which natural science had been developing since the seventeenth century.

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[1] Harold K. Schilling, "On Relating Science and Religion," The Christian Scholar, XLI (September, 1958), 375-395, passim.

On the other hand, there seems to be no very distinctive difference between Hodge's method and that of other biblical theologians. Perhaps he was more dependent on Scottish philosophy than others for his epistemology, metaphysics, and natural theology, but he was no less dogmatic but held even more firmly to the Westminster confession than did most of his contemporaries. These characteristics, however, would hardly make his method inductive where others were not.[1]

Knowledge of God

"God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth." This statement from the Westminster Catechism, Hodge believed, was the best definition of God ever penned by man.[2]

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[1] In his review of Systematic Theology, Henry B. Smith wrote that though Hodge followed the inductive method in the gathering of his materials, yet the ordering of his system was deductive rather than inductive. The Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review, I (April, 1872) 397. Hereafter this periodical will be cited as PQ and PR.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, I, 367.

In the nineteenth century this view of God was being challenged by many of the great names in philosophy who followed in the wake of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Some felt that the orthodox ideas about God were anthropomorphic and that the true nature of God was so exalted as to be beyond the grasp of the mind of man and, hence, unknowable to him. In opposition to Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856) and Henry L. Mansel (1820-71) who took such a position, Hodge wrote the article, "Can God Be Known?"[1] in which he acknowledged some truth in their position while still claiming an extensive knowledge of God. For Hodge, God is inconceivable in the sense that any form of infinitude is inconceivable. God is incomprehensible, for to comprehend is to know all that can be known about an object, its essence, all its attributes, and its relations to all other objects. According to Hodge, man does not know God's essence, all his attributes, nor all his relations to others. Even man's knowledge of what is revealed concerning God is partial and inadequate. But man does know that God knows, acts, feels, loves, pities, is merciful and gracious, and that he hates sin.[2] According to

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[1] Charles Hodge, "Can God Be Known?" PR, XXXVI (January, 1864), 122-152.

[2] *Ibid*., pp. 141-42.

Hodge, we form our idea of God "by attributing to him the perfections of our own nature without limitations, and in an infinite degree."[1] By doing this, he wrote:

> We attain a definite and correct knowledge of what God is; while we admit there is in him infinitely more than we know anything about; and while we are duly sensible that our ideas or apprehensions of what we do know are partial and inadequate, we are, nevertheless, assured that our knowledge within its limits is true knowledge; it answers to what God really is.[2]

Hodge justified this approach to the knowledge of God by claiming as a fundamental principle of all religion that "we are his children. He is the Father of spirits; we are of the same generic nature with him; we are created in his image; we are, therefore, like him, and he is like us."[3] This is anthropomorphism, a term which, he recognized has often been used in a bad sense, but as here explained, he claimed that "it expresses the doctrine of the church in all ages, and of the great mass of mankind."[4]

Hodge believed that the Scriptures support the conclusions of this approach to the knowledge of God. They declare that God is a spirit, a self-conscious, voluntary person with moral excellence of absolute perfection; that

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 145.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] *Ibid*.

> He is the Elohim; the Mighty One; the Holy One; the Omnipresent Spirit. He knows all things. He is the Maker; the Preserver; the Governor of all things. He is our Father; the Hearer of Prayer; the Giver of all good. . . . He is our Ruler, our Father, with whom we can have communion. . . . This sublime exhibition of God in his own nature and in his relation to us, is not a delusion. It is not mere regulative truth, or it would be mockery. It makes God known to us as he really is. We know God, although no creature can understand the Almighty unto perfection.[1]

Hodge held that belief in the existence of God is intuitive in that such belief is universal and necessary. It is universal in the sense that all men do believe that there is a God. It is necessary in that no man can possibly disbelieve his existence.[2] There are three kinds of necessity: logical necessity, truths concerning material or external things which have the power of constraining belief, and truths which cannot be denied without doing violence to the laws of our nature. That some men do, in fact, deny these "necessary truths" did not deter him from such strong assertions, for Hodge believed that such denial is forced and can be only temporary.

> Under the control of a metaphysical theory, a man may deny the existence of the external

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 151.

[2] C. Hodge, *ST*, I, 194.

> world, or the obligation of the moral law; and his disbelief may be sincere, and for a time persistent; but the moment the speculative reasons for his disbelief are absent from his mind, it of necessity reverts to its original and natural convictions. . . . So it is possible that the moral nature of a man may be so disorganized by vice or by a false philosophy as to have its testimony for the existence of God effectually silenced.[1]

Because of this threat, Hodge saw value in the use of the theistic arguments. They enable man to resist the temptation, due to his corrupt moral state, of denying the existence of a holy and just God and to frustrate constant efforts to pervert or contradict the testimony of man's nature to such a God.[2] In his opinion these arguments had received much criticism due to a misunderstanding of their purpose. No one of them is intended to prove the whole doctrine. He held that the cosmological argument proves only the existence of an eternal self-existing Being, but it fails to prove that this Being is either supramundane or personal. The teleological argument, which will be considered in connection with Darwinism, Hodge believed, proves that God is an intelligent voluntary agent, that is, a person.[1] Under the moral or anthropological proof he argued from the existence of mind in man to the existence of "the Father of spirits."[2] From the nature of the soul he argued to the Being who satisfied the necessities and cravings of the soul.[3] Man's sense of responsibility due to his moral nature demands a Being to whom he is responsible. Hodge pointed out that even Kant admitted that "our nature forces us to believe that He is, and that He is a person."[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 198.

[2] Ibid., p. 234.

Relation of God to Natural Law

Hodge held to the classical distinction between the _potentia absoluta_ and the _potentia ordinata_ of God. _Potentia absoluta_ is the efficiency of God as exercised without the use of second causes. _Potentia ordinata_ is the efficiency of God as exercised uniformly in the ordered operation of second causes.[1] By the former, God causes creation, miracles, immediate revelation, inspiration, and regeneration. In the beginning God created the substance of the world ex nihilo, an act which was neither metaphysically nor morally necessary but one done out of perfect freedom.[2] The world was not formed from any pre-existent substance nor out of the substance of God. On the basis of Genesis 1, Hodge made a distinction between this immediate instantaneous creation ex nihilo and the mediate gradual creation in which "the power of God working in union with second causes"[3] used the previously created matter to bring the universe into the desired form.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 227.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 235.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 237.

[4] _Ibid_., p. 239. McAllister writes that "Hodge did not mention Kant in connection with these arguments" (p. 148, n. 82). While it is true that he did not really grapple with Kant, Hodge did recognize that Kant held "that the law of cause and effect is only in our minds. Men view things in that relation; but they have no assurance that the relation holds in the world outside of themselves" (C. Hodge, _ST_, I, 210; cf. I, 228).

Hodge differed from the deists by holding that after creation had been completed, God continued to work in the preservation and government of his creation by means of his potentia ordinata. The universe is such that it cannot continue in being of itself and would cease to exist if unsupported by such power. This applies both to the substance and its form, to its essence, qualities, properties and powers and to all individual living creatures, for these are not held in existence by an inherent principle of life but by the will of God.[1]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, I, 410.

[2] Ibid., pp. 553-56.

[3] Ibid., p. 557.

The deistic idea that God determined all things according to the laws which he impressed upon them from the beginning without his continued intervention was rejected by Hodge as doing violence to the Scriptural teaching that God is everywhere present in his essence, knowledge, and power.[2] It denies "the instinctive religious convictions of all men" whether they love and trust him or fear him because they recognize him as active and present everywhere.[3]

All created beings, Hodge held, owe their contiued existence along with their properties and powers to the will of God. This work of God is called preservation, but it is not to be considered as continued creation, which makes the divine efficiency the same in both creation and preservation. It also destroys all continuity of existence, the existence of second causes, and all evidence of the existence of an external world and, if accepted, would lead to Pantheism of which Hodge had great fear. For Hodge, the doctrine of continuous creation would make God rather than man responsible for sin or else eliminate altogether the concept of sin.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 574.

[2] Ibid., p. 576.

[3] Ibid., p. 577.

Not only does God preserve the world in existence but, according to Hodge, he also governs it for some great end and many subordinate ends. To achieve his purposes, God controls the sequence of events. He governs the material world according to fixed laws, irrational animals according to instincts, and man according to his rational nature.[2]

Hodge rejected both the theory of divine government which sees the world as a machine operated by natural law and the opposite one of absolute dependence on God which views God as the only cause.[3] He also rejected the view that would eliminate all physical forces by giving to some mind, whether of God or of man, all power of producing effects.[4] The doctrine of pre-established harmony was opposed by Hodge because it violates the facts of consciousness.[5]

Hodge next considered the classical doctrine of concursus, which was, to a greater or lesser extent, adopted by most theologians from Augustine through the Remonstrants. Holding that no created being can initiate action, it assumes:

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[1] _Ibid_., pp. 578-580.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 582.

[3] _Ibid_., pp. 591-92.

[4] _Ibid_., p. 595.

[5] _Ibid_., p. 597.

> (1) That God gives to second causes the power of acting.
> (2) That He preserves them in being and vigour.
> (3) That He excites and determines second causes to act.
> (4) That He directs and governs them to the predetermined end.[1]

While this doctrine preserves many important truths, its difficulty in reconciling God's co-operation in sin with his holiness leads, in Hodge's opinion, to the definition of sin as mere defect, as lack of conformity to the moral law which "requires not an efficient, but only a deficient cause."[2] He also objected to the doctrine because the denial that any creature can originate action contradicts man's consciousness that he himself is a free agent. The doctrine, Hodge contended, tries to explain the inexplicable and raises many perplexing metaphysical questions, but it does not teach anything which we do not know already.[3]

As an alternative to these views, Hodge presented what he believed to be the Scriptural doctrine of God's providence. There is an external material universe. Matter is not merely a force but a substance which has properties or forces which are the proximate causes of physical changes. These physical forces--called "laws of nature"--"act of necessity, blindly, and uniformly"[1] over all regions of space and time. God has endowed nature with these uniform forces, but he is independent of them and can change or suspend them as he wishes. Although he can operate with or without them, he disregards them only to accomplish some higher purpose as, for example, in the case of miracles. Ordinarily he works with and through the laws of nature much as man does. Although the laws of nature are blind and can achieve nothing suggesting purpose or design, God, who knows them far better than man, can use them to produce definite and intended results for his special providential care over man.[2] God extends his providential care over physical nature, over such apparently accidental events as the falling of the lot or the flight of an arrow, over animals, nations, and even over the free acts of men.[3]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 600.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 602.

[3] *Ibid*., pp. 604-605.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 606-7.

[2] Ibid., p. 608.

[3] Ibid., pp. 587-89.

Science and Theology

Our discussion of Hodge's theological method revealed that he thought so highly of the empirical inductive method of natural science that he drew an extended analogy between the two. In reading many articles and reviews in the Princeton Review, it was discovered that, though Hodge and his colleagues were very critical of many movements, they had nothing but praise for the work of Francis Bacon (1561-1626). They also had a high regard for Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) and critized him only at a point or so where they felt that he fell short of the ideal of the method presented by Bacon. Hodge and other religious leaders of the nineteenth century had a favorable attitude toward science in general because they were confident that it was a valuable and effective ally to religion, and that, since the book of nature and the book of revelation alike were of divine origin, they would, when properly interpreted, be in harmony with each other.[1]

According to its etymology, science means knowledge, but Hodge held that usage had limited its meaning first to the causes and relations of facts and phenomena and then to the knowledge of the facts of the external world and their relations. Science, he concluded, is "the ordered knowledge of the phenomena which we recognize through the senses. A scientific fact is a fact perceived by the senses."[1]

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[1] John A. DeJong, "American Attitudes Toward Evolution Before Darwin," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1962), p. 10.

Although tension has existed between theology and philosophy from the time it left its native soil of Judea, the best known early conflict with theology began when Copernicus (1473-1543), a Polish Roman Catholic cannon, published a book in 1543 advocating the heliocentric model of the solar system in opposition to the Ptolemaic geocentric one which, as a modification of Aristotle's view, had won acceptance in Christendom. The controversy flared up when the theory was advocated by Galileo, and the book was put on the Index in 1616 where it remained until 1757.[1]

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[1] Charles Hodge, What Is Darwinism? (New York: Scribner, Armstrong and Co., 1874), p. 127. Kenneth Paul Berg, in "Charles A. Hodge, Controversialist" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1952), p. 195, quotes from the next page of this book as follows: "If science be the knowledge of the facts perceived by the senses, and scientific evidence, evidence addressed to the senses, then the senses are the only sources of knowledge." On the basis of this he asserts that Hodge "presupposed that since men of science accept only certain visible phenomena that they must of necessity reject the conclusive aspects of the philosophical. The inaccuracy of this Hodgian premise is obvious" (Ibid., p. 196). A careful examination of the discussion of this passage reveals that Hodge was asserting only the tendency, not the necessity, of men involved in scientific investigation to become reductionistic in their epistemology. When they do so, they may deny the existence of God, of the mind and even of the self, but he insisted that the great majority of men, scientists as well as others, are so controlled by "the laws of their nature, that they cannot go to this extreme" (C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 129). To Hodge, then, for scientists to limit the sources of knowledge to the senses was not a necessary result but only an unfortunate tendency resulting from intense concentration on empirical studies.

While the attitudes taken toward the new theory by Luther[2] and Calvin[3] are still a matter of debate, Francis

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[1] Andrew D. White, A History of The Warfare of Science and Theology in Christendom, (New York: George Braziller, 1955), I, 137-38, 155.

[2] John Dillenberger, in Protestant Thought and Natural Science (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1960), p. 37, points out that Luther's apparent rejection of Copernicus, "The fool would upset the whole art of astronomy," is complicated by the fact that it is not from Luther's writings but from one of his students who took notes about conversations at the dinner table. William Norlind, in "Copernicus and Luther: A Critical Study," Isis, XLIV (1953), 276, considers the phrase, "The fool . . ." to be an interpolation.

[3] Edward Rosen, in "Calvin's Attitude toward Copernicus," Journal of The History of Ideas, XX (July-September, 1960), 431-441, traces the source of an alleged quote from Calvin, "Who will venture to place the authority of Copernicus above that of the Holy Spirit?" found in both Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 528, and in White, p. 127. Rosen concludes that "Calvin never demolished, condemned, rejected, opposed, or stigmatized as an utter reprobate the quiet thinker who founded modern astronomy" (p. 441). Dillenberger writes, "I have been unable to find the passage in Calvin and doubt that it exists" (p. 39, footnote).

Turrettin (d. 1687) argued against the theory because it contradicted reason and his interpretation of Scripture.[1] Although the theory was generally accepted in Hodge's day, he mentioned an elderly relative who would not believe that the earth moved because it was contrary both to biblical authority and to his own observation.[2]

Hodge used this conflict to show how foolish it was for the theologian needlessly to oppose the teachings of science. According to him, the Church had vainly resisted the adoption of the Copernican theory of astronomy by taking their stand on the received Biblical interpretation which had been guided by the Ptolemaic theory. In so doing, they had staked the authority of the Bible on the correctness of the geocentric theory. When the heliocentric theory of the solar system was proven to be true, the interpretations of Scripture which had been made under the guidance of the older view had to be discarded. In spite of this, Hodge believed that the authority of the Bible had received no injury, but he felt that theologians had been taught the important lesson "to let science take its course, assured that Scriptures will accommodate themselves to all well-authenticated scientific facts in time to come, as they have in time past."[1]

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[1] Albert Barnes, Evidences of Christianity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1868), p. 106.

[2] A.A. Hodge, p. 4.

To avoid or to minimize conflicts between science and theology, Hodge urged his theology students to do two things. First, they should recognize that a man's interpretation of Scripture is inevitably influenced by his views of the subject under consideration.[2] Second, they should make a clear distinction between the facts of science and the theories which are advanced to explain and interpret those facts.[3] As long as men believed that the earth was the fixed center of the solar system with the daily revolution of the sun and stars, Hodge pointed out, they could be expected to interpret the Bible accordingly.[4] When a new theory is presented, the theologian, rather than quickly accepting it, should first seek to evaluate the evidence for its truth and to understand its implications. Thus after Galileo (1564-1642) had discovered the motion of the earth, the church was right, according to Hodge, "in not yielding at once to the evidence of an experiment which it did not understand."[1] However, after science had clearly established the facts, he felt that the church should have followed science in accepting the heliocentric theory and should have used it to reinterpret the Bible. The fact that the church is forced to modify her interpretation of the Bible in order "to accomodate the discoveries of science" need not, Hodge insisted, do any violence to the Scriptures nor in any degree impair its authority, but he acknowledged that such change "cannot be effected without a struggle."[2]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, I, 57.

[2] Ibid., p. 573.

[3] Ibid., p. 57; Charles Hodge, "Unity of Mankind," PR, XXXI (January, 1859), 106.

[4] C. Hodge, ST, I, 573.

While Hodge recognized the influence of theories on the interpretation of the Scriptures and accepted the heliocentric theory as the replacement for the geocentric theory as a guide in its reinterpretation, this task had been accomplished and accepted before Hodge received his education. It was for him a historical study from which he might learn, but he personally had never experienced the transition from one astronomy to another. When it came to accepting and using a new theory on the origin of the universe as a guide to interpret the Scriptures, he was far more cautious.

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[1] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 132.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, I, 573.

Pierre Laplace (1749-1827) had developed the nebular hypothesis to explain the origin of the universe without assuming the existence of God. This theory had been so modified by some theists that it could be used to describe the mode God had used in creation. According to this modification, God had intended to produce a universe such as we see around us but, instead of using his absolute power to create the finished product, he merely created matter with its forces in the form of atoms diffused through-out space. He gave it a rotary motion and then allowed the physical laws to work out the system of the heavens. God is the Maker of this end product just as much as he would have been had he produced it in a moment. Since this theory was, in Hodge's opinion, merely a hypothesis which had never commanded general assent among scientists, it could claim no authority as a norm for Scriptural interpretation.[1]

Throughout his writings Hodge appeared quite reluctant to accept new or controversial theories of science, yet, by suggesting the principle that when a theory or hypothesis receives the general assent of scientists, it becomes a legitimate guide in the interpretation of the Bible, he did leave the way open to such usage when any theory receives general assent or when a theologian becomes convinced of its truth.

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[1] Ibid., p. 558.

For Hodge there could be no conflict between the facts of Scripture and the facts of science because both are produced by God and to deny either is to deny what God affirms. The Scriptures, therefore, must be interpreted under the guidance of the established facts of science.[1] On the other hand, since scientific opinion as to what are the facts varies from age to age, from country to country, and often from scientist to scientist, Hodge held that the theologian has the right to demand that alleged facts "be verified beyond the possibility of doubt"[2] if they are to be used as a guide to modify the interpretation of Scripture or the doctrines of the church.

Because facts play such an important role in the interpretation of Scripture, Hodge made two requests of the scientists in the interests of harmony between science and theology. First, they should be "cautious in announcing facts even apparently hostile to the generally received sense of Scripture."[1] Second, they "should not propound theories framed in view of scientific facts alone, while they overlook facts of religion."[2]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, I, 57; PR, XXXI (January, 1859), 106.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, I, 57.

Although he gave to the heliocentric theory the same rights that he gave to facts, theories in general had, for Hodge, a much lower status. Theories are only human speculations which are constantly changing. As they have no binding authority, the theologian need not bow to them, as he must to facts, in the interpretation of Scripture.[3] Instead he has the right to judge for himself the validity of the scientific arguments and to compare the theories of different scientists to see whether they support or contradict each other.[4] Needless to say, Hodge frequently exercised these rights.

While Hodge criticized the tendency of scientists to ignore the distinction between facts and theories when they gave the name of science to their theories as well as to the facts,[5] he also criticized the theologian who, because of this liberty to reject theories, claimed that theology is independent of the facts of science.[1]

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[1] C. Hodge, PR, XXXI (January, 1859), 106.

[2] Ibid., p. 107.

[3] C. Hodge, ST, I, 57-58; Darwinism, pp. 132-34.

[4] C. Hodge, ST, I, 285; Darwinism, p. 139.

[5] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 134; ST, I, 58.

It is on the basis of this distinction that Hodge handled the relation between science and theology. While he claimed to accept all the facts of astronomy, geology, comparative anatomy, and biology, he felt that he was not bound to receive their scientific explanation.[2]

> If we admit that the human embryo passes through various phases, must we admit that man was once a fish, then a bird, then a dog, then an ape, and finally what he now is? If we admit the similarity of structure in all vertebrates, must we admit the evolution of one from another, and all from a primordial germ? . . . The facts are from God, the explanation from men.[3]

Hodge also attempted to minimize the conflict between science and the Scriptures by enforcing a distinction between the sacred writers and the Scriptures on infallibility. The infallibility resulting from inspiration was "limited to the nature of the object to be accomplished. . . . Infallibility did not become a personal attribute so that the sacred writers could not err in judgment or conduct in the ordinary affairs of life."[4] Inspiration made them infallible only as teachers and when acting as spokesmen for God. Otherwise, they shared the current opinions of their contemporaries on subjects now considered scientific. "To them the heavens were solid, and the earth a plane; the sun moved from east to west over their heads."[1] The crucial question, for Hodge, was not whether the inspired writers were incorrect on their views of science, history, or philosophy but "whether they taught error? For example, it is not the question Whether they thought that the earth is the centre of our system? but, Did they teach that it is?"[2] Hodge held, of course, that they did not so teach.

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, I, 58.

[2] Ibid.

[3] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 132.

[4] C. Hodge, "Inspiration," PR, XXIX (October, 1857), p. 668; cf. ST, I, 165.

As another method of minimizing conflict between science and Scripture, he used the principle that the language of Scripture "is the language of common life . . . founded on apparent, and not upon scientific truth."[3]

These distinctions between theory and fact, between an interpretation of Scripture and the Scripture itself, between common language and scientific language, and between what the sacred writers thought and what they taught,[1] enabled Charles Hodge to develop quite an optimistic view as to the ability of Scripture to maintain its authority in the face of the developments of science. In fact, he used the latter to enhance the divinity of Scripture.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 669.

[2] C. Hodge, _ST_, I, 169.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 170.

Although the Bible was written before the birth of science and touches on all areas of human knowledge, he claimed that "the Bible is found to harmonize with its new discovered wonders. . . . Geology will soon be found side by side with astronomy in obsequiously bearing up the queenly train of God's majestic word."[2] The Bible, of all ancient books, is alone in accord with the new revelations of science.[3] To Hodge it was an unmistakable evidence of the divine origin of the Scriptures for them to be written

> on such a high level that all the mutations of human science take place beneath them without ever coming into collision with their teachings. They could be read by those who believed that the sun moves round the earth, without their convictions being shocked by their statements; and they can be read by us who know that the earth moves round the sun, with the same satisfaction and confidence.[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 170-71.

[2] C. Hodge, *PR*, XXIX (October, 1857), 683.

[3] C. Hodge, *ST*, I, 573.

[4] *Ibid.*, III, 854.

His optimism may seem quite unfounded in view of the developments of the last one hundred years and some of his principles may be open to question. However, the principle that because a man's interpretation is influenced by his world view, a distinction should be made between what the Bible says and its interpretation appears to the writer to be sound. Of course, what a man thinks that the Bible says is itself always an interpretation. Thus, in a real sense, the interpreter cannot get behind the interpretation to what the Bible "really says." On the other hand, an awareness of this principle would tend to loosen the dogmatic hold either of an interpretation guided by an outmoded science, or of one which was quite satisfactory when it was proposed but which raises serious problems as a new scientific view gains acceptance.

The principle that the language of the Bible is not a scientific language but one of common life has been receiving more emphasis along with increased knowledge of the culture of the Hebrews and of surrounding ethnic groups.

The distinction between fact and theory which Hodge made is, it appears, somewhat oversimplified. Geothe (1749-1832) wrote, "Alles Factische ist schon Theorie."[1]

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[1] Goethe, quoted in Bernard Ramm, The Christian View of Science and Scripture (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1955), no pagination on page facing the preface.

Whether the most basic experience, "I see a red color patch," is already an interpretation or theory of one's experience may be debatable. However, "This is a red book" is an attempt to explain experience, i.e., a theory. Hodge would have said that it is a fact. It seems to the writer that there is a hierarchy of interpretations between the most elemental fact such as experiencing a color-patch, and the theories explaining the nature of light as either electromagnetic waves or quanta of energy. To make an either-or dichotomy between fact and theory, as Hodge did, disguises this continuum. In practice, it was not so easy for him to maintain the distinction. Because facts had the right to guide the interpretation of the Bible, Hodge claimed that the theologian should insist that they "be verified beyond the possibility of doubt."[1] On the other hand, as was shown above, he accepted the heliocentric theory as a guide to the interpretation of Scripture. Thus it seems Hodge would grant that if the theologian becomes sufficiently convinced of the truth of either fact or theory, he might use it as a guide to the interpretation of Scripture. Hodge's principle does, however, warn the biblical interpreter who is concerned with its authority not to be too hasty in modifying his interpretation of Scripture in the light of new scientific or philosophic theories.

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, I, 57.

The principle that the theologian should distinguish between what the sacred writers thought or believed and what they taught in Scripture is one that did leave Hodge open to the charge of a mechanical theory of inspiration, a charge that he vigorously denied.[1] It would, however, be incorrect to interpret Hodge as holding that the inspired writers believed one thing while teaching quite another. Rather, he intended to convey the idea that, out of the broad spectrum of beliefs which the prophet or apostle held concerning the content of experience, of verbal report, and of revelation, the inspiring Spirit led him to write only that which was without error. This seems more consistent with Hodge's many statements insisting that, under inspiration, their understanding was not in abeyance.[2]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, I, 157; PR, XXIX (October, 1857), 672.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, I, 157; PR, XXIX (October, 1857), 672-73.

Hodge's Concept of Species

The question of the specific unity of the races of man caused what was probably the most serious conflict between Christianity and science between 1850 and 1870. Louis Agassiz (1807-1873), Samuel G. Morton (1799-1851), Josiah C. Nott (1804-1873) and his co-author, George Gliddon (1809-1857), had taken the position that the different races of men had different origins or were of different species.[1] In the course of defending the classical Christian position of the unity of mankind, Hodge defined his concept of species. He listed the generally recognized characteristics of species as originality, universality, and immutability. Originality meant that the original forms were immediately created by God rather than being produced by physical causes or derived from other species. Universality meant that all members or varieties of a given species have the same essential characteristics. By immutability or permanence, he meant that one species never changed into another nor would two species produce a third which was capable of perpetuating itself.[2] These characteristics were, he felt, inadequate for the determination of species as distinct from varieties, because the origin of certain varieties could not be traced and because some varieties now have permanent characteristics. Therefore, Hodge sought other more useful criteria.[1]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, II, 78; PR, XXXI (January, 1859), 112.

[2] C. Hodge, PR, XXXI (January, 1859), 125-126.

Agassiz held that the genus of an animal is determined by minor peculiarities in structure of the anatomy such as number, arrangement, and proportion of teeth, claws, feet, and fins, which are likely to vary in several areas at the same time. The less important distinctions such as color, size, proportion, and structure are the criteria for different species of the same genus. The peculiarities of varieties within a given species are for the most part induced by food and environmental conditions and seldom endure beyond their causes.[2] On the basis of these criteria Morton could argue from differences in skull measurements to different species of humanity.[3] Nott could argue that the permanence of the negroid features, as indicated by the ancient Egyptian monuments dating from 2400

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, II, 80.

[2] C. Hodge, PR, XXXI (January, 1859), 110, citing Agassiz' Principles of Zoology, p. xiv.

[3] Charles Hodge, "Diversity of Species," PR, XXXIV (July, 1862), 435.

B.C., showed that the Negro had permanent characteristics differing from the Caucasian, and hence were a distinct species.[1]

Hodge protested that such a description of species was useless and inconsistent because these men used the permanent pecularities of color, size, and structure to infer different species of men, but allowed far greater diversity of as permanent peculiarities among dogs to indicate mere varieties within the same species.[2]

Hodge was annoyed with the extended comparison which Nott made between the different species of apes and the races of men, placing side by side sketches which emphasized their similarities. He noted that, while Nott was not arguing for any biological relation between man and ape, he was using the similarities to suggest that if one declined to accept the view of distinct species and, therefore, different creations of mankind, he would be unable to insist upon any specific difference between man and ape.[3]

Hodge countered this argument by taking another definition of species which Agassiz had used earlier. Each species is constituted and determined by its immaterial principle which is indicated by its organic structure, physiological and psychological nature, permanence and capability of indefinite propagation. While each of these only partially indicates the immaterial principle of the organic being, taken together, Hodge believed, they clearly indicate the species.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 439.

[2] C. Hodge, PR, XXXI (January, 1859), 111.

[3] C. Hodge, PR, XXXIV (July, 1862), 458-59.

James Dwight Dana (1813-1895) of Yale, Hodge noted with approval, held the same basic idea when he called species the "units of the organic world" which reveal themselves in their simplest condition in the germ-cell state. Dana also called them the "primordial type-idea" or "the potential idea" which form the basis of each individual organism of the species.[2]

Agassiz's description of the function of this principle as quoted by Hodge[3] reminds one of the function of genes and chromosomes in modern biological theory. These, however, are not immaterial but consist of differing arrangements of molecules. According to Hodge this immaterial principle determines the future form of the animal, the uniformity in the essential characteristics from generation to generation, and the varied instincts characteristic of each species.[1]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, II, 82; PR, XXXI (January, 1859), 116-22.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, II, 81-82, quoting from Bibliotheca Sacra, (1857), p. 861.

[3] C. Hodge, ST, II, 81; PR, XXXI (January, 1859), 117.

Since Hodge held that the organic structure only partially indicated the immaterial principle, he was able to minimize the dominant role that morphology had played at the expense of the physiological structure since the days of Carolus Linnaeus (1707-1778).[2] Hodge contended that there could be a wide variation within a given species. As an example he pointed to the dog which in its wild state is fairly uniform in color, size, and the shape of ears, limb, and tail. Yet skillful breeding has developed many peculiarities of color, form, and structure within the original concept of species of the dog, peculiarities which are permanent and are capable of indefinite propagation. He insisted that permanent peculiarities are characteristics such as color, form, proportion, and structure may be held as indicative of diversity of species only if they indicate a difference of design.[1] For example, webbed feet on a bird, though seemingly insignificant, show that it is designed for water and point to an immaterial principle different from one which has no webbed feet.[2]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, II, 81

[2] Abraham Wolf, History of Science of the 18th Century (London: Allen & Unwin, 1952), p. 461; C. Hodge, PR, XXXI, (January, 1859), 132.

During the middle of the eighteenth century when the authority of Genesis was still largely accepted by scientists, biological classification was concerned with genera and species. Each created kind (min) of the first chapter of Genesis was considered to be the ancestor of the entire genus and, hence, of the species included in that genus. Although Linnaeus was raised on this view, in middle life he changed to the idea that the created kind was the species. Later he returned to the idea that the genus was the created unit. The view of Linnaeus during the middle period of his life became the interpretation which was accepted by the Christian church. From that time until Darwin, many held that species were copies of type-ideas in the mind of God while the genera are merely convenient human modes of classification.[3] This type-idea, this immaterial principle, is permanent and eternal; so much so that Agassiz could say that the term "variability of species" suggested a confusion of ideas or a logical contradiction.[1]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, II, 83-84; PR, XXXI (January, 1859), 117.

[2] C. Hodge, PR, XXXI (January 1859), 118.

[3] Edwin T. Brewster, Creation: A History of Non-Evolutionary Theories (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1927), p. 188.

Hodge accepted this idea that the species were the primordial created kinds[2] but probably was unaware of its historical development. However, he did sense that biologists were "making" far too many species and tried to resolve a possible conflict by distinguishing two kinds of species. The natural species, which have their foundation in nature, had a distinct origin and are capable of indefinite propagation. The artificial species are those which the scientists have created for their own convenience in classification. Hodge would not affirm that artificial species were either originally created or permanent.[3]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, II, 14 n. 2. Bentley Glass, "The Germination of the Idea of Biological Species," Forerunners of Darwin: 1745-1859, ed. Bentley Glass, Oswel Tempkin, and William L. Strauss, Jr. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 35; Samuel Regester Neel, "The Reaction of Certain Exponents of American Religious Thought to Darwin's Theory of Evolution," (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1942), pp. 54-55.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, II, 81.

[3] C. Hodge, ST, II, 26; Darwinism, p. 152.

To establish a more clear-cut distinction between varieties or artificial species and natural species, Hodge followed the argument used by Buffon of infertility of hybrids to oppose the multiplication of species by Linnaeus and his followers.[1] Members within a given species are capable of indefinite propagation, but members of two different species of the same genus cannot produce offspring which can propagate themselves indefinitely. That hybrids are not always sterile, he acknowledged, yet if they mate with similar hybrids, they are so unprolific that the line dies out in a few generations. On the other hand, if a hybrid unites with one of the parent species, the offspring soon revert to that species. They cannot in either case produce a new and durable species.[2]

The psychological nature, which includes habits, instincts, and intelligence, also indicates the immaterial principle of a species because they are the same for all members of a given species.[3] When all of these criteria concur, then, according to Hodge, there is no reasonable doubt that the animals belong to the same species.

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[1] Arthur O. Lovejoy, "Buffon and the Problem of Species," Forerunners of Darwin: 1745-1859, p. 98.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, II, 26, 29; PR, XXI (January, 1859), 126-27.

[3] C. Hodge, ST, II, 85; PR, XXXI (January, 1859), 131.

With these criteria spelled out, Hodge turned to the subject with which he was concerned, the unity of mankind. He was willing to grant to Agassiz that each species of plants and brute animals was created in large numbers and in different parts of the globe rather than in single pairs in one location, for the latter is not even intimated in Scripture.[1] Hodge held that "although community of origin would prove identity of species, diversity of origin would not prove diversity of species."[2]

While Hodge would grant the diversity of origin to each of as many species of plants and brute animals as science should indicate and that polygenism was conceivable for mankind, yet he would not admit that the latter was actually the case for the Bible clearly teaches that all the races of man had descended from one human pair. The culmination of the criteria of the common external and physiological structure, the psychological nature, as well as the fertile offspring of the different races, Hodge believed, show the unity of species of mankind.[1]

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[1] C. Hodge, PR, XXXI (January, 1859), 140.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, II, 81. This is contrary to Danhof, (p. 89), who wrote that "Hodge teaches that identity of species implies identity of origin, but the identity of origin does not always necessarily imply identity of species." Danhof's statement of Hodge's position is compatible with evolution, but Hodge's is not.

He also believed that the similarity between languages of different races show the unity of the origin of those races. He quoted from Alexander von Humbolt (1769-1859), Max Müller (1823-1900), and Christian C. J. von Bunsen (1791-1860) to show that two-thirds of mankind are represented by the Indo-Germanic and Semitic languages which have a common origin.[2] This, along with the moral and spiritual unity of mankind, the common sinfulness of the race, and the common need of redemption, according to Hodge, confirmed the truth of the biblical testimony that "all men are the descendents of one fall progenitor."[3]

In addition to showing the unity of the species and the common origin of mankind, Hodge was also concerned with man's place in the classification system. He held that there are four categories of being. The first is matter with its properties and laws. The second is vegetable life; the third, animal life; and the fourth is mind, a much higher order of life. There is an impassable gulf between these categories, and none by itself ever originates in one category and then moves into the next category.[1] Man's physiological characteristics make him quite different from the highest brute, while his capabilities of language along with his moral and spiritual faculties would place him in the class of mental beings. Hodge preferred the classification of C. G. Ehrenburg (1795-1876) who had two cycles (mankind and mere animals) or that of Geoffroy St. Hiliare (1722-1844) with the three kingdoms (vegetable, animal, and human, each of which partakes of the lower kingdom) to that of Georges Cuvier (1769-1832) which was generally accepted at the time. Cuvier's system, according to Hodge, made classification wholy dependent on the physical constitution and treated man as a mere animal thus ranking him far below the place to which he should be assigned because of his mental and spiritual endowments.[2] Of course, neither the classification system of Hodge, Ehrenburg, nor St. Hilaire won the day, and when the four fold system of Cuvier (Vertebrata, Mollusca, Articulata, and Radiata) was changed, the higher group, vertebrata, out of which Hodge would have taken man, remained essentially unchanged and the lower two were divided into numerous phyla.

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, II, 82-88.

[2] Ibid., pp. 89-90.

[3] C. Hodge, ST, II, 91.

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[1] Ibid., I, 235.

[2] Chester Dewey, "True Place of Man in Zoology," PR, XXXV (January, 1863), 120 C. Hodge, PR, XXXIV (July, 1862), 461-62.

Had it been accepted, Hodge's classification into matter, plant, animal, and mind would have made it easier for him to concede evolution within each of these categories. God created matter, plant life, animal life, and man with his spiritual nature. Evolution, as a mode of God's working through secondary causes, could be thought of as producing the present observable results within each of these four divisions. This would have preserved the theological aspects with which Hodge was most concerned, i.e., the unity of the human species, the original state of innocence in man, his fall, and redemption.

Hodge on Antiquity of the Earth and Human Race

During the mid-nineteenth century, geologists were teaching that the earth had been in the process of development for countless ages, whereas Genesis had been interpreted as teaching that it had been created in six twenty-four hour days some six thousand years ago. While Hodge believed that, in the absence of other data, this was the most natural interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis, he held that, in the light of current geological teaching, the age of the earth had become an open question. The interpretation of Scripture, according to Hodge, should be controlled both by the laws of language and by the facts of nature. By 1871 he did not believe that the facts were as yet sufficiently authenticated,[1] but should it be proven that the earth had existed for countless ages, then Genesis 1 should be interpreted accordingly.[2] The word "day" in the first chapter should then be understood in terms of geological periods of indefinite duration.[3] Such an interpretation, according to Hodge, would in no way invalidate the understanding of the Sabbath as related to the seventh day of rest.

Kenneth Berg writes that Hodge, in his Systematic Theology, stated that scientists had never been able to prove that life existed on earth prior to 5000 B.C. and that he assumed this to be an "unalterable fact."[4] Berg gives no page reference to support this statement. While Hodge questioned the reliability of calculations of time requiring thousands of centuries,[5] Berg's statement could

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, I, 558.

[2] C. Hodge, PR, XXXI (January, 1859), 106; ST, I, 171.

[3] C. Hodge, ST, I, 570-71.

[4] Berg, p. 215.

[5] C. Hodge, ST, II, 33.

could hardly be a correct interpretation of Hodge. Hodge said little concerning the date of the origin of life, but he did have a rather extended discussion on the antiquity of man whose origin, of course, must have been later.[1] On this point Charles Hodge seemed more concerned with the possible conflict between science and the Scripture rather than insisting upon any date such as 5000 B.C. for the age of mankind. A. A. Hodge wrote that his father had expresed great relief when he learned that his younger colleague, William Henry Green (1825-1900) had, as the result of his study of biblical chronology, concluded that the age between Adam and the present "might have been, for all we know from the Bible to the contrary, much longer than it seems."[2]

In seeking to reduce the conflict on the age of man, Hodge evaluated the commonly presented evidence from

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, II, 33-41.

[2] W. H. Green, quoted in Archibald Alexander Hodge, Popular Lectures on Theological Themes (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1887), p. 177. These words were quoted by Penrose St. Amant in "The Rise and Early Development of the Princeton School of Theology"(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Edinburg, 1952), p. 309, n. 50, but he cited A. A. Hodge's Evangelical Theology, A Course of Lectures (London: T. Nelson and Son, 1890), p. 150. A comparison of these two books revealed that they had the same contents with the latter having some editorial emendations.

Swiss lake dwellings, fossil human remains, and flint utensils found with the remains of extinct animals. This evidence for a great age of man he minimized by pointing to the unreliability of calculations of time, by quotations from scientists, and by plausible explanations of the phenomena such that so great a time span would not be required. On the other hand, he went along with Green in admitting that the genealogical tables are unreliable for chronology and were not intended for calculations concerning the age of man. In his conclusion he wrote:

> If the facts of science or of history should ultimately make it necessary to admit that eight or ten thousand years have elapsed since the creation of man, there is nothing in the Bible in the way of such concession.[1]

While this is far from what geology or paleontology would demand, it does indicate a greater flexibility on the part of Hodge than the 5000 B.C. date for the origin of life given by Berg's interpretation of Hodge.

During the 1850's, another controversial issue between Christianity and science seems to have been the age of the earth.[1] Eleazer Lord had written a book entitled Epochs of Creation, in which he had opposed the geologists. The reviewer, probably Hodge, wrote in the Princeton Review that the unanimous agreement of geologists for years had been that before the origin of man there had existed many species of plants and animals which had succeeded one another. To oppose such a strong testimony to its probable truth by purely theological and exegetical arguments seemed foolhardy to the reviewer who preferred to see the issue left open to free discussion just "in case the theories of geology turn out to be clear and irresistible inductions from undisputed and unquestionable facts."[2]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, II, 41.

In another notice the reviewer held that, since scientists would not be much influenced by arguments drawn from revelation, it would be wise to avoid setting the two unnecessarily into irreconcilable contradiction.[1]

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[1] Although Hodge contributed a good many articles to the Princeton Review, there were only a few cases in which he became sufficiently concerned with issues between theology and science to write an extended article on the subject. There are, however, many instances in that periodical of "short notices" of books concerned with such issues. These, like the articles in the Review, are unsigned, but while the names of the authors of most of the articles are recorded in The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review: Index Volume (Philadelphia: Peter Walker, 1871), the names of the authors of the "short notices" are not and so are lost to posterity. Since Hodge was the senior editor from 1851 until 1871 and the only editor from 1856-68, these short notices may well have come from Hodge, or, at least, had his approval.

[2] "Short Notices," PR, XXIII (October, 1851), 698.

At a later date an author insisted that if the geologists were right on the age of the earth, then this disproves the inspiration of the Bible and makes it merely the product of man. In the Princeton Review, it was suggested that if a Christian were convinced of the geological teaching as to the age of the world, he would conclude, not that the Scriptures were uninspired, but that he was merely a fallible interpreter of Scripture.[2] In another review, it was suggested that there was really no need to be much concerned about the age of the earth, for the chronology of Genesis was of the human race and not that of the earth.[3] In still another review, it was urged that open conflict with science should be avoided so as not to tempt theologians, who often had a meager background in science, to enter into conflict in a specialized field with men who had devoted their lives to its study. To do so would expose the theologian to ridicule and injure the cause of

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[1] "Short Notices," XXIV (January, 1852), 144.

[2] "Short Notices," XXVIII (January, 1856), 161-62.

[3] "Short Notices," XXIII (January, 1851), 164.

Christianity.[1]

The views presented in these notices seem to take a more tolerant attitude toward the claims of science and a more cautious attitude about precipitating a conflict than is shown in those articles through which Hodge chose to enter the lists against the claims of some scientist which he believed to be in real and serious conflict with Scriptures or with theology. Still, the two attitudes would be quite compatible if Hodge considered the issue of the age of the earth to be of such a trivial nature that the conflict raised would do more damage to theology than the acceptance of the scientific claim.

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[1] "Short Notices," XXVI (October, 1854), 726.

CHAPTER III

HODGE AND DARWINISM

Complacency about Darwinism

After Charles Darwin published the Origin of Species in the autumn of 1859, its first mention either in the Princeton Review or by Charles Hodge was in the July issue of 1862. Hodge gave it no more than footnote importance as he pointed out that Morton's and Agassiz's theory of diversity of species of mankind and Darwin's theory that all animals descended from only four or five progenitors were in such conflict that their "conclusions cannot endanger the received doctrines of the immutable permanency of species, and of the specific unity of the human race."[1]

Others were also complacent about the threat of Darwinism. Albert Barnes of the New School Presbyterians stated that the four major problems involving religion and science were the inspiration of the Bible, antiquity of man, the unity of the human race and miracles.[2] While some of these are related to Darwinism, they were also prominent during the decade before the publication of the Origin and and Barnes does not add to these problems either evolution or Darwinism.

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[1] C. Hodge, "Diversity of Species," PR, XXXIV (July, 1862), 461.

[2] Albert Barnes, "Relation of Christianity to the Present Stage of the World's Progress in Science, Civilization and Art," American Presbyterian and Theological Review, II (October, 1865), 584-585.

In 1878 John T. Duffield,[1] a professor at Princeton University, looking back over the preceding score of years, concluded that the Origin of Species was not at first generally regarded as being in any serious or irreconcilable conflict with the Bible. Although he recognized that some people were concerned with the extent to which it might be pressed, yet he insisted that it was not until Darwin published the Descent of Man in 1871 that the vast majority of people, whether believers or not, realized that the Bible was under attack. Then, and not until then, evolution became a serious problem.[2]

Lowenberg, writing more than fifty years later than Duffield did, disagrees with him and claims that

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[1] John T. Duffield, "Evolutionism Respecting Man and the Bible," PR, LIV (January, 1878), 153. With the merger of The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review and the American Presbyterian Review into the Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review in 1872, a new series of numbering was started. However, due to the sale of the periodical, the title became The Princeton Review in 1878 with the volume number dating back to 1825 rather than 1829 as had been done before the merger. This accounts for the volume number being LIV rather than L.

[2] Ibid.

"neither the sources nor his own reaction" shows that the Origin "was not generally regarded as involving any serious . . . conflict with the Scriptures."[1] Although Duffield may have minimized the seriousness of the concern about the Origin during the dozen years following its publication in order to focus attention on the far more serious problems resulting from Darwin's Descent of Man, yet Loewenberg himself admits that there was no widespread discussion until 1873.[2] According to W. H. Roberts, the period from 1870-1880 was "the most intense phase of the evolutionary struggle.[3] Loetscher, in a study of Presbyterians, finds himself "surprised to find so little explicit discussion of evolution among Presbyterians."[4]

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[1] Bert James Loewenberg, "The Impact of the Doctrine of Evolution on American Thought 1859-1900" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1934), p. 210.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Windsor Hall Roberts, The Reaction of American Protestant Churches to the Darwinian Philosophy 1860-1900, Volume 126, University of Chicago (Chicago: By the author, 1938), p. 6.

[4] Lefferts A. Loetscher, The Broadening Church: A Study of Theological Issues in the Presbyterian Church Since 1869 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1957), p. 10.

Articles in the Princeton Review show that Hodge and its other contributors were more concerned with other problems of science and religion than with Darwinism.

Hodge's Understanding of Darwinism

Hodge published no more than a footnote concerning Darwinism until the appearance of the Descent of Man (1871). Why did he wait so long? When he did take a position against Darwinism and evolution, he used remarkably few quotations from Scripture to support his position. The most plausible explanation of this appears to be that he did not want to encourage conflict between science and theology by prematurely structuring the issue so as to bring about an irreconcilable antithesis between them. He preferred to have the scientists settle the problem on the basis of scientific argumentation. As a theologian he might cite one scientist against another or cull from the scientists or philosophers arguments to be used against a proposed theory, but he sought to avoid involving the Bible in the conflict by refraining from the use of proof texts.

It was not until thirteen years after the Origin of Species that Charles Hodge began to publish his rebuttal to Darwinism.[1] He then interpreted Darwin as holding to the creation of matter, plant life, and animal life in four or five forms. Four of these forms of animal life correspond to the four great divisions of Cuvier, that is, to the Vertebrata, Mollusca, Articulata, and Radiata,[2] which Hodge had given in an earlier work.[3] The fifth may have been the Protozoa which is the only other division of the animal kingdom listed in the glossary.[4]

Darwin felt that he had distinct evidence from "their embryological homologous and rudimentary structures that within each kingdom [phylum] all the members are descended from a single progenitor,"[5] but he admitted that it was only by analogy that he was led one step further "to the belief that all animals and plants are descended from some one prototype. But analogy may be a deceitful guide."[1]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, II, 1-41. This volume, which was first published in 1872, does not mention the *Descent of Man*, while it is cited frequently in *What is Darwinism?* (New York: Scribner, Armstrong and Co., 1874).

[2] Charles Darwin, *Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*, Vol. XLIX of *The Great Books of the Western World*, ed. R. M. Hutchins *et al*. (54 Vols; Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), p. 241.

[3] C. Hodge, "The Unity of Mankind," *PR*, XXXI (January, 1859), 109-110.

[4] Darwin, p. 249.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 241.

According to Hodge, four laws are involved in the Darwinian theory. The first is the law of heredity by which offspring are similar to their parents. The second, the law of variation, is that, while the offspring are like their parents in essential characteristics, many idffer from their parents in ways which are sometimes harmful, indifferent, or beneficial to the welfare of the organism in a given environment. The third is the law of over-production, derived from Thomas R. Malthus (1766-1834) which teaches that all organisms tend to increase in a geometrical ratio. If all the descendants of a given pair should live and reproduce in like numbers, the world would soon be unable to contain them. However, factors such as shortage of food supply and natural enemies tend to restrict the number of survivors. These combine to produce the fourth law, that of natural selection, which results from competition between the variants of a given species and also between species of the same genus. Those individuals which receive favorable characteristics will generally be those which survive at the expense of the rest.[1] From the original form or forms of life, through the operation of these natural laws, have descended all the observable species whether living or extinct.

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[1] Ibid.

In his criticism of Darwinism, Hodge made use of Scottish common-sense philosophy. He appealed to the wisdom which it attributed to the common-sense of mankind when he asserted that the idea that all forms of life, from the mosquito to the whale, were descended from a common living form, shocked "the common-sense of unsophisticated men."[2] This criticism, of course, also applied to evolution.

Hodge's metaphysical dualism is revealed when he charged that Darwinism is absurd because "it assumes that matter does the work of mind."[3] This was intolerable to him because it made evolution entirely a natural process by denying everywhere the intervention of mind. Instead it held that, from the most elemental living germ, there had developed, either by chance or by the powers resident in matter, the instinct of animals and finally the self-conscious intelligence of man. This was absurd to Hodge and yet he implicitly admitted the influence of his own philosophy when he explicitly recognized that such a view would not be absurd to the materialist who rejected dualism.[1]

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, II, 13-14; Darwinism, pp. 28-29.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, II, 14; cf. Darwinism, pp. 142-144.

[3] C. Hodge, ST, II, 15.

Another objection to Darwinism held it to be a "mere hypothesis"[2] similar to the nebular hypothesis. As the latter seeks to explain the solar system from an earlier supposed condition of matter, so the former seeks to explain the observable diversity of plants and animals from one or a few living forms on the basis of natural law. Although he admitted that Darwinism did account for much data, Hodge contended that this still did not amount to proof for two reasons. First, "these facts can be accounted for in other ways,"[3] and secondly, there are many other facts for which the theory will not account.[4] Moreover, Hodge pointed out, neither Darwinism nor its advocates pretended to prove that evolution had come about by the action of unintelligent physical causes. All that they claimed to show for the theory was that the species of plants and animals could have been produced in the way it described.[1] Thomas H. Huxley (1825-1895) was quoted as making a distinction between "scientific belief," which requires strong foundations, and "expectation," which is founded on "analogical reasoning." With Huxley's support and, he felt, with Darwin's consent, Hodge put Darwinism into the latter category and insisted that it was incapable of proof.[2]

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[1] Ibid. It is significant that although a dualistic philosophy, Scottish realism, had dominated the United States for a century, the leading philosophies some forty years after the *Origin* had, in one way or another, dissolved this dualism in an effort to relate to the theory of evolution.

[2] Ibid., p. 19.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

Since he realized that evidence in favor of the fixity of species is evidence against both Darwinism and the theory of evolution which it sought to explain, Hodge turned his attention to showing that mutability of species had never been proved. In What is Darwinism? the distinction was again made between natural and artificial species; however, this time he was arguing for the fixity of species rather than for the inclusion of all human races within one species. Although Hodge defined species as the primordial created kind, he did not wish to bind himself to the immutability of every group which some scientist might choose to call a distinct species since it might be artificial and, therefore, merely a variety of some primordial kind.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 20; Darwinism, pp. 144-145.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, II, 22-23; Darwin, p. 241.

It was noted above that Hodge made use of sterility of hybrids as a criterion of species. When attempting to prove immutability of species, he also used the relative sterility of hybrids as almost conclusive evidence that the two parent stocks could not have descended from a common ancestor however remote.[2] To support this insistence on the immutability of species, Hodge quoted principal John Wm. Dawson (1820-1899) and Francois Jules Pictet, who had examined mollusks and mammals respectively, to the effect that species of these groups continued unchanged through long ages while none had been found in transition state but were in perfect form when they first appeared.[3] Hodge then quoted Agassiz to show that fish existed contemporaneously with species of all other sub-kingdoms

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[1] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 152; ST, II, 26.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, II, 29. The contention that sterility of hybrids when bred *inter se* proves that the parent stocks had no common ancestor seems a priori no more probable than the fact that the same parent stocks could interbreed and produce the hybrid proves that the two parent stocks ultimately descended from a common ancestor.

[3] C. Hodge, Darwinism, pp. 155-156. This is contrary to J. W. Draper who asserted that the beginning of any animal species "is under an imperfect form." History of the Conflict between Religion and Science (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1898), p. 247. This work was originally published in 1874.

(phyla) in the Taconic or sub-Cambrian, the earliest geological strata in which there are fossils.[1] The earliest remains of man, the "Engis" skull of Belgium, is according to Hodge's quote from Dawson, as fully developed as that of the American Indian.[2]

The images of men and animals on the ancient Egyptian monuments, which had been used by others to argue the diversity of species of mankind, were used by Hodge to show the immutability of species throughout historical time, and thus to support his argument for their prehistoric immutability.[3]

The sterility of hybrids proved to Hodge that God had set limits on the variability of species. He did not, however, hold that hybrids were absolutely sterile but only that they would die out in a few generations if bred *inter se* or if bred one of the parent stocks would soon revert to that stock. In any case, no new species could be formed from the mixture of two species. If he were presented with an instance of a group of thriving herds of the cow-buffalo hybrid,[1] he would probably contend that this showed that the parents did not consist of two distinct species. If sterility of hybrids is to be considered essential to the distinction of different species then, of course, true hybrids would of logical necessity be sterile.

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[1] C. Hodge, *Darwinism*, p. 156.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

[3] *Ibid.*

From geological strata, paleontologists had discovered evidence of the destruction of some species and the formation of others. This had forced theologians and scientists of the century before the Origin to modify the doctrine of a six-day creation to one in which successive creations took place in different geological ages.[2] Hodge apparently accepted this interpretation, for he quoted Dawson and Hugh Miller to the effect that these newly created species could not be derived from previous ones nor could the extinct species have been the source of later species.[3]

To further his argument on the immutability of species, Hodge next turned his attention to the great gaps in nature. He quoted from Dawson, James H. Stirling (1820-1909), and Sir William Thomson (Lord Kelvin, 1824-1907) to the effect that there are gaps which it is impossible for natural process to bridge. These gaps occur between death and life, between plant and animal life, and between animal life and the self-conscious, reasoning, and moral nature of man.[1] The crossing of these gaps is, according to Hodge, inexplicable by evolution, and could be accounted for only by divine intervention. Darwin had granted a creative act of God for the origin of life, but according to Hodge, many Darwinians refused to grant even this because if one were to admit a divine intervention at any point there would be no good reason to deny one even for the production of species.[2]

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[1] Edwin Tenney Brewster, Creation: A History of Non-Evolutionary Theories (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1927), p. 275.

[2] Ibid., p. 260.

[3] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 160; ST, II, 26.

Hodge on Providence and Material Forces

Before the scientific revolution, philosophers and theologians had generally held that matter was entirely passive. Anything, such as motion, that happened to matter had to have a cause outside of itself. With the discovery of the laws of motion by Galileo, the law of gravitation and the extension of these laws to stellar bodies by Newton, the theory that matter possessed active powers gained favor.[1] Hodge, accepting this idea, held that God created matter as a substance and endowed it with various forces which become the proximate causes of physical events.[2] All physical forces, whether gravitational, electrical, or chemical, act of necessity, blindly, and uniformly in all of space for the stability of the universe and the existence of organic life. Although God, who created the laws of nature, can act independently of them or can change, suspend, or annihilate them at pleasure, yet, according to Hodge, he never does so except to accomplish some high purpose. Ordinarily he operates with and through these laws to govern the material world. "As mere blind, physical forces, they can accomplish nothing; at least nothing implying purpose or design," and so require the hand of an intelligent being to make any use of them.[3] The chemist may combine chemicals to accomplish his purpose. A complicated machine may be constructed to do the bidding of the engineer at the touch of a lever. God's relation to the world is, according to Hodge, somewhat analogous to that of man's use of a machine except that man is completely external to the object of his work, whereas God is immanent within the world and present in being, knowledge, and power within every atom of matter.[1] However, God's efficiency does not supersede that of matter. It is by physical forces that vapor rises and condenses into clouds, collects around particles, and falls in precipitation, yet God so controls the operation of the laws producing these results that he can send rain when and where he chooses. This control applies to all the operations of natural laws and all events in the physical world. They are due to physical forces, but these are combined, adjusted in such a way that, under the constant guidance of God, they are made to accomplish his intended results.[2]

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[1] C. Hodge, Darwinism, pp. 163-168.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 164.

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[1] James McCosh, Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, Critical from Hutcheson to Hamilton, (New York: Robert Carter and Bros., 1875) p. 44.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, I, 606.

[3] Ibid., p. 607. This quote appears to contradict Danhof (p. 83), who claims that, for Hodge, "the laws of nature are not blind forces, but they are the immanent mind of God everywhere present and active."

The statement, "As mere blind, physical forces, they can accomplish nothing; at least nothing implying purpose or design," quoted above, suggests that there are some events which do not imply purpose or design, as for example, an earthquake, an exploding star, or lightning which strikes a man. Hodge confirmed this by granting that such physical phenomena as the flow of water under the pull of gravity, the vapor arising from water on a hot day, heat producing expansion and all manner of chemical actions show no evidence of purpose or design.[1] His contention that God controls the operation of all physical laws is not inconsistent with his admission that some physical phenomena show no purpose or design, except on the a priori assumption that everything that God controls must show evidence of purpose to the finite human mind.

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[1] Ibid., p. 608.

[2] Ibid.

Hodge developed his doctrine of God's relation to natural laws in opposition to Deism.[2] He wished to preserve God's role as a guide to the processes of nature so that men could believe that He can answer the prayers of men. Such a doctrine of providence would provide a foundation for the Christian's faith that God, who is concerned with man, is also able so to guide the laws of nature that he can respond to man's prayer for help. If prayer is to be more than subjectively efficacious, God must be able to control the forces of nature.[3] On the other hand, in opposition to the doctrine of continued creation, Hodge wished to preserve the efficiency of natural forces as distinct from the divine efficiency. To fail to keep these distinct would, he feared, lead to idealism and pantheism as well as involve God in responsibility for sin.[1] For these reasons, he emphasized the reality of the external world, the distinction between creation and preservation, and between the efficiency of God and that of second causes.[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 280.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 576.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 609.

Hodge on Providence and Living Organisms

Hodge's insistence that the divine Mind be utilized to account for intelligent action on the part of physical forces raises the question about the origin and the actions of living organisms, whose actions, for example, of nutrition and reproduction certainly imply purpose and design. Hodge opposed the idea of spontaneous generation, which was advocated by many Darwinians though not by Darwin himself,[3] for he felt that matter with its properties simply could not accomplish such life sustaining processes as organization, growth, and reproduction.[1] These imply the perception of an end, the purpose to secure it, and the intelligent choice of the means of its attainment. This is not the work of matter, he claimed, but the work of mind. He insisted that it would be impossible even for God to endow matter with the capacity to do the work required by the processes of life because this would involve a contradiction.[2] These acts implying purpose are not the result of any created mind, but Hodge wrote, they are the result of "the everywhere present and everywhere active mind of God himself"[3] In living organisms, God guides the chemical and physical forces of matter to carry on the vital processes of organization, growth, and reproduction.[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 578-80.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 606.

[3] *Ibid.*, II, 4-10.

Thus in living organisms, two different kinds of forces are involved: the physical forces with which matter is endowed at creation, and mental force which is the mental activity of God, who uses and guides the physical forces. Hodge compared this with the similar combination of physical and mental forces which is observable in the voluntary actions of men. Walking or writing is possible only as the mind of man controls the movement of his body.[1] Since all vital processes reveal intelligence, he concluded that the mind of God was always active in guiding the physical forces involved in the living organisms.[2] If God should cease to guide, as he apparently does at death, the organism would cease to act intelligently, the various functions of life would cease, and the action of the various chemical forces would result in decay of the organism.

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[1] _Ibid_., I, 283.

[2] _Ibid_., pp. 611-12.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 612.

[4] _Ibid_. Also in letter from C. Hodge to Robert Watts, 1865, quoted in A. A. Hodge, _Life of Hodge_, p. 489.

This is Hodge's view of the relation of God to the physical forces of matter and to living organisms, but what is his relation to man whom Hodge held to be a union of mind and matter? God's relation to man seems to be more like his relation to matter than to living organisms. Man's soul or spirit is a substance which, like matter, has objective existence and the capacity of activity and power. These powers are those of thought, feeling, and volition which give him the qualities of a person. As a person, man is conscious of being a moral agent and responsible for his actions. Because he is finite, man, unlike God, is subject to change and can increase in knowledge, holiness, and power.[1]

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[1] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 43.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, I, 612-13.

The providential agency of God in relation to these God-given capacities of man is called *potentia ordinata*, and is such that he exercises control over the ordinary acts of man, especially those of the wicked, very much like the control he exercises over material causes. In neither case is anything accomplished which transcends the efficiency of second causes of either physical laws or the ability to perform on the part of man. God guides the action, but the results are such that the person with his natural abilities is able to perform the work and is responsible for the results.[2] Hodge thought of providence as God's natural method of operation and the operation of his grace as supernatural and placed the latter in the category of *potentia absoluta* along with prophecy and miracle. God works in men to produce acts of faith and repentance such as are beyond the ability of men in their present sinful condition. Such results are due to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.[3]

The question arises as to whether the operations of man's body are to be related to the mind of man or to the mind of God. He wrote that "the human body is fashioned in the womb by the intelligence of God, and not by undirected physical causes, acting blindly."[1] This would indicate that Hodge held that the involuntary actions of the human body are guided by the mind of God even as the actions of other living organisms, while only the voluntary actions are directed by the human mind.

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[1] *Ibid*., pp. 377-79.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 614.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 615.

With such an understanding of the relation of God to the laws of nature, especially in living organisms, it is not difficult to see why Hodge considered Darwin's denial of design in the production of the species of living organisms as "the grand and fatal objection to Darwinism."[2] To Hodge, the very processes of living organisms presented undeniable evidence of design and, hence, of intelligence. Since he held that this intelligence was a manifestation of the ever-active mind of God, to deny design was to bar God from the whole organic process.

Hodge quoted a challenge by Darwin:

> He who denounces these views (as irreligious) is bound to explain why it is more irreligious to explain the origin of man as a distinct species by descent from some lower form, through

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 613.

[2] C. Hodge, *Darwinism*, p. 168.

> the laws of variation and natural selection, than to explain the birth of the individual through the laws of ordinary reproduction.[1]

Instead of answering this challenge, Hodge used it to show that Darwin taught the descent of man from a lower form of animal. Hodge himself followed the traditional literal interpretation of Genesis 2:7 that man came from an even lower form--the dust of the ground--by a divine creative act.

God, Providence, and Evolution

According to Hodge's theory of providence, with God already working in the processes of life, it seems that the production of a new species whether of brute or man from a lower form of animal would have been far less complicated than from the dust and only a little more complicated than the ordinary conception and birth of an individual. The additional divine action would simply have been to guide the physical forces so as to manipulate a few genes on the chromosomes. In the case of man, God would also have created within the embryo a human soul even as, according to the doctrine of creationism of the soul, he has done ever since during the gestation period of each child.

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[1] C. Hodge, *Darwinism*, p. 40, quoting Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*, Vol. XLIX of *The Great Books of the Western World*, ed. R. M. Hutchins *et al*. (54 vols.,; Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), p. 593.

Hodge had a system by which he could have eliminated numerous special interventions in the production of species and still have the mind of God guiding their production by using the physical and chemical forces of matter. However, he did not use his doctrine of providence, previously developed in his Systematic Theology, to make a constructive effort to relate the theory of evolution to Christian doctrine and so failed to provide an intellectually satisfying alternative to Darwinism. Instead, he sought to discredit the doctrine of evolution, thinking that to do so was *a fortiori* to discredit Darwinism. This was, of course, true, but Hodge tried to turn back to Linnaeus' explanation of the divine creation of each of about a million species, claiming that such a view of divine creation could account for all the scientific data. But such an explanation explains too much. It could explain the existence of a world vastly different from our own. On the other hand, it could not explain some of the minute details of plant and animal life as plausibly as did Darwin's explanation.

Thus his effort was not only entirely useless but even damaging to the faith of the scientific student with a Christian background who, through his studies in the biological or geological sciences, became convinced that there was some truth in the theory of evolution. If Hodge's books failed to convince him of the falsity of that theory, they also failed even to make suggestions which might help the student to relate evolution to Christianity so as to preserve his faith. Undoubtedly the reason for this failure was due to Hodge's own inability to see "how the theory of evolution can be reconciled with the declarations of the Scriptures."[1]

Hodge did acknowledge that if one accepted the presence of design in nature, he could accept evolution without being an atheist.[2] In his earlier work, he had granted that there could be "a theistic interpretation of the Darwinian theory,"[3] and had admitted that the eighth Duke of Argyll (George Douglas Campbell, 1823-1900) had developed such a theory. While Hodge did not criticize these efforts, he felt that he himself could not reconcile the acceptance of evolution with allegiance to the Bible, and quoted Huxley as support that it could not be done.[4]

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[1] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 141.

[2] Ibid., p. 141.

[3] C. Hodge, ST, II, 16.

[4] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 141.

It appears that Hodge was too bound to the traditional interpretations of the first chapters of Genesis to be able to re-evaluate them in the light of the new theory. He had previously distinguished not only between fact and theory in science but also between fact and interpretation in theology and had recognized the latter to be fallible interpretations by fallible men who had, consciously or unconsciously, been influenced by the scientific and philosophical views of their day. Thus, according to Hodge, a traditionally accepted interpretation could rightly be modified in the light of new scientific theories if the theologian were convinced of their truth.

In spite of this theoretical flexibility of his method, Hodge failed to modify the interpretation of the first two chapters of Genesis in a way in which his friend, John Duffield of the college, suggested could legitimately be done with plants and non-rational animals. Duffield wrote of Genesis 1:

> This command to "the waters" to bring forth "the moving creature," and to "the earth" to bring forth "the living creature," may be intended--we do not say that it certainly was intended--to intimate that the generation of the lower orders of animals was in accordance with pre-existing physical laws.[1]

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[1] Duffield, PR, LIV (January, 1878), 166.

Even though the passage on the creation of man, "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul" (Gen. 2:7), made God rather than "the earth" or "the waters" the agent, Duffield was still willing to grant that if this were all that the Scriptures taught on the origin of man,"there would be no serious difficulty in interpreting it in harmony with the hypothesis of evolution."[1] Of course, this would have to be understood in the light of the reformed doctrine of providence which has God acting, ceaselessly guiding the laws which he has established. It was only the far more detailed and specific account of the creation of woman (Gen.2:21-23) that, in Duffield's opinion, made the biblical story of the origin of man "taken as a literal record of an historical fact . . . utterly irreconcilable with Evolutionism."[2] Since woman was created through the immediate agency of God, man too, he reasoned, must have been created in a similar manner rather than by the evolutionary process. Although Duffield rejected evolution as God's method of producing the family of man, he appeared willing to allow it for the lower animals.[1]

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 154.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 155.

James McCosh, the philosopher and president (1868-1888) of Princeton University, who agreed with Hodge on the inspiration of the Bible and on Scottish realism, made a much more positive effort to relate evolution to Calvinistic orthodoxy.[2] Although he granted that evolution had taken place, he opposed the theory that would account for all living organisms by evolution. If one would grant, as Darwin was willing to admit, the divine creation of matter and in-breathing of life into four or five forms,[3] McCosh reasoned that "there is surely, then, nothing inconceivable or improbable in the Almighty breathing into man the breath of life and making him a living soul."[4] While this divine breath produced man's higher nature, he held that man's body may have been formed out of existing materials by way of secondary causes which are "the same as effect the growth of the young in the womb."[5] Or "may there not have been a third process . . . by which man's body was created, diverse from the animal body and yet in affinity with it?"[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 166.

[2] John H. Gerstner, "Scottish Realism: Kant and Darwin in the Philosophy of James McCosh," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1945), p. 169.

[3] Darwin, Origin, p. 241.

[4] James McCosh, Christianity and Positivism (New York: Carter and Bros., 1871), p. 353.

[5] Ibid., p. 354.

This was a major step beyond Hodge and apparently beyond Duffield though twenty years after his article, the latter wrote that "there was nothing in the article of the Princeton Review . . . inconsistent with these well-known views of President McCosh."[2] McCosh's efforts to reconcile evolution with Christianity were gratefully remembered by one of the biology professors who said that McCosh's writings "averted a disastrous war between science and faith, and in 'his' college, men have studied Biology without losing their religion."[3]

Charles Hodge, at the age of seventy-six, was unable to do what his younger contemporaries did in resolving the conflict between science and Christianity. Instead, he girded himself for the conflict and proclaimed that "religion has to fight for its life against a large class of scientific men" and claimed that it had a right to be heard.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 355.

[2] Letter from John T. Duffield to the New York Tribune, January 13, 1897, reprinted in the Princeton Press, February 13, 1897, p. 2.

[3] Letter from Professor George Macloskie printed in W. M. Sloane, The Life of James McCosh (New York: Scribners, 1896), p. 124.

In spite of his pessimism and belligerent attitude, the principles which he had developed as the result of his earlier observations of the conflicts about the heliocentric view of the universe would have been useful here. Hodge held that the theologian is obligated to accept well verified facts as a guide to his interpretation of Scripture, but is still at liberty to reject a theory deduced from these facts. However, when a theologian becomes convinced of the truth of a theory, Hodge acknowledged that it too might be used to guide the interpretation of Scripture. He had approved of this principle in connection with the heliocentric theory and was willing to allow it with the nebular hypothesis should it receive adequate proof. He could have applied the same principle to the theory of evolution, but he was convinced that it could not be proved.

Hodge's doctrine on the origin of the soul would have helped him to reinterpret Christian doctrine along the same line as McCosh had done. He had long been in conflict with some contemporary theologians concerning the traducian theory, which taught that the human soul was the product of its parents. In line with his strong emphasis on dualism of mind and matter, Hodge held to creationism, which taught that the soul of the child is not generated or derived from his parents but is created immediately by God in the womb of its mother at, or shortly after, conception.[1] This is the view which Hodge, with his characteristically broad claims, assured his readers is the doctrine of the Reformed Church and also of the Greek and Latin Church.[2] In recent years, this view has made it easier for those who hold it to relate Christianity to the doctrine of evolution by admitting that the body of man could have developed by way of descent from some anthropoid member of the order of primates. At a certain point in time, God created a human soul in the embryo within the womb of a female primate, and the primate which was produced could properly be called man because it then had all the essential characteristics of humanity. But, according to the doctrine, this is really little different from what God has been doing at the conception of every child that has been born since the beginning of the human race. Because of his theological doctrine of creationism, Hodge had this same possibility before him had he been able to reinterpret the traditional doctrine of the first chapters of Genesis along the lines suggested by Duffield and McCosh.

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[1] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 142.

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, II, 70.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

In his earlier discussion of the relations between science and theology, Hodge had made a distinction between fact and theory in the scientific method. According to this distinction, he undoubtedly realized that the acceptance or rejection of design in the process of origin of species was far more on the theoretical side than was the acceptance or rejection of the facts which Darwin used to support the theory of evolution or even the theory of natural selection as the method by which evolution was accomplished. Hodge should have realized, in accordance with his distinction between fact and theory, that he could admit that evolution had occurred without accepting natural selection as its method. He could even have accepted natural selection without excluding, as Darwin did, the idea that this method was intentionally used of God to produce the abundance of species which occur today.

Darwin's Denial of Design in Evolution

According to Hodge, Darwinism consisted of three distinct elements: evolution or that all organic forms, plant and animal have been derived from one or a few primordial forms; this evolution has been accomplished by natural selection; and "by far the most important and only distinctive element in his theory, that this natural selection is without design, being conducted by unintelligent physical causes."[1] The major purpose of the book, What is Darwinism? was to prove the last point, that Darwin denied design.

Charles Darwin had corresponded with Asa Gray (1810-1888), a botanist at Harvard, before the publication of the Origin of Species and had sent him an advance copy for review.[2] Gray realized that Darwin's denial of design in the process of evolution would raise the charge of atheism and would unnecessarily hinder the acceptance of evolution in America. In answer to his letter, Darwin wrote:

> I am bewildered. I had no intention to write atheistically. But I own that I cannot see as plainly as others do, and as I should wish to do, evidence of design and beneficence on all sides of us. There seems to me too much misery in the world. I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express intention of their feeding within the living bodies of Caterpillars, or that a cat should play with mice. Not believing this, I see no necessity in the belief that the eye

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[1] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 48.

[2] Several review articles by Gray appeared in the Atlantic Monthly during 1860.

> was expressly designed. On the other hand, I cannot anyhow be contented to view this wonderful universe, and especially the nature of man, and to conclude that everything is the result of brute force. I am inclined to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, with the details, whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we may call chance. Not that this notion at all satisfies me. I feel most deeply that the whole subject is too profound for the human intellect.[1]

This letter shows that Darwin was grappling confusedly with two contrary ideas, the former from a naturalistic view and the latter from the theistic viewpoint advocated by Asa Gray. Another letter writter later that summer indicates the direction of his thinking.

> I see a bird which I want for food, take my gun and kill it, I do this designedly. An innocent and good man stands under a tree and is killed by a flash of lightning. Do you believe (and I really should like to hear) that God designedly killed this man? Many or most persons do believe this; I can't and don't. If you believe so, do you believe that when a swallow snaps up a gnat that God designed that that particular swallow should snap up that particular gnat at that particular instant? I believe that the man and the gnat are in the same predicament. If the death of neither man nor gnat are designed, I see no good reason to believe that their first birth or production should be necessarily designed.[2]

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[1] Letter from Charles Darwin to Asa Gray, May 22, 1860, printed in Francis Darwin (ed.), Life and Letters of Charles Darwin (New York: D. Appleton Company, 1910, II, 105.

[2] Letter from Charles Darwin to Asa Gray, July, 1860. Ibid., I, 284.

It is somewhat ironic that Darwin, who denied design in the evolutionary process in order to absolve God of direct responsibility for the evil resulting therefrom, should be condemned by Hodge as developing an atheistic system for having done so.

Darwinism is Tantamount to Atheism

Even though Hodge charged Darwin with the denial of design in the evolutionary process, his charge that the system which Darwin proposed is atheistic is open to question even on his own definition of the term. In the early part of Darwinism, a section is titled "Theism in Unscriptural Forms" in which he described several theories of God's relation to the world. The first is that God created matter, endowed it with properties, and then left this matter in its diffused form to develop following the laws resulting from these properties, into the present state of the world, without any interference or control on the part of God. The next theory includes the creative aspects of the first theory and adds at a certain stage of the process the creation of one or more living germs from which all living organisms have been developed, again without any further divine intervention. The third adds the creation of mind to this process. All these, according to Hodge, view the

Creator as a mere Deus ex machina, as an assumption to account for the origin of the world and its contents.[1]

None of these views are atheistic, but, as Hodge suggested by the title which he gave to this discussion, they are "unscriptural forms of theism." All of them are consistent with the definition which Hodge gave for deism in his Systematic Theology. The deistic theory of the universe teaches:

> that God having created the world and endowed his creatures with their attributes and properties, He has done all that is consistent with his nature. He does not interfere by his immediate agency in the production of effects. These belong to the efficiency of second causes.[2]

Each of the three "unscriptural forms of theism" described above fit into this description. A logical deduction from this would be that deism is, according to Hodge, one form of theism, a view that also has the support of a dictionary.[3] That a form of theism cannot be atheism is not only apparent from the etymology, but it also has the explicit affirmation of Hodge when he wrote that atheism "is in itself purely negative. . . . It simply denies what

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[1] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 22.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, I, 35.

[3] "Deism," Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Dagobert D. Runes (Ames, Iowa: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1955).

Theism asserts. The proof of Theism is, therefore, the refutation of Atheism."[1]

A study of Darwin's works shows that Darwin was a scientist, not a speculative philosopher. He did not seek to suggest radical changes in commonly held views which were outside the scope of his specialized study. Since his study did not include the origin of matter or life, he granted, as Hodge admitted he did, God's creation of matter and life.[2] With such assumptions about the origin of plant and animal life which were agreeable to theism, Darwin sought to show by a careful and detailed study of the similarities and differences of organisms how all could be derived from one or a few original forms by the operation of a few natural laws which he grouped under the rubric "natural selection." In this process of derivation, he denied all design and intervention by God. This put his system into Hodge's second form of unscriptural theism. Why, then, did Hodge, granting that Darwin was a theist, insist that his system was atheistic?[3]

Since matter and life were considered as "given" by Darwin, their origin was not the subject of his investigation,[1] and different views could be accepted without really conflicting with the results of his researches. The atheistic speculator could, by substituting the eternity of matter and spontaneous generation of life for the traditional theistic doctrine of origins, have a system which was consistently materialistic. Newton, though himself a theist, had had his theory of the universe interpreted in a materialistic way. Laplace, who had no need for the hypothesis of God in his nebular hypothesis, had had his theory interpreted in a theistic sense. Hodge recognized that the Darwinian theory had also been presented in a far more theistic manner than Darwin had,[2] but he was concerned about what Darwin did in his special area of study, namely, the origin of species. Here Darwin denied any design or intervention by God to accomplish the process. To have admitted design, he claimed, would make superfluous the laws included in the term "natural selection."[3] To Hodge, such a view meant that after creation of matter and life, God had no more to do with the universe than would have been the case if he had never existed.[1] Such a theory would leave man entirely without God as a father and ruler. It would make prayer meaningless and answers to prayer mere coincidences. This, Hodge concluded, was for all practical purposes atheism even though, according to his classification, it was a form of theism.

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, I, 241.

[2] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 27.

[3] C. Hodge, ST, II, 15, 19; Darwinism, p. 177.

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[1] Letter from Darwin, November 28, 1878, ". . . as to the eternity of matter, I have never troubled myself about such insoluble questions." F. Darwin, II, 412.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, I, 558; II, 16.

[3] C. Darwin, Variation of Plants and Animals under Domestication (New York: D. Appleton Company, 1910), II, 415.

Deism, having been a prominent alternative to theism for nearly two centuries, had so infiltrated popular Christian doctrine that many Christians tolerated deism.[2] Deism had become too mild a charge to make against Darwinism. In answering the question "What is Darwinism?" Hodge made it sound more ominous by answering, "It is Atheism."[3] To support this conclusion, Hodge used, not his own definition of atheism, but that of Asa Gray, a botanist not a theologian, who had in 1860 ably defended Darwin against the identical indictment.[4] Professor Louis

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[1] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 174.

[2] Stow Persons, "Evolution and Theology," Evolutionary Thought in America (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1956), p. 423.

[3] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 177.

[4] Asa Gray, "Darwin and his Reviewers," Atlantic Monthly, VI (October, 1860) 406-425. This essay is included in his Darwiniana, (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1876), pp. 129-177.

Agassiz, along with unnamed reviewers in the North American Review and the Christian Examiner, had charged the Darwinian hypothesis with atheism. In evaluating these criticisms, Gray had said, "The proposition that things and events in Nature were not designed to be so, if logically carried out, is doubtless tantamount to atheism."[1] Then he continued with this caution:

> Yet most people believe that some were designed and others were not. . . . So we should not like to stigmatize as atheistically disposed a person who regards certain things and events as being what they are through designed laws, . . . but as not themselves especially ordained, or who . . . believes in general, but not in particular Providence.[2]

In both of his works,[3] Hodge quoted the sentence ending with "tantamount to atheism" but ignored the explanation that followed. Since he had supported his charge that Darwin had denied design from Darwin himself, his advocates, and his opponents; Hodge was certain that he had proved his point. However, Gray's condition, "if logically carried out," would make the proposition mean that the denial of all design is "tantamount to atheism." There are two ways in which Darwin did not deny all design. First, to admit, as Darwin did, God's creation of matter and a few forms of life is to admit a rather definite kind of design. Secondly, Darwin also granted God's foreknowledge of every consequence of divinely imposed laws.[1] This, too, is to admit another kind of design. Having contrasted the general results of natural laws with those which were "intentionally ordered" by God, Darwin denied the latter.[2] He would not grant that the beneficial results of natural law are designed or intentionally ordered by God while those which are indifferent or prejudicial to the survival of the organism are merely due to natural laws. Both, he insisted, are "the result of the same general laws."[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 409.

[2] Ibid.

[3] C. Hodge, ST, 18; Darwinism, p. 176.

In Darwinism, Hodge made no such distinction in the meaning of design and so made his charge of atheism on the basis of a truncated quotation from Gray seem quite plausible to an unsophisticated audience. In his discussion of the problem, Darwin admitted that he was "travelling beyond my proper province" and concluded that he faced a difficulty "as insoluble as is that of free will and predestination."[1] Even Charles Hodge admitted after a careful discussion that divine providence is a "most difficult doctrine."[2] Hence, it is not surprising that these two men, one a life-long devotee of science, the other, of theology, should differ on the doctrine of the relation of God to the natural law which controls the universe. Because of this, it seems neither fair nor expedient on the part of Hodge simply to denounce Darwinism as atheism when he could have shown, by bringing his own doctrine of providence to bear on the subject, that evolution and even natural selection could have been affirmed without the denial of the design or intention of God in the origin of species.

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[1] C. Darwin, Animals and Plants, I, 415.

[2] Ibid., pp. 414-15.

[3] Ibid., p. 415.

During his study in Germany, Hodge had become suspicious of any innovation in philosophy because of what it might do to a theology which was based on it. In theory and in practice, he admired the methods and results of science as long as they seemed to have no effect on theology. He could approve of changes in interpretation of the Scripture made under the guidance of a scientific teaching when both the teaching and the reinterpretation of Scripture had already been successfully accomplished before he was born. He could even draw from these past conflicts a useful set of principles for the reinterpretation of Scripture in the light of scientific facts and accepted theories. But when it came to a new scientific theory such as the nebular hypothesis, he was reluctant to accept it as "a norm for the interpretation of Scripture" because it "has never commanded general assent among scientific men."[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 414-15.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, I, 615.

This was also the case when it came to the theory of evolution. He admitted both that it could be and had already been interpreted theistically. However, he felt that the conditions required for the evolutionary theory to become a norm for the reinterpretation of Scripture were far from being met. Hodge believed that the theory of evolution not only had not been proved, but that it could not be proved.[2] It may be, as was contended by a reviewer,[3] that Hodge was not as familiar with evolution as he should have been, for he claimed that the facts concerning evolution were as well known in 1844 when the theory propounded by Vestiges of Creation was rejected, as they were in 1874 when evolution was widely accepted. Hodge credits Darwin's denial of design for giving his theory wide acclaim.[1] If Hodge really felt that Darwin's accumulation of data and the arguments presented in his books before 1874 really added no new knowledge of evolution, then it can be seen why he failed to be impressed with the evidence.

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[1] C. Hodge, ST, I, 558.

[2] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 144.

[3] Review of What is Darwinism?, Popular Science Monthly, V (June, 1878), 246.

Even though he acknowledged that a person could "be an evolutionist and yet not be an atheist and may admit of design in nature," he could not see how the theory of evolution could be reconciled with the declarations of the Scriptures.[2] This reflects the fact that Hodge was essentially a conservative theologian. His son wrote that the elder Hodge held precisely the same doctrines in his old age as in the controversies of his youth.[3] It is well known that at the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of his professorship at Princeton, he could proudly say "a new idea never originated in this Seminary."[4]

Thus the conservatism of his theology, his view of Scripture, and his failure to appreciate the persuasiveness of the arguments for evolution combined to prevent him from making a positive attempt to relate his theology to evolution, even though, according to his view of providence and his teaching on the relation of science and theology, he could have done so.

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[1] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 146.

[2] Ibid., p. 141.

[3] A. A. Hodge, Life of Hodge, p. 253.

[4] Ibid., p. 521.

CHAPTER IV

A. A. HODGE AND EVOLUTION

Biographical Data and Publications

Archibald Alexander Hodge was born July 18, 1823, of Charles Hodge and Sarah Bache, great-granddaughter of Benjamin Franklin. After graduating from the College of New Jersey in 1841, he spent a year studying physics under Joseph Henry (1797-1878), the famous physicist then professor at Princeton and later director of the Smithsonian Institute. In later life Hodge told how they worked together on original experiments on the telegraph.[1]

After a year teaching at an academy and one as tutor at his Alma Mater, he entered the seminary and was graduated in the class of 1847. He and his bride then went as missionaries to Allahabad, India. Because of ill health, they served only three years before returning to pastorates, first in Maryland (1851-55) and then in Fredericksburg, Virginia (1855-61). During the latter pastorate, he developed his _Outlines of Theology_ as Sunday evening lectures to his congregation.[1] In 1864 he was called from his pastorate at Wilkesbarre, Pa., to fill the chair of theology at Western Theological Seminary where he taught until he left to assist his father. His next book was The Atonement,[2] followed by A Commentary on the Confession of Faith.[3] In this book as well as in both the 1860 and 1878 editions of the Outlines, he has expressed his views on evolution. During 1885 and 1886, he gave a series of lectures, some of which were published in The Presbyterian. After his death, these were collected and published as Popular Lectures on Theological Themes.[4] This, too, gave his views on evolution as he expressed them to a lay audience. After the death of the younger Hodge, Charles A. Salmond, a Scotsman who had attended Princeton Seminary during the 1877-78 term, the one year in which the father and son were colleagues, published Princetoniana.[1] A section of this book, "Brevia Theologica," consists of notes which are, according to Salmond, given as far as possible in A. A. Hodge's own words.[2] Included in this are Hodge's expressions of his views on evolution to his theological students but not for publication.

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[1] A. A. Hodge, "God, His Being, and His Attributes," _The Presbyterian_, January 30, 1886, p. 5.

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[1] A. A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1866), p. iii. First published in 1860, the index was added in 1865, and then the book was rewritten and enlarged in 1878. Because significant additions about evolution occur in the latter edition, it will be distinguished from earlier editions.

[2] A. A. Hodge, The Atonement (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1867).

[3] A. A. Hodge, A Commentary on the Confession of Faith (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1869).

[4] A. A. Hodge, Popular Lectures on Theological Themes (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1887). Another book, Evangelical Theology, A Course of Lectures by A. A. Hodge was published in 1890 by T. Nelson and Sons of London. A comparison of these two books revealed that the latter was a reprint of the former with a new set of type and minor editorial revisions.

Although he was a less prolific writer than his father and wrote only a few articles in the Princeton Review and Presbyterian Review, he did write several reviews of books. His most significant one for this study was of Asa Gray's Natural Science and Religion.[3] During the last year of his life, he wrote the "Introduction" to the book, Theism and Evolution.[4] In these expressions of opinion over a period of twenty-six years, there is evidence that A. A. Hodge changed his attitude toward evolution.

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[1] Charles A. Salmond, Princetonia, Charles and A. A. Hodge With Class and Table Talk of Hodge the Younger (Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson, and Ferrier, 1888).

[2] Ibid., p. 114.

[3] Presbyterian Review, I (July, 1880, 586-589.

[4] Joseph S. Van Dyke, Theism and Evolution (New York: A. C. Armstrong and Sons, 1886), pp. xv-xxii.

Both A. A. Hodge and Charles Hodge began to teach theology in seminary at about the age of forty-two. Whereas the elder Hodge had spent the years since seminary studying or teaching biblical literature and developing a solid biblical foundation for his teaching of theology, the younger Hodge had devoted himself to the more practical efforts on the mission field and the pastorate. He certainly had less learning than his father but, according to Patton who was a student of the one and a colleague of the other, the son had "more genius" than his father and was "distinguished by keen metaphysical insight and a marvelous power of extemporaneous expression."[1] This ability is revealed especially in his last work, Popular Lectures, in which he also made use of his knowledge of physical science to illustrate theological doctrines.

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[1] Francis L. Patton, "Address", printed in The Centennial Celebration of the Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., ed. B. B. Warfield, W. P. Armstrong, and H. M. Robinson (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Theological Seminary, 1912), p. 341.

Early Views of Relation of Theology and Science

Undoubtedly most of the first edition of the *Outlines* (1860) had been written before Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published (November, 1859). At least, there is no indication in the book that A. A. Hodge had read the *Origin*. However, he did have an awareness of many of the problems existing between religion and science. In the *Outlines*, he indicated that Laplace's nebular hypothesis and the theory proposed in *Vestiges of Creation*[1] should be seen as different aspects of "the theory of development," which "does not *necessarily* lead to theoretical atheism" but rather "to practical atheism, since it denies all providential intervention."[2] He noted that although the nebular hypothesis was by that time "generally held by Christian philosophers and astronomers as a highly probable speculation, agreeing with and interpreting all known facts,"[3] they held it to be only a description of the successive stages by which God, after having created matter from nothing, had by exercising "his ceaseless providential agency" brought the world into its present condition.[1] In line with this theory and on the basis of agreement by geologists, Hodge apparently had no difficulty in accepting nor hesitancy in teaching his parishioners the idea that matter had been in existence for incalculable ages and that it had gone through both a gaseous and a molten stage before it reached its present solid state.[2] While he could accept these as facts, he felt that it would be absurd to accept the nebular hypotheses as Laplace had proposed, that is, as a rational account of the origin of the universe apart from the intelligent action of God.[3] Although the younger Hodge appeared more willing than his father to accept without more extensive proof the nebular hypothesis as the method of development of the universe, he followed him in insisting that God should be considered the intelligent agent guiding the whole process.

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[1] /Robert Chambers7, *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*, (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1845). This book was published anonymously while the younger Hodge was in seminary. Albert B. Dod, professor of the College, wrote an extended review for the *Princeton Review*, XVII (October, 1845), 505-557.

[2] A. Hodge, *Outlines* (1860), p. 23.

[3] *Ibid*.

Hodge was sufficiently impressed by the success of scientific investigation that he taught his people that geology had "clearly established the fact that the earth had existed many myriads of years," that it had passed through many catastrophies which had destroyed "whole races of plants and animals," and that then "new and distinct species" had been introduced to repopulate the earth.[1] Accordingly, the earth had successively supported many "different orders of organized beings."[2] Each species was adapted to the earth's physical condition during the age when it had lived, and each successive kind had "an advancing scale of organization, from the more elementary to the more complex and more perfect forms, until the advent of man, the last and most perfect of all, about six thousand years ago."[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 23, cf., p. 188

[2] Ibid., p. 191.

[3] Ibid., p. 24.

As evidence for this position A. A. Hodge cited as facts of geology several statements taken from Edward Hitchcock's (1793-1864) Religion of Geology. The first was that fossils which are found in the rocks were not simply created there but are the organic remains of plants or animals. Other conclusions of Hitchcock's which he apparently accepted, are as follows:

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 191.

[3] *Ibid.*

> "Numerous races of animals and plants must have occupied the globe previous to those which now inhabit it, and have successively passed away as catastrophies occurred, or as climate became unfit for their residence. Thirty thousand species have already been dug from the rocks, and with few exceptions none of them corresponding to those now living upon the earth." "Not less than four or five, and probably more, entire races have passed away, and been succeeded by recent ones, so that the globe has actually changed all its inhabitants half a dozen times."[1]

In the pre-Darwininian period this teaching of geologists, along with his confidence that all naturalists rejected both spontaneous generation and the production of one species from another, led him to conclude that "geology demonstrates not only one, but many successive acts of absolute creation."[2]

After admitting all this, he described Hugh Miller's (1802-1856) method of reconciling geology with Genesis as follows:

> The days spoken of . . . in Genesis were not natural days of twenty-four hours, "but periods of great, though indefinite length, during which all the changes exhibited by the strata of the rocks took place," and in which the several orders of organized vegetable and animal beings were successively created, man being brought into existence at the end of the closing day of creation.[3]

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[1] Edward Hitchcock, quoted in A. A. Hodge, Outlines (1860), p. 192.

[2] A. Hodge, Outlines (1860), p. 22.

[3] Ibid., p. 194.

His dissatisfaction with this method is indicated by his comment that "theologians and geologists agree in regarding this method of reconciliation as doing equal violence to the language of the record and to the facts of science."[1]

Hodge seemed most satisfied with what is known as the gap theory which teaches that the universe was created out of nothing in the remote past. After an undetermined time, God in six natural days produced "the present order of this world, adapting it to the residence of its present inhabitants, and . . . created the present races of plants and animals."[2] This meant that the fossils, being different from extant species, must have been due to previous but unrecorded creations.

The theory proposed in Vestiges rejected these numerous acts of absolute creation and sought to account for the same data by other means. Hodge understood it as an explanation of the origination of the simplest organic beings from inorganic material elements, and then "the gradual development through successive stages of organic races, the higher from the lower in virtue of the inherent self-acting principles of nature."[3]

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 193.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 24.

In his criticism of this view, Hodge followed the same pattern of quoting scientists as used by his father. He mentioned several including Agassiz, who repudiated it and cited Hugh Miller on speciation, spontaneous generation, and degradation of races. He also noted the discreditation of the experiment, offered by the author of Vestiges, of the formation of small insects by means of a galvanic current.[1] Hodge then gave several less scientific and more philosophical objections: (1) It is based "wholly upon the absurd idea of 'law.'"[2] Hodge held that law is only the method according to which a cause acts and not the cause itself. (2) It develops mind from matter. (3) It ignores the doctrine that the vital principle which directs material forces in the development of the organism, is itself wholly immaterial, and cannot be developed by material forces.[3]

In summary, it is evident that Hodge was willing to follow astronomy in accepting the nebular hypothesis when it was viewed as God's method of working, to follow geology in accepting catastrophes and the recreation of new species to replace the ones which had been destroyed. However, he would not accept a new theory if the prevailing opinion of scientists was against it, if it was opposed to the dualism of mind and matter, if it denied God's providential guidance of the operation of the universe, or if it was in conflict with the Scriptures.

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[1] Ibid., citing Hugh Miller, Footprints of the Creator.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., pp. 24-25.

After discussing these problems in relation to geology, Hodge set down more principles by which to handle problems involving science and Scripture. The first is the idea that all truth must be consistent, and, since "God's works and God's word are alike absolute truth,"[1] any discrepancies which occur must "wholly exist in man's imperfect interpretation, either of the works upon the one hand, or of the word upon the other."[2] Here is a recognition that the theologian too may be mistaken in his interpretation of the Scripture. The second principle involves his understanding of the nature and purpose of Scripture.

> Revelation was not designed to anticipate the natural progress of science, consequently the Scriptures teach us nothing concerning the interpretation of the phenomenal world of nature, but uniformly speak of phenomena as they appear, and in the common language of the age and people among whom they were written, and never of physical causes or laws as they are in fact. Thus they speak of the sun "rising," "setting," "going back," "standing still," etc.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 194.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., pp. 194-195.

The third principle consists in the recognition that many inconsistencies between nature and revelation have already been resolved by fuller knowledge of the facts and unprejudiced interpretation of the Bible. The fourth is that problems involving geology are no different from those involving history because both are incomplete. He also urged Christians to rejoice at every advance of science, pointing out that fear of the results of science reveals a lack of faith.[1]

Although his next book, The Atonement (1867), was written well after the advent of Darwinism and deals with a subject which could be most profoundly affected by a full acceptance of the theory of evolution, Hodge does not touch upon this or any other phase of the problem involving religion and science. This was undoubtedly due to the fact that evolution had not yet been accepted to a sufficient extent to make such a consideration appropriate.

In his Commentary on the Confession of Faith (1869), he briefly restated the problems which geology poses for Genesis 1 and again gave suggested solutions, but he admitted that "no adjustment thus far suggested has been found to remove all difficulty."[2] He then reaffirmed the principles for reconciliation which he had previously suggested.[1]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 195.

[2] A. Hodge, *Confession*, p. 118.

In handling the theory of organic development, he mentioned the theory of man's descent from the next lower organism, but immediately denied any such connection, insisting that man "was immediately created by God, his body out of earthly materials previously created and his soul out of nothing."[2] In support of his position, he pointed to the lack of a single specimen in transition from a lower species to a higher one and referred to a list of scientists who rejected the theory.[3]

Sir Charles Lyell (1797-1875), who was cited in support of Hodge's rejection of organic development, had taught that man had existed on earth thousands of years before Adam and that Adam was the ancestor of only one variety of the human race. Hodge rejected this conclusion because the facts on which it was based were neither "certainly substantiated" nor "thoroughly digested," and, he insisted, they could "prove nothing as to the relation of Adam to the race, but only that he was created longer ago than we supposed."[1]

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[1] Cf., A. Hodge, Outlines (1860), pp. 194-195.

[2] A. Hodge, Confession, p. 122.

[3] Ibid.

Professor Agassiz, also cited by Hodge, taught that the differences between the races of man were so great that the progenitors of each must have been created separately. Hodge presented this view as contradictory to that of the derivation of man from the lower animals. He argued for the unity of mankind giving as evidence that the human family varied no more than did some of the lower groups of animals whose common descent was known. He also cited the fertility of the races when interbred; the identity of their mental, moral, and spiritual natures; and the archeological, historical, and philological evidence.[2]

Even ten years after the publication of the Origin, A. A. Hodge still did not specifically mention the book, and, if he dealt with it at all, he did so only under the broader category of organic development. He made no progress in relating to the theory except to admit the possibility of a more ancient date for the origin of man than the 6000 years accepted in 1860.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 123.

[2] Ibid., pp. 123-124.

[3] A. Hodge, Outlines (1860), p. 191.

Later Views on Theology and Evolution

The Outlines of Theology, published in 1860, was used as a theological text book and went through several reprintings. After having taught theology for fourteen years, Hodge rewrote the book adding much new material. His first three books had been written during a period when theologians were still attempting to discredit evolution and could draw, as the Hodges had done, on quite a group of scientists for support.[1] By the time of the revision Agassiz was dead, and his leading students had become evolutionists of the neo-Lamarckian variety.[2] Lyell had long accepted evolution, while James Dana of Yale had conceded it in 1874. The elder Hodge had written against Darwinism in 1873-74, but James McCosh had made some important concessions in his attempt to relate Christianity to evolution. In this changed atmosphere, would A. A. Hodge hold to his former course and to that of his father or follow the way pointed by James McCosh, the president of his alma mater?

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[1] Roberts, p. 39.

[2] Edwin Justin Pfeifer, "Reception of Darwinism in the United States, 1859-1880" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 1957), p. 168.

The first evidence of any change occurs in his discussion of the charge that evolution had "very much weakened, if not absolutely invalidated," the teleological argument.[1] He began by classifying the "many theories of evolution" into three categories according to their relation to orthodox theology. The first consisted of those which "neither deny nor obscure the evidence which the order and adaptation observed in nature afford to the existence of God, and his immanence in and providential control of his works."[2] Of this group he wrote, "The Natural Theologian has, of course, only the most friendly interest."[3] This is quite a change from his "interest" as indicated by his earlier works.

The second group consisted of those who recognize God as the creator of matter and its laws in the remote past but "deny his immanence and constant providential activity in his works."[4] This is the deistic position, which had also used the teleological argument but had long been opposed by orthodox theology because of its denial of providence. Hodge claimed that the "scientific principle of continuity" is less compatible with the deistic view than with the orthodox conception "of the First Cause as immanent in the universe, and as organically concurring with all unintelligent second causes in all processes exhibiting power or intelligence."[1] The evidence from man's moral consciousness, man's history, and revelation, Hodge held, also supported God's immanence and providence as against the deistic view.[2]

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[1] A. A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology Rewritten and Enlarged (New York: A. C. Armstrong and Son, 1891), p. 38. This is the 1878 edition and will be cited as Outlines (1878).

[2] Ibid., p. 39.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

The third group consisted of those which "professedly or virtually obscure or deny the evidence afforded by the order and adaptation of the universe for the existence and activity of God alike as Creator and as Providential Ruler."[3] Hodge put Darwin's theory into this group because it taught that the differentiation of all organisms is due to "accidental variations occurring through unlimited time."[4] The Darwinian theory of evolution, Hodge argued, not only could not explain the origin of life, sensation, intelligence, will, or conscience; but, because of the sterility of hybrids, it could not even explain the origin of genera or species. Against the case for man's descent from any lower animal, Hodge quoted Professor Rudolf Virchow (1813-1902) to the effect that scientists are farther from its proof than ever.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

"But even if continuous evolution could be proved to be a fact,"[2] Hodge felt that this would still not affect the teleological argument. Such proof "would only establish a method or system of means,"[3] while the nature of the results would remain the same and so would disclose the same attributes of their real cause. He even held that, in spite of their intentions, the criticism of this argument by Hume and Kant had been beneficial because they had forced the natural theologian, who had previously tended merely to accumulate instances of the argument, to reexamine its basic principles and the correct method and range of its application.[4] Christendom, he told his students, was in need of "another Paley, to rewrite the argument from design in view of the advance of science."[5]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] A. A. Hodge, Review of Religion and Chemistry, by Josiah Parsons Cooke, Presbyterian Review, II (April, 1881), 427.

[5] A. Hodge, quoted in Salmond, p. 42.

Hodge's confidence in the continuing validity of the teleological argument, even should evolution be proved, was shared by many other writers during this period.[1] This fact forecast the removal of the charge, "denial of design" of which the elder Hodge had made such vigorous use, from the list of objections to evolution.

In his survey of the teachings of geology in the later edition of the Outlines, Hodge held that there was agreement on such major points as the creation of the elements in past ages, followed by chaos, the advance of the earth through various stages to its present state, and the successive creation of different genera and species of organic life from the lower to the higher and culminating in man.[2] There is difficulty in adjusting between geology and the Mosaic record, he claimed, only "in matters of detail, in which the true sense of the inspired record is obscure, and the conclusions of the science are immature."[3] Because of such limitations, all attempts at detailed reconciliation have so far failed. To those who might be disturbed by this lack of detailed reconciliation, he pointed out the contrast between other ancient cosmogonies and the Genesis record and the latter's purpose as "a general introduction to the history of Redemption."[1]

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[1] Pfeifer, p. 135.

[2] A. Hodge, Outlines (1878), p. 246.

[3] Ibid.

After this discussion, Hodge again gave a list of principles to be used in considering apparent conflicts between science and revelation. A comparison of these with those previously given reveals some maturing of insight through the passage of eighteen years. Science, the interpretation of God's works, has the right to pursue the investigation of its own branch of study by its own legitimate methods without interference from outside. It has the duty to keep within its area of study, to recognize that it deals only with one segment of truth, and "to respect alike all orders of truth, historical and inspired as well as the scientific; mental and spiritual, as well as material."[2] He believed that men who confine themselves to specialized branches of inquiry develop peculiar habits of thought and are apt to measure the whole of truth by criteria used in their area of specialization. This, of course, generates conflict and misunderstanding. Each must realize that both the scientist and the biblical interpreter are fallible and make mistakes. The theologians "should never assert the absolute identity of their interpretations of the Bible with the mind of God."[1] In the resolution of these conflicts, one may have to give way to the other. "Sometimes it is the views of the theologian which are amended into harmony with perfected and demonstrated science, e.g., . . . the once abhorred Copernican system."[2] In many cases, however, the state of science is as yet incomplete, and one must wait until the time "when geologists are all agreed among themselves, when all the accessible facts of the science are observed, analysed, and classified"[3] before a reconciliation can be obtained. In the meantime, he warned against two divergent tendencies:

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[1] Ibid.

[2] A. Hodge, Outlines (1878), p. 247.

> The first is the weak acceptance of every hostile conclusion of scientific speculators as certainly true; the constant confession of the inferiority of the light of revelation to the light of nature, and of the certainty of the conclusions of Biblical exegesis and Christian theology to that of the results of modern science; the constant attempt to accomodate the interpretation of the Bible, like a nose of wax, to every new phase assumed by the current interpretations of nature. The second and opposite extreme is that of jealously suspecting all the findings of science as probable

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

> offences against the dignity of revelation, and of impatiently attacking even those passing phases of imperfect science which for the time appear to be inconsistent with our own opinions.[1]

Although these principles might well be improved, their observance in the relations of Christianity and science would have eliminated much acrimonious controversy.

In the first edition of the Outlines, Hodge indicated his position by a passing reference to man as being created "about six thousand years ago."[2] However, he did not discuss the problem in print until the revised edition in which he cast doubt on all calculations which were based upon "the incomplete historical and genealogical records of the pre-Abrahamic period found in the first chapters of Genesis."[3] He noted that William Henry Green, Princeton's professor of Old Testament since 1850, had shown that these genealogies may have been condensed, like those in the gospel of Matthew in which names are known to have been omitted, perhaps for mnemonic purposes. That the pre-Abrahamic genealogies were, in fact, incomplete, Hodge felt, is indicated by modern research which

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[1] Ibid., pp. 247-248.

[2] A. Hodge, Outlines (1860), p. 191.

[3] Outlines (1878), p. 297.

"has developed a vast and constantly increasing amount of evidence that the human race has existed upon the earth many centuries longer than is allowed for . . ."[1] even by the longer chronologies. He set no limit on the time allowable and even indicated his approval of the Duke of Argyll whom he quoted as saying, "The older the human family can be proved to be, the more possible and probable it is that it has descended from a single pair."[2] In his Popular Lectures, Hodge quoted Professor Arnold Guyot (1807-1884) of the college as saying about the antiquity of man, "I think that thirteen thousand years instead of six thousand would cover it,"[3] and then minimized its importance by asking, "Now, what difference does it make?"[4] On the basis of his own evaluation of the scientific evidence of the date of Adam's creation, he concluded, "There is no reason to believe that it was more than fifteen or sixteen thousand years; but whether more or less, revelation has not informed us."[5] This supports St. Amant's assertion that the younger Hodge "was more impressed than his predecessor by scientific claims to man's antiquity."[1] Such concessions, however, hardly make a dent in the half-million to two million years which are often claimed in the mid-twentieth century.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 298, quoting Primeval Man, p.128.

[3] A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, p. 178.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. 179.

In this connection, the younger Hodge also made some surprisingly broad statements about the earlier chapters of Genesis. Before the history of redemption which, he held, began with Abraham, the Bible merely puts the chronological events into position.

> All before that is the simple introduction crowded into some ten or twelve chapters, designed to teach us these tremendous facts: first, creation; second, the fall; thirdly, the general dealing of God with men in preparation for redemption to come; but these great facts are dropped in by the great artist of revelation as an introduction merely to the history beginning with Abraham. Everything back of this is piled up like the background in front of which history stands. [2]

Beginning with the birth of Abraham, he claimed, "We have biography, we have appointed times, we have history."[3] This indicates that A. A. Hodge was more willing to consider a less literal interpretation of the pre-Abrahamic portions of Genesis than was his father or other defenders of orthodoxy.

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[1] St. Amant, p. 309.

[2] A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, pp. 178-79.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

Review of Asa Gray's Science and Religion

After his revision of the Outlines, his next significant utterance was an extended notice of Asa Gray's Natural Science and Religion.[1] He described Gray as being "a thorough evolutionist of the Darwinian variety, and at the same time a thoroughly loyal theist and Christian."[2] This statement, along with Hodge's affirmation, "We have no sympathy with those who maintain that scientific theories of evolution are necessarily atheistic,"[3] probably led St. Amant to say that the younger Hodge's view cut straight across his father's position in which "Darwinism and theism were mutually exclusive."[4] Even Charles Hodge, in perhaps an unguarded moment, admitted that "there may be a theistic interpretation of the Darwinian theory."[5]

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[1] A. A. Hodge, Review of Natural Science and Religion, by Asa Gray, Presbyterian Review, I (July, 1880), 586-89.

[2] Ibid., p. 586.

[3] Ibid.

[4] St. Amant, p. 314.

[5] C. Hodge, ST, II, 16.

The elder Hodge's position was not, as St. Amant put it, "that evolution nullified teleology and, therefore, necessarily implied atheism."[1] Charles Hodge repeatedly admitted that evolution may be and has been interpreted in a theistic manner.[2] His position was that evolution, if it nullified teleology, necessarily implied atheism. He held that Darwinism included evolution, natural selection, and the denial of design, it being the last that gave Darwinism its "peculiar character and importance."[3] This denial of design made Darwinism particularly offensive to the elder Hodge and became the basis of his charge of atheism. His son recognized this and acknowledged his agreement in a discussion of the Darwinian theory in which "the universe and its order is referred to Chance" so that "teleology is impossible," and theism is "stripped of its most effective evidence."[4] He concluded, "Therefore Dr. Charles Hodge was abundantly justified in indicating this phase of evolution as atheistic."[5]

Asa Gray, although called a Darwinian by A. A.

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[1] St. Amant, p. 314.

[2] C. Hodge, ST, II, 16, 25; Darwinism, pp. 50-51, 70, 104.

[3] C. Hodge, Darwinism, p. 52.

[4] A. Hodge, in Van Dyke, p. xviii.

[5] Ibid.

Hodge, was not one in the strict sense of denial of design. He tried through a series of letters to get Darwin to accept the idea that "variation has been led along certain beneficial lines."[1] In other words, Gray tried to convince Darwin that he should put design back into evolution. Therefore, in calling Gray a Darwinian, A. A. Hodge was not suggesting that Gray denied design, nor was he himself accepting the denial of design as consistent with theism.

In the course of this review, A. A. Hodge evaluated several scientific principles as to their compatibility with Christian theism and gave his imprimatur to "the uninterrupted Continuity of Causation throughout the universe" and "the absolutely universal law of the Uniformity of Nature when that law is truly expounded."[2] The acceptance of these principles would not, according to Hodge, exclude miracles, for they do not violate the law of uniformity.

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[1] Asa Gray, quoted in C. Darwin, Animals and Plants, II, 415. Italics mine. Cf., letter from C. Darwin to Asa Gray in The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, II, 104.

[2] A. Hodge, Presbyterian Review, I (July, 1880), 587.

> A miracle is simply the introduction at a single point into the system of natural causes, of a new supernatural con-cause designed so to work together with the already working natural causes that the resultant should be to intelligent, moral agents a sign of God's presence, or power, or authority.[1]

He also approved, as not incongruous with Christian theism, the introduction of a "more comprehensive and ultimate teleology"[2] which sees the universe as an intellectual system, a coherent plan of God in which all aspects of the history of the universe comprise "an ideal evolution, a providential unfolding of a general plan, in which general designs and methods converge in all directions to the ultimate end of the whole."[3] In fact, Hodge felt that this scientific view of the unity of the universe is "in its essence" the one that has been for ages held by Augustinian theologians.[4]

On the last scientific principle, Hodge wrote:

> Nor, finally, has Christian theism any essential objection to the doctrine of the descent of species from species, as of individuals from individuals, if it be, indeed, capable of proof, the case of man, because of the specific assertions of Scripture, being excepted. Very evidently it is not beyond the power of the Creator, nor incongruous with what appear to be His methods on the whole, for Him to engraft by a direct act of His will, new and higher powers upon an organism produced by natural processes originated in a previous creation.[5]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. 588.

In this review, A. A. Hodge was careful to distinguish the word "evolution" and "the doctrine of the descent of species from species." If man were excluded from the process, he would accept the latter as compatible with Christian theism. This very exclusion of man because of "specific assertions of Scripture"[1] (undoubtedly Genesis 1-2) suggests that he felt no such conflict with the Scriptures in assuming that the rest of the organic world had descended from lower forms of life. Although he felt that such descent neither had been proved nor was capable of proof, he admitted that the Christian theist could consistently hold to such descent if he held that the gaps which Hodge believed were unbridgeable by natural processes had been bridged by the engrafting on earlier organisms of "new and higher powers" by direct acts of God's will. Such divine acts which utilized natural processes would, according to Hodge, come under the definition of "mediate creation."[2] He would require such divine engraftings for transitions involving life, consciousness, reason, will, and conscience.[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

Hodge felt that evolution should be distinguished from this theory of descent of species from lower organisms which teaches the necessity of divine engraftings. He wanted to restrict the word, "Evolution" to that theory:

> the very essence of which involves the bringing, by natural process, of the living out of the non-living; the conscious from the unconscious; the rational from the irrational; the living soul, the spontaneous will, the voice of conscience from the mechanism of organs, which, in their turn, had their origin in the mechanism of molecules. The cause which produces the series of offspring is in the constitution of the original germ. . . . The theory necessarily implies that the soul of man, with its wonderful essential attributes, was virtually present in the primeval germ, and has been transmitted down through the intermediate stages; or otherwise, that life comes from death, consciousness from unconsciousness; and reason, will, and conscience from mechanical force. This is Evolution.[1]

This Evolution is, according to A. A. Hodge, not only incompatible with Christian theism but should be protested both by reason and religion.[2]

While he charged Gray with failure to clear away "the essential logical incongruousness"[3] of this evolution and theistic philosophy, Hodge sensed the value for the theistic viewpoint of the principles which Gray had suggested. The first was that the proofs to which the biologists appealed were largely probabilities of a higher or lower order which have been accepted on prima facie evidence.[1] The second, a key difference between Gray and Darwin, was that variation, rather than spreading in all directions from the parent stock as Darwin held, was "providentially led along certain designed lines of special usefulness."[2] The third, involving providence and the principle of conservation of energy, urged that a particular direction could be given to an act without adding to the sum total of the energy in the universe, or, if not, such increments of energy could be so minimal that science could not detect them.[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

Hodge also followed Gray when the latter argued that the general causes (heredity, variation, natural selection) advocated by Darwin could not account for all biological phenomena and brought in "unknown causes . . . of a more special character and higher order,"[4] but he differed from him when Gray suggested that theistic evolution "does not declare that these are not secondary causes."[5]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 589.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

Hodge insisted that no combination of secondary causes alone could produce life, consciousness, reason, will, or conscience; but that God alone could create these "transcendental endowments" and place them at the appropriate points in the process of development. This combination of process and divine intervention, he felt, should not be called "evolution"[1] but "mediate creation."[2]

Earlier in the review, Hodge had expressed sympathy with Noah Porter's question to his scientific friends who as theistic or Christian evolutionists accepted "evolution as a 'working hypothesis,' to consider whether they do not therein 'commit themselves to the merciless grasp of a logic from which it may not be easy to escape.'"[3] The logic referred to was that of W. K. Clifford who in "short and apparently easy steps" went "from the inorganic to the living, from life to spirit, from spirit to conscience, . . ."[4] It was evidently Hodge's purpose to oppose this logic and its tendency to the denial of the existence of God[5] by insisting on the necessity of a direct divine intervention for the production of each of these "new and higher powers."[1]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 588.

[3] Ibid., p. 586, quoting Noah Porter, "The Newest Atheism," PR, LVI (May, 1880)~~, 392.~~

[4] Porter, p. 392.

[5] Ibid., p. 380.

Brief Reviews

In 1883 Hodge reviewed Henry Drummond's Natural Law in the Spiritual World which, he recognized, was written in the interests of orthodox Christianity, but he felt that Drummond "naturally magnifies the extent of the changes which the wise application of his method will effect either in the substance, the form, or even in the relations of Christian Theology."[2]

Samuel Cox wrote a book in which he showed that "a theistic form of evolution may be assumed, which, instead of excluding teleology, presents the very highest conceivable conception of it," and gave the credit for this achievement to "'new departures' and 'broad' views of Biblical interpretation and theology."[3] Hodge refused to allow such an exclusive ownership and claimed that the representatives of conservative theology would "as heartily and as intelligently" accept these same views.[1]

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[1] A. Hodge, Presbyterian Review, I (July, 1880), 588.

[2] A. A. Hodge, Review of Natural Law in the Spiritual World, by Henry Drummond, Presbyterian Review, IV (October, 1883), 873.

[3] A. A. Hodge, Review of Miracles: An Argument and a Challenge, by Samuel Cox, Presbyterian Review, VI (January, 1885), 176.

George Matheson suggested that if evolution should prove to be true and even if Herbert Spencer's variety were accepted, this still would "not injuriously affect the hold which Christianity possesses over the minds of men."[2] In his review, Hodge warned that Matheson's book should be read with great caution and with constant reference to the Bible.[3]

During this period, A. A. Hodge was neither dogmatically rejecting proposals for reconciliation nor naively accepting them, but was making a critical evaluation of each.

Introduction to Theism and Evolution

During the last year of his life, Hodge, in his "Introduction" to J. S. Van Dyke's Theism and Evolution, gave a fairly extended discussion in which he sought to delineate the limits of evolution. This time, rather than defining evolution in a way that would be incompatible with Christian theism, he contrasted the doctrine of evolution as a working hypothesis with the theory of evolution as allied with an alien philosophy.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] A. A. Hodge, Review of Can the Old Faith Live with the New? by George Matheson, Presbyterian Review, VI (October, 1885), 757.

[3] Ibid.

First, he defined science very narrowly as concerned "only with phenomena and their fixed relations in time and space" and as having nothing to do "with origins, or causes, or final ends."[1] When the scientific doctrine of evolution is confined to "the scientific account of phenomena and their laws of co-existence and of succession," he wrote, it is "not antagonistic to our faith as either theists or christians."[2] However, when evolution becomes allied with a philosophy which supplies the ideas, causes, and final ends to give a rational account of the scientific data, then it can threaten the Christian faith. When evolution is so connected with a materialistic philosophy, with pantheism, or with Darwinism, which seeks to explain progress in biology by an "all-directioned variation" and by natural selection; teleology is ruled out along with its evidence for God's existence.[3]

In general, any theory of evolution that refuses to acknowledge "spiritual views of man and God and their relations,"[1] that admits no divine intervention at any time or for any purpose, or that allows no active agent other than the natural, would deny the supernatural and be contrary to Christian theism.[2] On the other hand, he wrote:

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[1] A. Hodge, in Van Dyke, p. xvi.

[2] Ibid., p. xvii.

[3] Ibid., p. xviii.

> It is evident that any doctrine of evolution which intelligently recognizes the plain facts of man's spiritual nature, his reason, conscience, and free-will, will equally recognize the same attributes as the property of God. Evolution considered as the plan of an infinitely wise Person and executed under the control of His everywhere present energies can never be irreligious; can never exclude design, providence, grace, or miracles.[3]

Hodge insisted that every doctrine of evolution, if it recognizes its own limitations, must "presuppose a creative and rational basis" and acknowledge "the universal causal judgment . . . that every new thing coming into being must have been preceded by a cause adequate to account rationally for its existence."[4] This means that molecular mechanics can account neither for the origin of life and its properties, nor for the origin of sensation, consciousness, instinct, and intelligence. Neither can non-rational or non-moral existence account for man's higher reason or his conscience.[1] These new elements and especially the soul of man could, according to Hodge, have been introduced into the process of "natural evolution only by an immediate act of God."[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. xx.

It should be noted that Hodge did not here, as he had done earlier, so restrict the term "evolution" as to make it incompatible with Christian theism. Instead, he made the incompatibility rest not in the meaning of the term itself, but in its alliance with philosophies incompatible with Christianity. In this essay, while he stated some rational requirements for evolution to be compatible with Christian theism and gave a list of about a dozen "new facts" which could only be introduced into the evolutionary process by divine intervention, he did not even hint that such an intervention would be needed to make the transition between two species in which no such new power was in evidence. Apparently he felt that this could be safely conceded without jeopardizing Christian theism.

It should also be noted that Hodge was here doing his theological task of indicating the limits of evolution which, he believed, would be compatible with Christian theism and with the Scriptures, but he was not expressing any personal conviction as to the truth of evolution.[1] He certainly did not believe that evolution had as yet been proved and may well have believed that God had created each one of about a million species directly from the elements of the earth.[2]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

Popular Lectures

During the fall of 1885, A. A. Hodge was asked to deliver a series of lectures in Philadelphia which were published in The Presbyterian. These lectures, along with some that were written the next year, were collected after his death and published as Popular Lectures on Theological Themes.[3] Since these were delivered during the same period as the "Introduction", they contain largely the same point of view, but they were delivered with fuller elaboration to make them understandable to a lay audience.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. xxi.

[2] A. Hodge, quoted in Salmond, p. 188.

[3] A. Hodge, *Popular Lectures*, pp. 3-4. About half of these were revised or rewritten after delivery; others were printed from the manuscripts without revision. However, two including the lecture on "The Original State of Man" (pp. 164-190) were printed from the newspaper reports and were not revised.

In developing his views on the relation of science to the Scripture, A. A. Hodge, like his father, made a distinction between "the speculations of science and its ascertained facts."[1] The theologian, he insisted, has to accept facts, but can claim the right to criticize the inferences and consequences drawn from these facts.[2] Therefore, like his father, the younger Hodge also accepted the role of an established scientific fact as a guide to the interpretation of Scripture.[3]

In the Popular Lectures, he again distinguished between "evolution as a working hypothesis" and "evolution as a philosophy"[4] and told his audience that while they need not be afraid of the "doctrine of evolution, when it is confined to science as a working hypothesis,"[5] they should fear and oppose it in philosophy because it "has no more authority than any other wild speculation," because it is not based upon facts.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 92.

[2] A. Hodge, quoted in Salmond, p. 147.

[3] A. Hodge, The Presbyterian, January 30, 1886, p. 5.

[4] A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, p. 173.

[5] Ibid., p. 174.

In this popular discussion for laymen, A. A. Hodge omitted any discussion of the teleological or any other theistic argument and simply asserted that "the most certain of all truths is the existence of God."[2] His view of providence is essentially the same as, though more eloquently presented than, that of his father.[3] He criticized the analogy that God's relation to the world is like that of a man to a machine as being too deistic. He preferred, instead, the conception of God acting from within through the spontaneities of the things He had made. This is compared to the action of the vital principle of a plant which is present in the germ from its first formation and continues to control all the natural physical forces in the plant throughout its life.[4] The works of God, in contrast to those of men, Hodge wrote, "grow continually through the evolution of germs from within, by internal forces."[1] To the charge made by the advocates of the "New Departure" in theology that "this view of God as immanent and constantly active in his works is new in the thoughts of Christians,"[2] he responded by insisting that the church had always held both to the immanence and the transcendence of God as equally essential.[3] A study of his father's works and the reformation doctrine of concursus seems to verify this as far as the theologians are concerned, but how far this emphasis on immanence was understood by the laity is quite another question.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 175.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 11.

[3] *Ibid*., pp. 33-51; cf. A. A. Hodge, "The Relation of God to the World," *Presbyterian Review*, VIII (January, 1887), 1-15.

[4] *Popular Lectures*, pp. 22-23. This is similar to the analogy suggested by David Hume. Cf. David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1948), p. 57. Part VII deals with this question.

In a joint work with B. B. Warfield, A. A. Hodge had made use of this idea of God's immanent working in his creatures to understand his mode of operation in the inspiration of Scripture. In inspiration "God prompts from within the spontaneous activities of his intelligent creatures" to lead them to accomplish his purpose, but such activity of God, which may be below the level of consciousness, does not interfere "with the personal attributes or the free rational activities" of man.[1] With this view of the immanence of God in inspiration, Hodge and Warfield could reject the method of dictation and still insist upon the inerrancy of the autographs without holding that the sacred writers were omniscient or that the Scriptures were intended to teach philosophy, science, history, or even an infallible system of speculative theology.[2] They felt that the question as to the truth of the doctrine of inspiration should be decided not merely on the basis of the claims of Scripture alone, as some insisted, but also on an exhaustive and impartial examination of the phenomena of the Scriptures themselves.[3]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[3] *Ibid.* Cf. A. A. Hodge, *Presbyterian Review*, VIII (January, 1887), 12; Review of *Old and New Theology*, by J. B. Heard, *Presbyterian Review*, VI (April, 1885), 372-379.

Hodge seems to have had this same idea of the immanent working of God when he wrote:

> Evolution considered as a plan of an infinitely wise Person and executed under the control of His everywhere present energies can never be irreligious; can never exclude design, providence, grace, or miracles.[4]

Scientists who were also Christians had found such an absence of conflict between the data of science and the first two chapters of Genesis that Hodge and Warfield were convinced that this in itself "proves that the scientific element of Scripture, as well as the doctrinal, was within the scope of Inspiration."[1] In notes taken by a student a few years earlier, Hodge is recorded as saying, "Man is left to digest phenomena himself, and thence to elaborate science. God did not reveal the latter."[2] These two statements seem inconsistent, until it is remembered that Hodge and Warfield distinguished between revelation and inspiration. Even if God did not reveal science, yet He could by inspiration prevent the sacred writer from putting into writing that which he thought was true but actually was erroneous.

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[1] A. A. Hodge and B. B. Warfield, "Inspiration," Presbyterian Review, II (April, 1881), 228.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] A. Hodge, in Van Dyke, p. xviii.

When Hodge came to treat the more specific problems involved in evolution, he claimed that science had no facts to support spontaneous generation.[3] Since he held it to be "intuitively certain that a thing cannot be evolved out of that which does not contain it,"[4] he claimed that:

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[1] A. Hodge and Warfield, Presbyterian Review, II (April, 1881), 239.

[2] A. Hodge, quoted in Salmond, p. 125.

[3] A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, p. 175.

[4] Ibid., p. 176.

> It would be a contradiction to the first principles of reason, an impossibility, to conceive of the living coming from the non-living (if it does come, God must be living in it), or of the conscious coming from the unconscious (if it does, God must be conscious in it), or of reason coming from the irrational (if it does, God must be the reason in it), or of the moral coming from that which is destitute of morality (if it does so come, it must have a moral sense in it).[1]

This sounds as though Hodge was willing to substitute God's immanent working to bridge any gap or to perform any function for which he felt unaided natural laws were insufficient.

On the other hand, Salmond quoted him as saying, "Instinct is the reason of God working. It is an organic pre-adaptation of the creature towards certain pre-determined results. Instinct works mechanically."[2] This sounds less like God's continuous immanent working than a divine intervention at the origin of the animal, building instinct into it so that it responds in certain ways under certain circumstances. This also seems to be the case as he continued in the Popular Lectures:

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] A. Hodge, quoted in Salmond, p. 143.

> If it were found to be true that successive species have been produced by generation from existing species--if it could be proved, as it cannot be--it would follow that it was not the natural process, but there must have been a series of definite interventions all along the line. First, you would have life, then consciousness, then reason, then will, and last the conscience; and thus you will determine that God has at last "made man in his own image."[1]

Although A. A. Hodge was always firm in his conviction that if existing species had descended from lower organic forms, God was somehow involved, he was not consistent in his thinking as to the nature of this involvement. On the one hand, he wrote of God working within, providentially guiding the natural processes to produce organic and rational beings. On the other hand, he spoke of divine engrafting as necessary even for the transition from one species to another as well as for the major gaps involving life, sensation, consciousness, and reason.

It seems that in his more relaxed and confident moments and when he was generalizing, he placed more emphasis on God's immanent providential guidance. During his more serious arguments and when he was dealing with details, he seemed to emphasize the necessity for divine interventions to bridge the gaps which, he felt, were impassable by the natural processes. In one place he said that such interventions would be necessary for the biological descent of one species from another,[1] but whenever he gave specific examples of divine intervention in the biological world, they never referred to transitions between two species of the same genus such as the lion and the tiger, but always to the introduction of such characteristics as life, sensation, consciousness, or reason.

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[1] A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, p. 176.

More significant than whether divine providence or divine intervention was the mode of God's working is the fact that Hodge admitted, this time before a lay audience, that the descent of species from lower organism is compatible with Christian theism.

Evolution of Man

In his book, Confession of Faith, Hodge considered the evolutionary doctrine as to the origin of man by writing:

> The scientific advocates of the hypothesis of organic development have denied that man was created immediately by God, and have held that the higher and more complex living organisms were developed gradually and by successive states from the lower and more simple as the physical condition of the world became gradually favourable to their existence, and that

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[1] Ibid.

> man at the proper time came last of all from the last link in the order of being immediately below him.[1]

He rejected this hypothesis as "a mere dream of unsanctified reason, utterly unsupported by facts,"[2] and reaffirmed the traditional doctrine that man "was immediately created by God, his body out of earthly materials previously created and his soul out of nothing."[3] He supported this by citing a number of scientists and the book of Genesis (1:26, 27, 2:7) and by emphasizing "the immense distance which separates man from the nearest of the lower animals" to which man is incomparably superior "in kind as well as degree."[4] This was his attitude in 1869 before Darwin's Descent of Man, before his father's What is Darwinism?, and before the full development of the controversy. Some nine years later in his revision of the Outlines, he wrote that the "Natural Theologian has, of course, only the most friendly interest" in those theories of evolution which "neither deny nor obscure the evidence which the order and adaptation observed in nature afford to the existence of God, and his immanence in and providential control of his works."[1]

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[1] A. Hodge, Confession, pp. 121-122.

[2] Ibid., p. 122.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

A. A. Hodge's diverse statements have led his interpreters to quite different conclusions as to his position on the origin of Adam's body. Roberts describes him as an "intransigent literalist" who "would not yield one iota, even on the creation of Adam's body."[2] On the other hand, St. Amant, when comparing him with his father, writes:

> The younger Hodge stated that "the human race /i.e., Adam and Eve as 'persons'7 was originated by an immediate creation of God" but he never allowed himself to specify that man's "body" was a special creation, though he implied it. . . . Hodge the younger toyed with the possibility that, though man's soul was a direct divine creation, his body was merely an animal organism, already in existence as result of the process of evolution.[3]

These differing interpretations of Hodge's view of the origin of the body of Adam may be explained in part by the fact that Roberts was contrasting Hodge with other denominational leaders of the day who had made far greater concessions to evolution. St. Amant was, on the other hand, contrasting the younger Hodge with his father who not only had stated his views some six years earlier but had done so as a much older man who was more fixed in his thinking.

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[1] A. Hodge, Outlines (1878), p. 39.

[2] Roberts, p. 13, cf. footnote 26.

[3] St. Amant, p. 313. The brackets are St. Amant's.

There is, it seems, another reason for the variety of statements by the younger Hodge concerning evolution. Not only did he make a distinction between what he himself believed to be true and other positions which he believed to be probably false, but there is also evidence that he sought as a theologian to make a distinction between those positions which are essentially compatible with Christian theism and those which are not. That he had such a view of his task is indicated by a paragraph which he wrote at the conclusion to his "Introduction":

> It is not intended in all that has been said to express any opinion as to the truth of evolution in any of its forms, but only to indicate the limits, on the respective sides of which christians, as such, can have no controversy, or no truce.[1]

If this is considered, it is quite understandable that he should make some approving statements about the implications of some evolutionary theory for Christian theism even though he did not believe in the truth of that theory. Failure to discern this seems to have led St. Amant to make a faulty interpretation from Hodge's conditional statement:

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[1] A. Hodge, in Van Dyke, p. xxi.

> But even if continuous evolution could be proved as a fact, the significance of the evidence of intelligent order and contrivance would not be in the least affected.[1]

From this conditional statement, St. Amant infers that Hodge "conceded the possibility of eventual proof of 'continuous evolution,' *i.e.*, the descent of man's purely physical organism from the sub-human level."[2] Grammatically Hodge's statement is a condition contrary to fact. Not only was he saying that the descent of man from a lower organism had not yet been proved, an inference confirmed by his quote from Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902) to the effect that every positive development in "the province of prehistoric anthropology has actually removed us from the proof of such connection (*i.e.*, the descent of man from any lower type)";[3] but by the use of the word "could" he was also saying that such proof was impossible. This is confirmed by a statement in the *Lectures* where he spoke of successive species being "produced by generation from existing species--if it could be proved, as it cannot be-- . . ."[1]

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[1] A. Hodge, *Outlines* (1878), p. 40.

[2] St. Amant, pp. 312-13.

[3] A. Hodge, *Outlines* (1878), p. 40. This quote was taken from Professor Virchow's address at the German Association of Naturalists and Physicians at Munich, but no publication was given.

The least that he could have meant by these statements was that, considering the state of science in his day, such proof was impossible. However, he may also have meant that, no matter what new discoveries should be made, proof of continuous evolution is, by its very nature, impossible. In the former case, he would not be committing himself one way or the other as to the future proof of continuous evolution. In the latter case, he would be denying the possibility of proof even in the future. Although the former was probably his meaning, it still seems to be stretching the interpretation quite a bit to go from the conditional clause, "But even if continuous evolution could be proved as a fact,"[2] to St. Amant's conclusion that by this conditional clause, Hodge "conceded the possibility of eventual proof of 'continuous evolution.'"[3]

St. Amant writes that Hodge believed that "the descent of man's purely physical organism from the sub-human level . . . would not necessarily discount the Biblical view."[1] It should be noted that Hodge, in the context of the paragraph which St. Amant cited, was stating the implications of such a view, not for the Biblical view of the origin of man, but for the teleological argument.[2]

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[1] A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, p. 176.

[2] A. Hodge, Outlines (1878), p. 40.

[3] St. Amant, pp. 312-13.

If St. Amant means that Hodge believed such human descent is consistent with the traditional interpretation of specific detailed statements of Genesis 1-2, then he has wrongly interpreted Hodge. In a passage where Hodge admits the compatibility with Christian theism of descent of species from other species, he explicitly excludes man from the process "because of the specific assertions of Scripture."[3] Although he cited no Scripture in that article, he was undoubtedly referring to Genesis (1:26, 27; 2:7, 21-23) which he had cited elsewhere for this purpose.[4]

It is more likely that St. Amant intended by "the Biblical view", not the literal statements of the first two chapters of Genesis, but the biblical, theological understanding of man, his creation in the image of God, his probation, fall, and consequent sinful nature. If this is the case, then St. Amant is negatively supported even by the passage in which Hodge excludes man from the process of descent merely because of "specific assertions of Scripture."[1] The fact that Hodge gives only this reason indicates that there was no urgent theological reason in Hodge's mind for denying such descent.

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[1] St. Amant, p. 313.

[2] A. Hodge, Outlines (1878), p. 40.

[3] A. Hodge, Presbyterian Review, I (July, 1880), 588.

[4] A. Hodge, Confession, p. 122; Outlines (1878), p. 296; Popular Lectures, p. 170.

St. Amant would also have support for this interpretation in the lecture, "The Original State of Man."[2] After distinguishing between evolution as a scientific hypothesis and as a philosophy, Hodge showed how the Christian could consistently accept the origin of man as part of the evolutionary process.

> If it were found to be true that successive species have been produced by generation from existing species . . . it would follow that it was not the natural process, but there must have been a series of definite divine interventions all along the line. First you would have life, then consciousness, then reason, then will, and last the conscience; and thus you will determine that God has at last "made man in his own image."[3]

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[1] A. Hodge, Presbyterian Review, I (July, 1880), 588.

[2] A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, Lecture VIII, pp. 164-90. This chapter was taken from the newspaper reports in The Presbyterian and, because of his death, he was prevented from revising it as he did most of the lectures. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[3] Ibid., p. 176.

Because these new and higher powers could not, he felt, be accounted for by molecular mechanics, "they could have been introduced into the flow of natural evolution only by an immediate act of God, as a new thread is shot by the hand of the weaver into a rapidly evolving web of cloth."[1]

Hodge's inclusion of man after his conditional statement concerning the truth of the descent of one species from another and as the culmination of a series of divine interventions engrafting increasingly higher characteristics on physical organisms, indicates that he intended to include the origin of man as the combined product of evolutionary descent and divine intervention. He would hardly have done this had he felt that there was any essential incompatibility between the view here set forth and Christian theism.

On the origin of the soul, A. A. Hodge, like his father, rejected the traducianist position and held that God creates the soul or spirit of each human being about the time of conception.[2] More than any other possible characteristic of organic beings, he insisted that the human soul could be accounted for not as a product of natural forces according to the evolutionary theory but only as a new creation by God. Its capacities are such that its origin in the first man introduced a new era.[1] The presence of the soul in man as compared to the lower animals brings about an "absolute difference in kind in respect to man's intellectual, moral, and religious nature, and his capacity for indefinite progress."[2] He quoted Huxley, a most vocal advocate of evolution, to the effect that "when man's higher nature is taken into the account there exists between him and the nearest beast 'an enormous gulf, a divergence immeasurable and practically infinite.'"[3] The introduction of the human soul into the processes of nature brought about such a change of relations and events that Hodge insisted:

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[1] A. Hodge, in Van Dyke, pp. xx-xxi.

[2] A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, pp. 168-169.

> No doctrine of evolution can be tenable which does not make room for a moral government and a redemptive providence, including miracles and the Incarnation of God, and the gracious operations of the Holy Ghost.[4]

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[1] A. Hodge, in Van Dyke, p. xxi.

[2] A. Hodge, Outlines (1878), p. 296; cf. Popular Lectures, p. 169.

[3] Ibid., citing Duke of Argyle, Primeval Man. This spelling is used by Hodge, but the books themselves spell it "Argyll."

[4] A. Hodge, in Van Dyke, p. xxi.

Because such was the nature of the human soul, Hodge wanted it understood that even if evolution is accepted, "the facts recorded in the Scriptures as to the creation of Adam and the formation of Eve are not inconsistent with the analogy of truth, and must be recognized as historically true."[1] On the other hand, it was noted above that A. A. Hodge seemed to make some concessions as to the historicity of the first eleven chapters of Genesis when he contrasted it with the Abrahamic period. The pre-Abrahamic period is

> merely the putting of chronological events into position. But begin with the birth of Abraham: after that we have biography, we have appointed times, we have history--a history that goes back only to the birth of Abraham. All before that is the simple introduction crowded into some ten or twelve chapters, designed to teach these tremendous facts: first, creation; second, the fall; thirdly, the general dealing of God with men in preparation for redemption to come; but these great facts are dropped in by the great artist of revelation as an introduction merely to the history beginning with Abraham. Everything back of this is piled up like the background in front of which the history stands.[2]

This statement was presented as part of his discussion on the antiquity of man as he sought to show that

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] A. Hodge, *Popular Lectures*, pp. 178-179.

"revelation has not informed us"[1] how long ago man came into being. In spite of this view of Genisis 1-11, in his next topic which dealt with the original condition of man, he still treated Adam as being historical, the ancestor of all mankind.[2]

In summary then, Hodge appears to be willing to grant that Christian theism has no essential objection to the idea that all plants and animals have been produced by descent from earlier more simple forms of life and eventually from one original created form of life, provided that a series of definite divine interventions be allowed in order to introduce higher powers into the process. Even the purely physical body of man could be included as the culmination of this process, but, he would insist, the human soul could be produced only by creation _ex nihilo_ within the body of the being which, by that act, becomes human. He would insist, however, that this evolutionary theory of the origin of man be so related to the first three chapters of Genesis that they could be held to be historically true.

However, it should be clear that Hodge's theoretical concessions to Christians, scientists, and others who were convinced of the truth of evolution should not be confused with what Hodge believed had actually happened in the origin of man. He was too much a child of the traditional thinking to make himself become so immersed in evolutionary thought as to explore it from the inside and to make a vigorous effort to aid the Christian evolutionist by attempting to interpret Genesis 1-3 in the light of biological evolution.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 179.

[2] _Ibid_.

What Hodge believed actually happened can best be seen in his lecture on "The Original State of Man"[1] in which he developed the question along traditional lines without any mention of evolution and apparently without having the question in mind. He spoke of Adam, the first man, who "came to consciousness as an adult individual, without previous infancy, and without education."[2] He pointed out that the Genesis statement that man's body came from the dust of the earth, should not be taken literally. However, instead of meaning that the body of man came by generation from some lower animal, he simply meant that, since common clay might not contain all the elements which constitute man's body, one should assume not that God created the absent elements out of nothing at that time, but that all the elements were created in the beginning of time and that God simply drew from what had previously been created the elements needed to make man's body.[1]

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[1] A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, pp. 164-190.

[2] Ibid., p. 165.

Next, he discussed the origin of the soul of man, which is not to be considered as part of the Spirit of God, but as created by God out of nothing within the body which he had made.[2] On the origin of the first woman he said:

> God put a deep sleep upon Adam, and, taking from him a rib, made out of it a woman. That is what the Bible says distinctly and clearly, and it cannot be got rid of.[3]

He concluded by saying:

> I maintain that these three points are true: that the body of man was made out of pre-existing materials; that the soul of man was created by the mighty power of God; and that Eve was made from Adam by the miraculous power of God.[4]

After a brief explanation of how the hypothesis of evolution could be made compatible with Christian theism, he returned to the non-speculative, verifiable area of science, affirming that he had no fear that science had discovered anything which would "give Christians any ground for fear as to the utter integrity and truth of the declarations of God in the first chapter of Genesis."[1]

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[1] *Ibid*., pp. 166-167.

[2] *Ibid*., pp. 167-170.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 170.

[4] *Ibid*.

In support of this, Hodge described the views held by scientists on the antiquity of man and the original condition of man and compared them with the statements of Scripture.[2] "The whole testimony of history is therefore not that we were developed out of animals, but that when we began to exist it was in the fullness of our organization, in the fullness of our powers."[3] In the originally published report of this lecture, he is said to have made the remark, "Now I deny that Darwin ever said that Adam came from a monkey. I am perfectly competent to say that he never thought of it in his inmost soul."[4] This reveals that Hodge rejected man's descent from a monkey on the basis of intuitive feeling. He also pointed out that Genesis teaches that "Adam was brought into existence, not gradually, but suddenly and in a state of maturity."[1] Since Adam had no tradition or history, Hodge concluded:

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[1] Ibid., p. 176. The editor of Evangelical Theology: A Course of Popular Lectures omitted this quote in the edition published in London by T. Nelson and Sons, 1890, p. 150.

[2] Ibid., pp. 177-180.

[3] Ibid., p. 179.

[4] A. Hodge, The Presbyterian, March 6, 1886, p. 4. This rather presumptuous statement was deleted when the lecture was published in Popular Lectures.

> What knowledge he had God gave him. Then he gave to man a perfect body; he had a heart and a mind; he could talk and he could breathe. I do not know that he had higher qualities of a human body; I do not care. I do know that God gave Adam a good trial, and if he had not sinned he would not have died; and that is all the Bible says, and that is all that you and I have a right to make out of it.[2]

Hodge's rather puzzling admission that Adam might not have had the "higher qualities of a human body" could be taken as an admission that his body had evolved from some anthropoid ape, but it seems more likely that it is an admission that his body might have been similar to those indicated by ancient and primitive skulls and skeletons.[3]

There is, then, quite a contrast between what Hodge felt would be compatible with Christian theism and what he felt was actually the case based upon the facts of science, of history, and the Scriptures. He did not feel that science had proved its case with the lower forms of animal life, but if it should, he could easily accommodate without violating Scripture or his concept of God's working by a divine intervention to bring new and higher powers into the process. In the case of man, such accommodation would be somewhat more difficult. He always insisted on the creation *ex nihilo* of the soul. This was basic both to his theology and philosophy. He believed that the Scriptures taught that Adam was made a mature man with his body coming directly, apart from the mediation of another organism, from previously created elements of the earth. Christian theism might have no essential objection to the admission that man's body might first have been generated by way of a divine intervention from a lower animal body, but for Hodge it would be difficult to square this with the teachings of the early chapters of Genesis which he wished to preserve as historically true.

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[1] A. Hodge, Popular Lectures, p. 180.

[2] Ibid., p. 182.

[3] Ibid., p. 179.

While Hodge was too much a product of the traditional interpretation of Genesis and too skeptical of the evidence for evolution to be capable of making a vigorous effort to reinterpret it in the light of the doctrine of biological evolution as both he and his father had approved in the case of the heliocentric theory, yet he did make some contributions to resolving the conflict. He suggested ways to make the theory of evolution "safe" for Christian theism by insisting upon divine providence and divine interventions especially at the introduction of the soul of man. This protected the doctrine of immortality. By refusing to regard the early chapters of Genesis as mythical rather than historical, he protected the doctrine of man's innocent state, the fall, and the doctrine of redemption. He made it possible for a Christian who, while studying science, became convinced of the truth of biological evolution to resolve more readily the possible conflict between his Christian faith and science. He also made it less likely for such a person to be suspected of heresy simply because he believed in evolution. In doing this A. A. Hodge was following in the footsteps of President James McCosh rather than those of his father, Professor Charles Hodge.

CHAPTER V

B. B. WARFIELD AND EVOLUTION

Background

Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, the successor to the chair of theology held successively by Archibald Alexander, Charles Hodge, and Archibald Alexander Hodge, was born near Lexington, Kentucky, November 5, 1851. His father was a farmer with a substantial estate and an authority on cattle breeding; however, he followed the tradition on his mother's side to fame if not to fortune.[1]

His mother's grandfather, Hon. John Breckinridge had been a Senator from Kentucky, and the Attorney General of the United States under Thomas Jefferson. Robert Jefferson Breckinridge, Warfield's maternal grandfather, practiced law and served in the Kentucky legislature before entering the ministry of the Presbyterian church. He served as Moderator of the General Assembly (Old School, 1841), as president of Jefferson College, founded the Presbyterian Seminary in Danville, Kentucky and served as professor of theology.[1]

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[1] Samuel G. Craig, "Benjamin B. Warfield," a biographical essay introducing B. B. Warfield, Biblical and Theological Studies, ed. Samuel G. Craig (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1952), p. xi.

Education

Although such family ties may have influenced the young Warfield in his final choice of vocation, his early interests were scientific. He made collections of birds' eggs, butterflies, and moths and, under the stimulation of teachers who were to become leading educators in Kentucky, he studied the plant and animal life of the region and the geological formations revealed by the deep canyons cut by the nearby Kentucky river.[2]

In 1868, he entered the College of New Jersey with sophomore standing and three years later graduated with highest honors. He was an editor of the Nassau Literary Magazine, and won prizes in essay and debate, but his most serious academic interests developed in mathematics and physics. He even sought the college fellowship in experimental science for further study in Europe until persuaded otherwise by his father, who suggested that he should have the freedom to follow his interests as they developed in the course of his European study. In February, 1872, he went to Edinburgh and then to Heidelberg from which he wrote of his decision to enter the ministry. He returned to enter the seminary in 1873, was graduated in 1876, married, and went to Leipsic for a year of study. On his return, he spent a year as assistant pastor in Baltimore before he accepted a call to Western Theological Seminary to teach New Testament Language and Literature. He had completed a book on textual criticism (1886) by the time he was asked to fill the chair in theology left vacant by the death of A. A. Hodge, one which he was to hold for thirty-three years until his death in 1921.[1]

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[1] Princeton Review: Index Volume, I (January, 1870), 113-116.

[2] Craig, pp. xi-xii.

Thus in the course of his life, Warfield went through a period of interest in biological science, then physical science, and finally in theological studies, but in all this, Patton pointed out, he "had but little interest in philosophy, and relatively speaking it formed but a small part of his intellectual equipment."[2]

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[1] Craig, pp. xiii-xiv.

[2] Francis L. Patton, "Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield--A Memorial Address," Princeton Theological Review, XIX (July, 1921), 386.

Attitude toward Evolution

On the forty-fifth anniversary of his graduation, Warfield credited Dr. James McCosh, who had arrived at Princeton to take over the presidency during his initial year of college, with being "distinctly the most inspiring force which came into my life during my college days."[1]

Dr. McCosh had advocated a modified form of evolution shortly after his arrival. On that question, Warfield wrote a paragraph which, because of its relevance to this thesis, will be quoted in full.

> No, he did not make me a Darwinian, as it was his pride to believe he ordinarily made his pupils. But that was doubtless because I was already a Darwinian of the purest water before I came into his hands, and knew my _Origin of Species_, and _Animals and Plants under Domestication_, almost from A to Izard. In later years I fell away from this, his orthodoxy. He was a little nettled about it and used to inform me with some vigor--I am speaking of a time some thirty years agone!--that all biologists under thirty years of age were Darwinians. I was never quite sure that he understood what I was driving at when I replied that I was the last man in the world to wonder at that, since I was about that old myself before I outgrew it.[2]

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[1] Benjamin B. Warfield "Personal Recollections of Princeton Undergraduate Life," _The Princeton Alumni Weekly_, XVI (April 19, 1916), 652. When a new article or book by Benjamin B. Warfield is cited, the name B. B. Warfield will be used.

[2] _Ibid_., The reference to this article in Craig's biographical essay on Warfield in _Biblical and Theological Studies_, p. xxi, n. 2, is in error. The year should be 1916, not 1926.

This suggests that, during his college years, Warfield had held essentially the same view as that of Dr. McCosh, and that he remained in "his orthodoxy" until he was about thirty (1881),[1] three years after he began teaching at Western Seminary. His interchange with President McCosh probably took place after he had arrived at Princeton to take over the chair of theology. During the year (1887-88) he must have spent much time and effort on the problem of evolution and Christianity. He wrote reviews of Christianity and Evolution: Modern Problems of Faith by George Matheson and others,[2] The Religious Aspect of Evolution by James McCosh[3] and an article entitled "Christian Evidences: How Affected by Recent Criticism."[4] His reading of The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin[5] resulted in articles entitled "Darwin's Religious Life"[6] and

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[1] This "thirty" should not be taken as exact, for Warfield had to conform to McCosh's "thirty".

[2] Presbyterian Review, IX (April, 1888), 355.

[3] Presbyterian Review, IX (July, 1888), 510-511.

[4] Homiletic Review, XVI (August, 1888), 107-112.

[5] Francis Darwin (ed.), (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1887).

[6] Presbyterian Review, IX (October, 1888), 569-601. Reprinted in Studies in Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932), pp. 541-582.

"Darwin's Arguments against Christianity and Religion."[1] He also wrote a series of lectures on "Anthropology,"[2] which involved the problem of Christian theology and evolution. In these lectures and later in "The Present Status of the Doctrine of Evolution,"[3] Warfield developed his thought by discussing three general positions which could be held with respect to evolution.

The first position considers evolution "as furnishing a complete account of the origin and present state of the universe."[4] Such a view, Warfield insisted, is "tantamount to Atheism and is but a new form for expression of an atheistic philosophy."[5] Into this category, he put both Huxley and Darwin, in spite of the fact that the latter used "theistic language" when writing the Origin of Species.

Although Darwin had studied at Cambridge with the idea of becoming a clergyman and, while still on board the

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[1] Homiletic Review, XVII (January, 1889), 9-16.

[2] Manuscript notes for lectures on "Anthropology", Speer Library, Princeton Theological Seminary (1888), containing twenty-four unnumbered sheets. The numeration has been added.

[3] Presbyterian Messenger, III (December 5, 1895), 299-300. This article was taken, with some additions and deletions, from the first half of his lectures on "Anthropology".

[4] Ibid., p. 299.

[5] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 1.

Beagle, had considered himself an orthodox Christian,[1] he had slowly drifted from his early faith. Warfield divided this drift into two well marked periods. The first, which ended about his fortieth year (1840), resulted in the loss of his Christianity, that is, he doubted that God had ever spoken to men in the Bible. The second period extended over the remainder of his life during which he struggled to retain even a theistic faith.[2] Darwin insisted that even in his most extreme moments, he had "never been an Atheist in the sense of denying the existence of God. . . . An Agnostic would be the more correct description of my state of mind."[3]

This loss of faith in Christianity was due not only to the fact Darwin held to speciation by a long continued process of naturalistic evolution but also, Warfield wrote, because "he held, with dogmatic tenacity, the opinion that the Book of Genesis teaches that God created each species by a separate, sudden, and immediate fiat."[4]

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[1] Francis Darwin (ed.), Life and Letters of Charles Darwin (Westminster edition; New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1910), I, 277.

[2] Warfield, Homiletic Review, XVII (January, 1889), 10,

[3] C. Darwin, Life and Letters, I, 274.

[4] Warfield, Homiletic Review, XVII (January, 1889), 10.

If both of these positions were sound then, of course, either Darwin's theory or Genesis must be in error, but Warfield had "the gravest of doubts" about the accuracy of both "his theory of evolution and his interpretation of Genesis."[1] Darwin, deciding to give up Genesis, also gave up any idea of revelation in the Old Testament or the New Testament.

Although Warfield felt that an erroneous interpretation of Genesis was an important factor in Darwin's rejection of Christianity, he felt that the key to the explanation of this rejection and the root of his agnosticism lay in "his enthusiastic acceptance of his own theory of evolution, in the mechanical, naturalistic sense in which he conceived it,"[2] and in his "ruthless subjection of all his thought to its terms."[3]

This in turn, Warfield held, was directly related to Darwin's understanding of the nature of God and of His relation to the world. While Darwin's idea of God could still be called theistic, it was so deistic that he was never able to grasp the conception of divine immanence.

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[1] Ibid., p. 11.

[2] Ibid., p. 15.

[3] Ibid., p. 16.

To Darwin, it seemed that either God should do all things without second causes, or having ordained second causes, He should stand aside and let them do all things without Him. There was no room in his thought for any doctrine of divine providence whereby God guided second causes or laws of nature to accomplish His purposes. Darwin felt that if he could trace the causes of an event to natural law, this indicated that God had nothing to do with it except possibly to originate the whole process. Thus, Warfield contended that because Darwin's deistic conception "pushed God out of His works",[1] he ceased to see God in His works, and the theistic proofs ceased to carry conviction with him. Darwin's theory also resulted in "the assimilation of the human mind, in its essence, with the intelligence of the brutes"[2] which in turn meant the loss of belief in the soul and its immortality.[3] Since Darwin's theory had this effect, Warfield found himself in agreement with his predecessor Charles Hodge that the theory as Darwin held it was "essentially atheistic".[4] Warfield was quick to point out that this drift to agnosticism was by no means inevitable even for those whose "general conception of God to the universe seems to be very similar to what Mr. Darwin's originally was."[1]

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[1] Warfield, Studies in Theology, p. 556.

[2] Ibid., p. 555.

[3] Ibid., p. 556.

[4] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 2; Presbyterian Messenger, III (December 5, 1895), 299.

Throughout his life, Warfield vigorously opposed all theories of evolution which, like Darwinism, holds a position which seeks to give a complete account of the origin and present conditions of the universe apart from the intervention of God, that is, a philosophy of the universe. For example, the very definition of evolution by Professor Edward Drinker Cope (1847-1897) as the doctrine which holds "that creation has been and is accomplished by the agency of energy which is intrinsic in the evolving matter, and without the interference of agencies which are external to it,"[2] placed his theory in this class.

Some have sought to interpret evolution in a more religious way and, like Professor Joseph LeConte, see nature as struggling "upward to reach again 'the divine plane from which it originated.'"[3] This is to conceive God in the pantheistic sense as "only the All whose varying manifestations the changing world is; Who is not only entangled in matter, but is indistinguishable from matter."[1] In neither of these evolutionary philosophies, is there, according to Warfield, a place for the Christian God, "the living God of the Bible--at once above the world and in the world, the author of the world and its strong governor."[2] In spite of their differences, each of these philosophies, whether the materialism of Cope or the pantheism of LeConte, is, according to Warfield, "tantamount to Atheism."[3] Thus, Warfield not only found himself in agreement with both Charles and A. A. Hodge in applying the epithet "atheism" to Darwinism and similar views allying evolution with naturalistic philosophy, but he also applied it to LeConte's attempt to give a religious interpretation to evolution.

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[1] Warfield, Studies in Theology, p. 552, n. 49.

[2] B. B. Warfield, "The Present Day Conception of Evolution," Presbyterian Messenger, II (August 22, 1895), 1399; cf. "Anthropology," p. 8.

[3] Ibid.

Although Warfield considered himself in his earlier years as being "a Darwinian of the purest water,"[4] it should not be understood that he held it in any sense of excluding the Christian conception of God. He had joined the

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[1] Ibid., p. 1400.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Warfield, The Princeton Alumni Weekly, XVI, (April 19, 1916), 652.

Presbyterian Church on profession of faith at sixteen, and there is no evidence in his writings or references to him that he ever went through a period of doubt or unbelief. In 1881, he and A. A. Hodge had collaborated on an article in which their view of God and His relation to the world is presented in an orthodox way.[1] It is not unlikely that his earlier view was similar to that of McCosh, who held the second position to be evaluated by Warfield in his lectures. McCosh, while defending "the Christian doctrine of God," considered the evolutionary hypothesis as "a discovery of science of the order and conditions under which the various living forms have as a matter of fact come into existence."[2] This according to Warfield, is to use it simply, as a second cause, _i.e._, as an account of the way in which forms have been produced,[3] and not as a sufficient account of the phenomena of the organic world.[4] Although in 1888 he did not accept this position as having been proved, he did point out that McCosh so "harnesses" evolution "to his own theistic conceptions, and makes it subservient to and indeed give way before even his Christian supernaturalism"[1] that he succeeds in showing that it is both thoroughly consistent with Christian theism and that it actually implies and presupposes theism.[2] Although Warfield approved of McCosh's reconciliation of evolution with Christian theology, he felt that the latter had gone too far in saying that the fact of evolution is "'completely made out,' 'proved,' 'demonstrated' (although not 'mathematically')."[3]

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[1] A. A. Hodge and B. B. Warfield, "Inspiration," _Presbyterian Review_, II (April, 1881), 226-260. This was summarized in the chapter on A. A. Hodge.

[2] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 2.

[3] _Ibid_.

[4] Warfield, _Presbyterian Review_, IX (July, 1888), 511.

Warfield then considered the third general position on evolution and the one which he recommended to his students from 1888 for as long as he used these lectures.[4] This considers the evolutionary hypothesis "as a more or less probable, or a more or less improbable conjecture of scientific workers as to the method of creation, and then uses it merely as a working hypothesis."[5]

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[1] Warfield, Presbyterian Messenger, III (December 5, 1895), 299.

[2] Warfield, Presbyterian Review, IX (July, 1888), 511.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 3. The last insertion of bibliography is a book dated 1895. It appears that Casper Wistar Hodge, Jr. took over the anthropology lectures about 1907 when he was promoted to assistant professor of theology.

[5] Ibid.; cf. Presbyterian Review, IX (July, 1888), 511.

In order to establish his thesis that the evolutionary hypothesis had not yet been proved to be true, Warfield proceeded to set up criteria for the demonstration of theories. First, a theory must be capable of accounting for all the facts. Only when it has met this requirement should it be allowed to compete with other theories which likewise have accounted for all the facts in order to determine which is to be considered as the true theory. Since the evolutionary theory had not yet met the first requirement, he felt that it was presumptuous to claim it to be the true theory.[1]

In the course of his lectures from year to year, Warfield must have sensed that this was an unrealistically high standard to demand of scientific hypotheses, for he added to his lecture notes a caution that it was hardly legitimate to demand anything like strict demonstration or direct proof of such a theory, but that any proof could only be of a probable order and could arise only out of inferences from observed effects to causes and processes.[2] In spite of such limitations, he granted the possibility that a theory could so explain with ease and completeness all the known facts and by deduction predict new facts which could then be sought out that the mind could not resist the evidence.[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[2] Ibid., p. 4, back of sheet. Thus, it was undoubtedly added later. Cf. Presbyterian Messenger, III (December 5, 1895), 300.

From this admission he turned to the evidence for the Darwinian hypothesis.[2] Of the paleontological evidence, he wrote, "Darwin defends himself against the geological record, rather than appeals to it."[3] The embryological evidence, he believed, did not support Darwinism, but he did show how it might be used to support another theory of evolution which makes use of the Neo-Lamarckian theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics.[4] These, along with the observed limits of variation of animals, he believed, made it very improbable that any form of evolution resting on Darwinism should be considered as a true account of how God produced the species. Yet he made it clear that he was not denying that species came by descent or that natural selection has had its effect.

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[1] Warfield, Presbyterian Messenger, III (December 5, 1895), 300.

[2] Warfield, "Anthropology," pp. 7-17.

[3] Ibid., p. 11.

[4] Ibid., p. 13-14.

> There may be such a thing as descent with variations forming new species, and yet not such a thing as descent with variations forming new genera--or new classes--or new kingdoms. . . . We do not need to multiply original forms because we cannot see that all existent forms come from one original form. The how many may be left for future investigation, therefore. And we may welcome evolution as accounting for much while yet seeing that it is not proven that it accounts for all--or even if we see clearly that it cannot account for all.[1]

After evaluating the evidence from geology embryology and the length of time demanded by Darwinism, Warfield concluded that "any form of evolution which rests ultimately on the Darwinian idea is very improbable as an account of even how God has wrought in producing species."[2] However, he did not want this to be taken as a denial that "species have come by descent, or that natural selection is a fact and has its effect."[3]

> I only mean that it seems to me improbable in the present state of the evidence, that God has created species by means of the natural tendency of the natural cause which has received the name of natural selection. As to whether species have in any way come by descent, I am more of a pure agnostic.[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

Evolutionary Theology

The reason that Warfield spent so much time in his lectures on evidences against evolution was its religious significance. He felt that if the evolutionary hypothesis "has been proved to be true, then we must adjust our theological thinking to it," but if it is still a hypothesis on trial, "while we may point out tentatively its relation to it and the changes it may presently involve, we dare not adjust our theology to what is as yet a more or less doubtful conjecture."[1]

Both before and after Warfield wrote this, he was acutely conscious that many had assumed the truth of an alien philosophy and then used it to dominate or "supply the moulds" by which to rewrite Christian theology.[2] The scientific attack on the supernatural which had developed deism had called forth an apologetic which encouraged "a new conviction of divine power and presence."[3] The naturalistic school of historical criticism, which questioned the genuineness and unity of the books of the Bible in order to rearrange them according to evolutionary principles, had stimulated research so as to bring to light a mass of direct evidence to confirm the authenticity of the Bible.[1] The newer critical attacks, he believed, would likewise have the effect of modernizing and developing better defences for Christian theology.[2]

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[1] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 5.

[2] B. B. Warfield, Review of Public Services at the Installation of the Rev. J. Preston Searle, The Presbyterian and Reformed Review, V (July, 1894), 545. This periodical will be designated hereafter as PRR.

[3] Warfield, Homiletic Review, XVI (August, 1888), 109.

Examples of Warfield's own efforts in this direction are found in his reviews of the work of such critics as C. H. Toy who developed biblical theology from the viewpoint of the evolutionary school. Toy presented "Jewish thought in its transition from a national to a universal religion"[3] according to "the general laws of advance from national to universal religions,"[4] ending with the complete development of Christian doctrine "at the end, not the beginning, of the New Testament."[5] Warfield wrote that this

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 112.

[3] B. B. Warfield, Review of Judaism and Christianity, by Crawford Howell Toy, PRR, IV (October, 1893), 686.

[4] Ibid., quoting C. H. Toy.

[5] Ibid.

"is a very meagre 'Biblical theology,' . . . a very naturalistic progress. . . . Christ . . . is pared down to a natural phenomenon."[1]

Warfield granted the appeal of Mackintosh's thesis that Christianity took "its rise 'in a great spiritual and religious movement among the Jewish people,' so that 'Judaism and Christianity denote successive stages of one long evolution of religious thought and sentiment.'"[2] However, when it is spelled out in detailed history, such gaps are left in the development from paganism to Judaism and from Judaism to Christianity, that Warfield felt that it was historically impossible to bridge them apart from the supernatural.[3]

Throughout his career as a book reviewer, Warfield noted and criticized many books for which evolution had been made "the constitutive principle of theology."

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[1] Ibid.

[2] B. B. Warfield, Review of Natural History of the Christian Religion, by William Mackintosh, PRR, VI (July, 1895), 516.

[3] Ibid.

Wilhelm Bousset's What is Religion,[1] J. A. Patterson's "Leviticus" in the Temple Dictionary of the Bible,[2] J. C. V. Durell's The Self-Revelation of our Lord,[3] Foundations, by B. H. Streeter et al.,[4] and H. Wheeler Robinson's The Christian Doctrine of Man[5] all received strictures for making evolution a determining influence in their theology.

Occasionally he found a kindred spirit with whom he basically agreed in such men as G. G. Stokes' Natural Theology,[6] Andrew Lang's The Making of Religion[7] and Magic and Religion,[8] H. H. Kuyper's Evolutie of Revelatie,[9] and James Orr's God's Image in Man.[10]

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[1] B. B. Warfield, The Princeton Theological Review, VI (July, 1908), 479-484. This periodical will be designated hereafter as PTR.

[2] B. B. Warfield, PTR, VIII (July, 1910), 481.

[3] B. B. Warfield, PTR, X (January, 1912), 133-138.

[4] B. B. Warfield, PTR, XI (July, 1913), 526-538.

[5] B. B. Warfield, PTR, XII (January, 1914), 151-161.

[6] B. B. Warfield, PRR, VI (April, 1895), 365-366.

[7] B. B. Warfield, PRR, IX (October, 1898), 744-749.

[8] B. B. Warfield, PRR, XIII (July, 1902), 457-459.

[9] B. B. Warfield, PTR, II (October, 1904), 668-670.

[10] B. B. Warfield, PTR, IV (October, 1906), 555-558.

The Compatibility of Evolution with Theism

Although Warfield continued to believe until the end of his life that evolution had not been proved[1] and criticized those who sought to extend evolution beyond biology into theology, he did lay some guidelines for his students as to the relation of evolution to Christian theology in the latter part of his "Anthropology" lectures. Whether Warfield accepted evolution as a fact or not, these still retain their significance. His evaluation of the state of scientific evidence between 1888 and 1916 may not be relevant later because of new scientific developments, but his evaluation of the religious significance of evolution has continuing relevance for those who stand in his conservative theological tradition.

To accomplish this, Warfield began by defining the terms "evolution" and "theology".[2] As was noted in the case of Professor Cope, he considered any purely materialistic theory of evolution to be opposed to theology in any sense because it seeks to be a philosophy of the universe, a complete explanation of all that exists without reference from any activity to God.[1]

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[1] B. B. Warfield, Review of The Natural Theology of Evolution, by J. N. Shearman, PTR, XIV (April, 1916), 326.

[2] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 17.

Although Warfield did not discuss the relation of evolution to pantheism in the "Anthropology" lectures, he was concerned enough to deal with it in his address to the faculty and students in September, 1896, which was published as "Christian Supernaturalism."[2] He quoted John Bascom as saying, "'The task which the bolder thinking of our time has undertaken,' . . . is 'to curb the supernatural, to bring it into the full service of reason.'"[3] Warfield continued, "The tap-root of this movement is firmly set in a pantheistic philosophy"[4] for which there is no possible distinction between the natural and the supernatural. Pantheism uses "evolution" to reduce the apparent distinctions of all that exists to mere varying forms achieved through natural process by that one life which underlies all things.[5] Since theology is inevitably influenced by the currently ruling philosophy, Warfield called on his audience to oppose the de-supernaturalization of Christianity by pantheized evolutionary philosophy.[1]

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[1] Warfield, Presbyterian Messenger, II (August 22, 1895), 1399.

[2] B. B. Warfield, PRR, VIII (January, 1897), 58-74. Also reprinted in Studies in Theology.

[3] Ibid., p. 60.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

On the other hand, if one considered evolution merely in its biological sense apart from an overall philosophy, Warfield was willing to grant that "no theory of evolution in itself considered is necessarily inconsistent with the dogma of the existence of a God."[2] A mechanical theory of evolution such as Darwin taught could be accepted by deists if, while assigning the whole process to physical causation, it were taught that the process and results reveal divine intelligence.[3] This, Darwin did not admit, for having "pushed God out of His works, . . . he could never be sure that he saw Him in His works."[4] However, Warfield did not feel that Darwin's own shift from deism to agnosticism was inevitable and pointed as a counter-example to W. B. Carpenter (1813-1883), an English physiologist, whose general conception of the relation of God to the universe was similar to Darwin's original view.[5]

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[1] Ibid., p. 61.

[2] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 17.

[3] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[4] Warfield, Studies in Theology, p. 556.

[5] Ibid., pp. 552, n. 49; 557, n. 62.

Even the theist, Warfield granted, could hold to practically the same mechanical theory if he believed in a God who is every where present and active and yet who acts only according to law.[1] Perhaps he had in mind the Duke of Argyll's Reign of Law which held that "God uses everywhere and constantly physical laws, to produce not only the ordinary operations of nature, but to give rise to things specifically new."[2]

Warfield treated sympathetically those theists who accept evolution and then use it to prove the existence of God. He called it one of "many striking modes of argument" when J. Agar Beet went from the idea that since inorganic matter is not a sufficient cause of life, its development from the inorganic must have had a non-material cause.[3] However, when Robert Watts went from this same principle not only to a God who is the adequate cause of all phenonomena but also charged that atheistic and agnostic thinkers stifle "the questioning impulse" by being satisfied with "immediate and proximate causes,"

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[1] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 18.

[2] C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, II, 16, cf. p. 25. Hodge also granted that this was a theistic interpretation of the Darwinian theory.

[3] B. B. Warfield, Review of Credentials of the Gospels, by J. Agar Beet, PRR, I (April, 1890), 335.

Warfield was irritated for he commented, "with this simple wand of an adequate cause, he proposes to exorcise all the demons of recent unbelieving thinking."[1]

Greater enthusiasm is expressed for James Iverach who so related evolution to the immanence of God working according to plan that each discovery of science of the laws of the process strengthens rather than weakens the theistic argument.[2] Some twenty years later, Warfield announced that "an evolutionary Paley" had arrived when J. N. Shearman, who accepted evolution as true, argued from the fact of order to the action and existence of an intelligent Being. Darwin's attempt to refute Paley's teleological argument for God's existence was considered irrelevant because the same results would still indicate the same characteristics in the true cause regardless of the method used, whether evolution or the creation of each species.[3]

Although Warfield concluded that there is no necessary conflict of evolution with theism, he pointed out that a thoroughgoing system of evolutionary philosophy which seeks to account for all that is by "the action of forces inherent in matter" is not entirely consistent with "the frank supernaturalism" of Christian theology.[1]

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[1] B. B. Warfield, Review of Reign of Causality, by Robert Watts, Presbyterian Review, IX (April, 1888), 340-341.

[2] B. B. Warfield, Review of Christianity and Evolution, by James Iverach, PRR, VI (April, 1895), 366.

[3] Warfield, PTR, XIV (April, 1916), 323.

Absolute Creation, Mediate Creation, and Evolution

The God of Christian theology acted in creation to produce something which was not a mere molding or ordering of a pre-existent substance nor an evolution or modification of His own substance. He produced a new Being, which is a "derived and dependent Being, but just as real Being as His own infinite essence."[2] This, to the older theologians, was known as "absolute" or "immediate" creation.[3] Because God endowed this created substance with real powers which really act and really produce effects, Warfield willingly accepted the reality and activity of second causes as sufficient for the ordinary government of the world.[4]

Theistic evolutionists, according to Warfield, hold that absolute creation "supplies the original material" while evolution "accounts for all its subsequent modifications."[1] Although he recognized that they had no inherent objection to God's providential guidance of the process, he was bothered by their restriction of God's creative activity "to the origination of the primal world-stuff,"[2] while everything after that is the modification of this world-stuff by its intrinsic forces.

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[1] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 17 back, a later addition.

[2] Warfield, PRR, VIII (January, 1897), 66.

[3] B. B. Warfield, "Editorial Notes," The Bible Student, IV (July, 1901), 5.

[4] Warfield, PRR, VIII (January, 1897), 67.

Others have failed to make even this distinction between creation and evolution and have spoken of "'evolution' as only God's 'method of creation.'"[3] Warfield not only wanted to maintain this distinction but also to place the category of "mediate creation" between absolute creation and evolution. The essential mark of creation, he held, is the production of something new which is not within the capability of the antecedent conditions. Mediate creation is to be distinguished from absolute creation, that is, the original creation of a substance. It is also distinct from providence because providence, like evolution, can never produce anything really new. Mediate creation occurs after the absolute creation of the original substance and, in co-operation with its laws, introduces something new to produce the desired results.[1]

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[1] Warfield, The Bible Student, IV (July, 1901), 4.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Ibid*.

By mediate creation, Warfield meant:

> The truly creative acts of God occurring in the course of His providential government, by virtue of which something absolutely new is inserted into the complex of nature--something to the production of which all that was previously existent in nature is inadequate, however wisely and powerfully the course taken may be led and governed--something for the production of which there is requisite the immediate "flash of the will that can."[2]

Warfield urged Christians not to confuse this with providence or evolution, and especially that they should insist that Jesus Christ is an instance of mediate creation for he was the product not "of precedent conditions in the world" but "an intrusion from without and above."[3] Christ began a whole series of events which make up the Kingdom of God.[4]

Origin of the Soul

Another crucial area which, Warfield insisted, should be included in the category of mediate creation rather than that of evolution or providence is the origin of the human soul. He cited J. J. Murphy as one who included "the mind under the law of evolution" and in so doing had been led to what Warfield considered to be the inevitable result, that of giving up the natural immortality of the soul and of changing "the doctrine of life after death into the one formula of '*God will raise the dead*.'"[1] Warfield asked the rhetorical question, "Is theology ready to make this sacrifice?"[2] Although a rather significant biblical-theological question on the nature of the human soul had been raised, Warfield wrote nothing in this brief one-half page notice of any conflict with the Bible, and criticized Murphy's position only on theological grounds by speaking of "the unsettled, unreasoned, uninstructed attitude of the writers, as a body, toward theology."[3] In his "Anthropology Lectures" he said that theology should not be forced to give up "the substantiality and immateriality of the soul and its consequent persistence in life after the dissolution of the body,"[4] in order to accommodate to an evolutionary process wholly by natural law.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[4] *Ibid.*

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[1] B. B. Warfield, Review of *Christianity and Evolution*, by George Matheson *et al.*, *Presbyterian Review*, IX (April, 1888), 335.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 18.

If one believed that evolution had happened and still accepted the traditional Christian doctrine of the soul, Warfield held that, to be consistent, one must believe that God had broken into the evolutionary process "at the point where an immaterial principle of life as distinguished from what we may call physical life came in."[1] This divine interference is not an instance of divine providence but one of mediate creation. Immediately following the above quote, Warfield continued with a statement which, coming from him, is surprising.

> It matters not when we place this point of interference--whether at man, or at the influx of animal life, or at the beginning of life itself--if the soul be immaterial substance, it was not the product of material substances and forces.[2]

He seemed to be so concerned with the necessity of a divine interference for the origin of the human soul that the point at which the break was made in the evolutionary process, "whether at man, or at the influx of animal life, or at the beginnings of life itself,"[3] was to him trivial in relation to that necessity.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[2] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 19. Later he revised the opening words, "It matters not," to a more cautious "It may not matter." He also inserted between the words "at man" in an almost illegible scrawl so as to appear to make it "at the apparition of man."

[3] *Ibid.*

Later Warfield inserted at this place in his manuscript a brief discussion of LeConte's acceptance of the immortality of the soul while teaching that it had developed from something already existing in animals. He did not stop to criticize LeConte but turned to "a similar notion" of Romanes as to the origin of self-conscious life in the growth of a child.[1] According to the latter, self-consciousness is the result of growth, and yet when the child arrives at a certain point, it makes a sudden leap of progress which is analogous to that of the body of a baby at birth. Warfield commented that if this were said of the origin of self-consciousness in the race, then he would ask:

(1) What was the cause of the sudden leap?
(2) Was it the communication of a new essence or only of a new process?[2]

Warfield's discussion of the attempts of others to derive the origin of self-consciousness and of the immortal soul did not enlarge on the idea of placing the introduction of the soul at an earlier point in the evolutionary process than the origin of man, but he did reemphasize his insistence on a divine intervention for its origin. For Warfield, to deny a divine intervention for the origin of the soul meant to reject the Christian idea of the soul as an immaterial entity because "an immaterial soul cannot be made through the instrumentality of simply material forces and materials."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 18 back.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 19 back.

After the discussion of the need of a divine intervention for the origin of the soul of man, the question will inevitably rise as to whether Warfield held the traducianist or creationist view of the origin of the human soul. Historically, Lutheran theologians have been traducianists in holding that God created the soul of the first man and that all his descendents have derived their souls from their parents by way of the process of procreation. On the other hand, Roman Catholic and Reformed theoligians generally, W. G. T. Shedd (1820-1894) being an exception, have held the creationist view that God creates the soul of each human being at or shortly after the moment of conception. Charles Hodge followed the Reformed tradition[2] and criticized Shedd for his deviation at this point. Warfield, who used Hodge's text and probably held to the creationist viewpoint, did not indicate it as he wrote on the question of divine intervention for the creation of the soul.

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[1] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 21 back.

[2] C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, II, 71

In his attempt to carve out a place for "mediate creation" between absolute creation and providence, Warfield made a lengthy quote from Evolution and Dogma by J. A. Zahm (1851-1921), a Roman Catholic priest who had made the distinction between absolute creation of spiritual intelligences and material elements and derivative creation, which is the formation of something with pre-existent materials under the guidance of God's providence. When Zahm placed the origin of spiritual intelligence in the category of absolute creation, Warfield was in doubt as to whether he meant

> that at the formation of Adam there was an act of absolute creation, producing the immortal spirit, which accompanied the derivative creation by virtue of which his body was formed (not created) from the lower animals [traducianist view]: or that at the birth of every human being there is an act of absolute creation of the soul, accompanying the act of "derivative creation" by which the body is derived from its parents [creationist view].[1]

In this discussion, while Warfield did not reveal his own position on creationism or traducianism, he pointed out that in either case the origin of the soul, which Zahm had classified under absolute creation, would in his own three-fold system be classified under mediate creation.[1]

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[1] Warfield, The Bible Student, IV (July, 1901), 7 The words in brackets are supplied.

Morality, Probation, and Fall

The next problem which Warfield considered in the course of his lectures was the origin of the moral sense within man. A thoroughgoing evolutionism as presented in Darwin's Descent of Man is, he believed, contrary to any significant meaning of the term "moral sense."[2] On the other hand, he granted that in a deistic scheme of evolution which allowed neither providential guidance nor divine intervention after the initial creation, the moral sense still "might be truly moral and bear the impress of the divine."[3] To theistic evolution, he granted that "true morality might be aimed at even by development from the brutish mind."[4] Morality would then be an original goal toward which God had been providentially guiding the evolutionary process. However, without an appropriate divine interference, Warfield felt that there would be no place in theistic evolution for "a race probation in the Biblical sense."[5] He reasoned that, if the moral sense had slowly and gradually developed in man, no issues as important as the fall of the race could justly be made dependent on only a partially developed moral sense. On the other hand, according to Warfield, the Bible seemed to portray the first man on whom the fall depended as having as fully developed a moral sense as does modern man.[1]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 20.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., pp. 20-21.

[5] Ibid., p. 21.

In contrast with the Biblical doctrine which presents the fall as a descent from morality, Warfield felt that the evolutionists tended to reverse this teaching and to present it as an ascent or improvement. Grenville MacDonald, in his attempt to account for the religious and moral sense in man, had, according to Warfield, assumed the necessary existence of the moral sense in the lowest forms of life and then had called certain phenomena in the sponge-sarcode, "the sense of the obligation to obey."[2] Warfield rejected this attempt to make the moral sense in man merely a more highly developed sense of what was in the lower phyla and reaffirmed his conviction that man's moral sense was "something absolutely new" which could be accounted for only by divine intervention and that "Evolution is not a sufficient formula to account for all life and all its functionings on our globe."[1]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] B. B. Warfield, Review of The Religious Sense in its Scientific Aspects, by Grenville MacDonald, PTR, II (April, 1904), 328.

Warfield quoted at length another evolutionary scheme of moral development which held that ages after man had evolved from some lower animals, the change in man's moral condition called "the fall" took place. This was not a lapse from a previous condition of moral excellence but was a great moral illumination of the human mind in which man came to see the heinousness of sin. Thus, "man really fell upwards, not downwards."[2] This was compared with the second "great moral illumination" of mankind in which the atonement of Jesus Christ fully revealed the antagonism between sin and righteousness.[3] Warfield commented that he could not see how the evolutionary theory, if it were "made inclusive of mental as well as bodily phenomena," could do better than this with the doctrine of the primary probation of man, but, he claimed, "This is to *reverse* Bible teaching and to stand the whole system of Christian theology on its head."[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 22 back, quoting E. J. Hamilton's Review of *What is Reality*, by Francis Howe Johnson, *PRR*, IV (April, 1893), 341. The words quoted above are from Hamilton's interpretation of Johnson.

[3] *Ibid.*, Warfield, quoting Johnson.

[4] *Ibid.*

Origin of the Human Body

Following a discussion of the necessity of a divine intervention for the origin of the human soul and the moral nature of man in order to have consistency with Biblical doctrine, Warfield did not, as might be expected, discuss the origin of the body of the first man, but instead turned to the question as to possible conflicts of evolution with statements in Genesis.

It should be remembered that in the latter part of his Anthropology lectures when he was discussing the religious meaning of evolution and its relation to theology,[1] he was not discussing the extent to which he believed that evolution had actually taken place but the extent to which it could be accepted and still be compatible with Christian theology in the orthodox sense, as well as possible points of conflict between the two. Thus, his omission of the problem of the origin of the body of the first man as distinct from the soul can be taken as positive evidence that he did not consider its evolutionary derivation from the animal world a problem for Christian theology.

Earlier in his lecture, Warfield had given a list of points in the evolutionary process where science itself might suggest breaks at which a divine intervention might be necessary. These were the origin of motion, life, sensation, and consciousness. However, no mention was made of any need of a divine intervention to produce the first human body either from the dust of the earth or from the body of a non-human parent.[1] When he criticized LeConte and Romanes who, in discussing the method of the evolutionary development of the soul, assumed a fortiori the origin of the first human body by the evolutionary process apart from divine intervention, Warfield did not even comment on any need of a divine intervention for the origin of the human body.[2]

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[1] Warfield, "Anthropology," pp. 17-24.

When reviewing a book which advocated that all living beings, with the exception of Christ, were produced through evolution by the immanence of God in the world, Warfield pointed out that, while Christ is the great exception, "He is not the sole exception."[3] The added "exception" was, it seems to the writer, very likely the soul of man but hardly the creation of his body, for Christ's body was developed in the womb of his mother, and there is no evidence that it was significantly different from that of any other man. The significant characteristic about Jesus Christ, according to Christian doctrine, is not that his earthly body was unique but that He was the pre-existent Son of God in his pre-incarnate state.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 19.

[2] *Ibid*., pp. 18 back-20back.

[3] B. B. Warfield, Review of *Christianity and Evolution*, by James Iverach, *PRR*, VI (April, 1895), 366.

When Warfield interpreted J. A. Zahm as holding that, while an act of absolute creation produced the immortal soul, it was accompanied by "derivative creation," i.e., evolution by which man's "body was formed (not created) from the lower animals,"[1] he did not criticize him for holding that man's body was formed from the lower animals, but for omitting the category of mediate creation between absolute creation and derivative creation, i.e., evolution or providential guidance of second causes. He even admitted his differences with Zahm "as possibly lying in his words,"[2] i.e., in his failure to use the term "mediate creation" as a name for his description of the origin of the first man.

During the fall term of 1903, James Orr (1844-1913) delivered the "Stone Lectures" at Princeton Seminary on the subject of the conflict between Christian anthropology and modern views of the nature of man. In an earlier work, Orr had indicated that the general hypothesis of evolution as applied to the organic world had seemed to him with certain limitations "extremely probable, and supported by a large body of evidence."[1] In the later lectures, while he extensively criticized many views of evolution such as those of Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), Thomas H. Huxley (1825-1895), and Darwin who held that "accident and fortuity have done the work of mind,"[2] yet he wrote that "no religious interest, I may take it for granted, is imperilled by a theory of evolution viewed simply as a method of creation, provided certain conditions are fulfilled, and certain limits are observed."[3]

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[1] Warfield, The Bible Student, IV (July, 1901), 7.

[2] Ibid.

On the origin of man, Orr considered the vital question to be whether "that which constitutes the _differentia_ of man, those bodily and mental characters in which he stands above, and is distinguished from, the animals, can be accounted for by unaided evolution."[4] He cited Huxley, John Tyndall (1820-1893), Hermann Helmholtz

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[1] James Orr, _The Christian View of God and the World_ (8th ed.: New York: Charles Scribners & Sons, 1907), p. 99; originally published in 1893.

[2] James Orr, _God's Image in Man_ (3rd ed.; New York: A. C. Armstrong and Sons, 1907), p. 95.

[3] _Ibid_., pp. 87-88.

[4] _Ibid_., pp. 122.

(1821-1894), Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), and Alfred Russell Wallace (1823-1913) as holding that the "chasm between the physics of the brain and consciousness is intellectually impassable."[1] Thus Orr felt that, according to "the pure data of science, apart from . . . theories of development, . . . the balance of probability is in favour of man's exceptional origin,"[2] and found some evolutionists agreeing with him that "a special supernatural cause" is required to account not only for man's mind but also for his body.[3]

In his review of God's Image in Man, Warfield disagreed with Orr's contention that it was inconsistent to postulate a special divine origin for man's mind while denying it for his body by pointing out that Orr's objection held only against that form of evolution which held that "the body of man was formed by the accumulation of insensible variations from a brutish original, and the soul made all at once by a divine fiat for the completed man."[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 125-126.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 151-152.

[4] B. B. Warfield, Review of God's Image in Man, by James Orr, PTR, IV (October, 1906), 557. Warfield reviewed the London edition of Hodder and Stoughton, published in 1905. This review was reprinted in Critical Reviews (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932), pp. 136-153.

Orr's argument, Warfield claimed, would be ineffective against the theory of evolution by mutation. Warfield offered the suggestion:

> If under the directing hand of God a human body is formed at a leap by propagation from brutish parents, it would be quite consonant with the fitness of things that it should be provided by His creative energy with a truly human soul.[1]

Here Warfield provides support for the idea of an evolutionary development of the human body by suggesting that the gulf between the physical aspects of man and those of his brutish parents could be bridged by providential guidance apart from a divine intervention. He also claimed that mutations as they are observed in animals could be accounted for by "the forces operating in the materials dealt with"[2] and do not require creation in any sense.

Another objection which Orr had advanced against the purely evolutionary origin of man is the difficulty in producing at approximately the same time male and female who had the same type of mutation.[3] Warfield circumvented this objection by pointing out that "nothing is commoner in the experience of breeding than the production from the same parentage of a succession of individuals of the same or nearly the same 'sporting' characters."[1] Thus, the production of the first human pair of both sexes by mutations due to natural forces posed for Warfield no special difficulty for the evolutionary development of the purely physical aspects of the race.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Orr, God's Image, pp. 153-154.

This refutation of an argument for the necessity of divine interference for the production of the first pair of human bodies supports the thesis that Warfield felt that the insistence on such an intervention was unnecessary for consistency with orthodox theology.

When writing an article about Calvin a decade later,[2] Warfield came out with the surprising announcement that Calvin's doctrine of creation is, "for all except the souls of men, an evolutionary one."[3] According to Warfield, Calvin

> ascribed the entire series of modifications by which the primal "indigested mass," called "heaven and earth," has passed into the form of the ordered world which we see, including the origination of all forms of life, vegetable and animal alike, inclusive doubtless of the bodily form of man, to second causes as their proximate account. And this, we say, is a very pure evolutionary scheme.[4]

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[1] Warfield, PTR, IV (October, 1906), 558.

[2] B. B. Warfield, "Calvin's Doctrine of Creation," PTR, XIII (April, 1915), 190-255.

[3] Ibid., p. 208.

[4] Ibid., p. 209.

Warfield did not have to say this and, had he felt that there was a conflict between the evolutionary origin of the body of man and the traditional orthodox Christian doctrine, he could have emphasized their differences, which were many, rather than the similarities, which seem superficial. After all, Calvin did believe that the whole process, including the modifications which produced the body of man, took place within the limits of six twenty-four hour days.[1]

It seems clear that Warfield would never have written as he did in these examples had he believed either that, in the production of the first human body as distinct from the human soul, something specifically new was produced which required a divine intervention, or that the origin of the body of the first man without such divine intervention was in serious conflict with Christian doctrine.

So far, in his differences with James Orr, Warfield seemed to hold a position more sympathetic to evolution than did Orr. On the other hand, he vigorously disagreed with Orr's conciliating statement that

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 196.

> neither 'evolution' nor 'special creation,' as ordinarily understood, is an ultimate conception; that what we need is some higher notion which will be seen to be a synthesis of both--in which, in fact, the supposed contradiction between them will disappear.[1]

Warfield responded:

> Surely "evolution" means just "modification"; and "creation" just "origination": and surely "modification" and "origination" are ultimate conceptions and mutually exclude one the other. You cannot "originate" by "modifying"; you cannot "modify" by "originating." Whatever comes by "evolution" that certainly cannot arise by "creation"; and whatever is "created" certainly is not "evolved." . . . Unless the thing produced is above what the powers intrinsic in the evolving stuff are capable of producing (under whatever Divine guidance), the product is not a product of "creation" but of "Providence." And "Providence" can never do the work of "Creation."[2]

The difference between Orr and Warfield here is less real than verbal. In his Anthropology lectures, Warfield himself spoke of the "doctrine of creation by evolution."[3] It was not until later when he developed the three categories of absolute creation, mediate creation, and providence that he made a sharp dichotomy between creation and evolution in which he used phraseology similar to what he used in this criticism of Orr. This distinction was made in order to assert the reality of mediate creation and to avoid its confusion with evolution. To say that "evolution" is God's "method of creation" or to speak of "creative evolution" is, according to Warfield, to blur the distinction between evolution and mediate creation and play into the hands of the anti-supernaturalists who seek to rule out any divine intervention, at least, after the origin of matter.[1]

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[1] Orr, God's Image, p. 87. For support, Orr quoted the Duke of Argyll's Unity of Nature, p. 272.

[2] Warfield, PTR, IV (October, 1906), 557.

[3] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 23.

However, in insisting that evolution and creation are mutually exclusive, Warfield did not intend to imply that the evolutionist could get along without creation for "to obtain the evolutionary stuff with all its potentialities, as exhibited in the process of its evolution, you must therefore posit a 'creation.'"[2] According to Warfield, a given entity is either created or evolved. Matter and spiritual beings are created, and if created they cannot be evolved. However, given matter in some form along with its resident forces, it may evolve into some other form. If asked whether a given animal, such as the first horse was mediately created or evolved, Warfield would probably ask whether it was produced by forces resident in the preceding material, or whether it contained something "specifically new."[1] If the former, then the horse came by evolution, i.e., by providentially guided second causes. If the latter, then it was by mediate creation. In the production of the world as we know it, Warfield would insist that matter and spiritual beings were created, while most of the rest were produced by modification of what was previously created and this may be by evolution. When Orr wrote about evolution and special creation, he was not saying that matter in its first form was both created and evolved, but that, in the production of the world as it is today, God used both creation and evolution to produce it.

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[1] Warfield, The Bible Student, IV (July, 1901), 2-5.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 4.

Warfield's paradoxical assertion that Calvin's doctrine of creation was an evolutionary one can be understood in the light of this three-fold division of God's relation to the world: absolute creation, mediate creation, and providence (evolution). The Reformed divines, Warfield believed, had observed a similar division in which First or Immediate Creation ex nihilo of material substance took place the first day; Second or Mediate creation which was partly ex nihilo and partly forming the previously created matter into what the world was at the end of the sixth day.[2]

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[1] Warfield, PTR, IV (October, 1906), 557.

[2] Warfield, PTR, XIII (April, 1915), 204.

John Calvin, Warfield noted, repudiated this twofold division of creation by restricting the use of the term "_ex nihilo_ creation" to the first day and the creation of each human soul, and he would not apply the term to any production where any pre-existent material was used.[1] Calvin insisted that the works of the second to the sixth day--the organization of the world into stars, sun, and planets; the origination and development of plant and animal life, including the human body--were produced by God working through second causes, that is, through the modification of the "original world-stuff by means of the interaction of its intrinsic forces."[2] Since these would all be in the category of providence, Calvin would therefore reject the category of mediate creation. He would then have only immediate creation and providence.[3] Warfield pointed out that since the idea of development, which was familiar to Greek philosophy and a leading principle in Aristotle's concept of _potentia_ and actus, had been accepted into Christian theology and philosophy, Calvin "very naturally thought along the lines of a theistic evolutionism."[1]

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 206.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 208.

[3] It should be clear from what has been said before that Warfield, who usually agreed with Calvin, did not follow him in eliminating the category of mediate creation. However, the disagreement is mainly verbal. All those events for which Warfield would insist on a divine intervention and so would put in the class of mediate creation, e.g., the origin of the human soul and miracles; Calvin would also hold even while rejecting the category of mediate creation. _Ibid_., pp. 206, 208.

Whether or not one agrees with Warfield's attempt to make Calvin as palatable as possible to a world dominated by evolutionary thought, this does reflect strongly Warfield's own attitude as to the compatibility of orthodox Christian theology with an evolution molded by strong theistic convictions.

Criticism of the Biblicist

Warfield did not merely concede theoretically that evolution from created matter with only a divine intervention of the soul of man was compatible with Christian theism, while saying that those who held that evolution had not been proved could legitimately hold that the traditional literal interpretation was the way that God probably produced the world. He criticized the evolutionist who held that man had evolved from preceding forms solely by the interaction of forces intrinsic in the evolving material. He felt that this "dogmatic exclusion of the directing hand of God"[2] was not the result of the observed facts, but was due to "antitheistic prejudice."[1] God, he claimed, should no more be excluded as a factor in the evolutionary process than the breeder should be excluded in an explanation of the production of purebred horses.

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[1] Ibid., p. 210, n. 56.

[2] B. B. Warfield, "Editorial Notes," The Bible Student, VIII (November, 1903), 242.

On the other hand, he felt that the conflict was to some extent due to the extreme position taken by the biblicist who claims that "the creation of man by Divine fiat must have been immediate in such a sense as to exclude all process, all interaction of natural forces."[2] To show that this exclusive supernaturalism in the production of the first man is not supported by Scripture, he cited Psalm 89:47 to the effect that all the children of men are created by God, and Psalm 119:73 to show that the Psalmist considered himself as fashioned by the hand of God, along with Genesis 2:7, which refers to the forming of the first man out of a pre-existent stuff. From this he concluded that the scriptural teaching on the origin of man as due to God's creative act need not exclude "the recognition of the interaction of other forces in the process of his formation."[1] However, Warfield felt that the language of the Scriptures "clearly represent man as something specifically new,"[2] which even a "wisely led" evolution could not "get out of preceding forms" because it "was not already potentially at least in them."[3] For the plants and lower animals, the divine fiat was "Let be." For man, there was a "pause and counsel--'Let us make.'"[4] In the former case, each thing was made after its own kind. Man, on the other hand, was "created after the kind of God,"[5] a double production of the dust of the ground and the divine breath.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

While he insisted that man, since he was something specifically new, requires "the assumption of a direct intervention of Power from on High,"[6] Warfield did not want it inferred that this necessarily involved "the denial of the interaction of an evolutionary process in the production of man."[7] All that he wished to insist on was that "in man

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 243. There also appears to be an implication here which Warfield did not make explicit. Since the Psalmist speaks of himself as having been fashioned by the hand of God when he knew that he was produced by the ordinary means of procreation, could it not be inferred that when the body of the first man was formed by God from preexistent stuff, he too was produced by ordinary means of procreation, but from some lower primate?

[2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.* [4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.* [6] *Ibid.* [7] *Ibid.*

God 'created' something specifically new, the elements of whose being were not all present even potentially in the precedent stuff."[1]

In this article he did not specify what it was which was specifically new, whether it was merely the human soul or whether it also included some aspect of the body of man, but it would be consistent with his "Anthropology" lectures and his review of Orr's God's Image in Man to say that the "specifically new" applied only to the soul, while man's body could have evolved by divinely guided mutation to the point when the soul was implanted in the body.

The Unity of the Human Race

The question of the descent of all the races of man from a common ancestor and its theological implications were being sharply debated during the decade before the publication of the Origin of Species.[2] When Warfield wrote, he did not consider it of sufficient importance as a problem between evolution and Christian doctrine to discuss it in his lectures. This omission was undoubtedly due to the fact, which he pointed out in a later article, that evolution had done Christianity a significant service for it removed "all motive for denying a common origin to the human race, and rendered it natural to look upon the differences which exist among the various types of man as differentiations of a common stock."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 243-244.

[2] *Supra*, Chap. 2.

Because of racial pride, there had been a strong tendency to deny the unity of mankind during the pre-Christian era. Warfield credited the Stoics with having been the first among classical peoples to advocate human unity. Not only is it taught in the Bible, but it forms a basic postulate of its entire teaching, especially of its doctrine of sin and redemption.[2] Because of this, the unity of the human race became accepted as Christianity gained influence. During the Renaissance there was some tendency to revive the doctrine of polygenism and to develop theories of co-Adamitism and pre-Adamitism. During the pre-Civil War period many advocated these theories for the defense of slavery.[3] While he thanked the evolutionary hypothesis for the virtually universal acceptance of monogenism, he felt that it was solidly established by physiological and psychological evidence.[1]

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[1] B. B. Warfield, "Antiquity and the Unity of the Human Race," PTR, IX (January, 1911), 19. This article was reprinted in Studies in Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932), and later in Biblical and Theological Studies, ed. S. G. Craig (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 238-261.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 20.

Warfield placed great emphasis on the importance of this doctrine by saying that "the whole doctrinal structure of the Bible account of redemption is founded on its assumption that the race of man is one organic whole, and may be dealt with as such."[2] Hence, it appears reasonable to say that should evolution advocate polygenism as some do today, then this would be a point of conflict for biblical statements and for orthodox Christians if not for theism.

Evolution and the Bible

After his discussion of evolution and Christian doctrine in his "Anthropology" lectures, Warfield gave to his students his view of the question as to whether evolution is consistent with "the Biblical account of the origin of things in general and of man in particular."[3]

> I am free to say, for myself, that I do not think that there is any general statement in the Bible or any part of the account of creation, either as given in Gen. I and II or elsewhere alluded to, that need be opposed to evolution. The sole passage which appears to bar the way is the very detailed account of the creation of Eve.[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[3] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 22.

[4] *Ibid.*

He granted the possibility that the origin of Eve could be held to be a miracle, which presumably means that the body of Adam could have been produced by evolution while the body of Eve was produced from his body by a miracle.[1] He also considered the possibility that the narrative could be understood as the "very practical descriptions of the formation of the individual in Job, and the Psalms, to teach only the general fact that Eve came of Adam's flesh and bone."[2] Neither seemed natural to him.

During the period when Warfield was giving these lectures, his colleague John Davis (1854-1926) published a book in which the vision theory received extended notice. The biblical account tells of the first man falling into a deep sleep and yet observing what was occurring. When he awoke, he recognized Eve as being of his own flesh and blood. The vision theory held that the scene was merely apparent and not real but that it was used by God to teach Adam that she, in contrast to the animals he had observed, was truly of his own kind.[1]

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[1] _Ibid_. He cited Dr. _______ as holding this position but his handwriting at this point is so illegible that the name could not be determined.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 23.

Warfield undoubtedly knew of this interpretation, and probably some student brought it to his attention as he went through these lectures. Nevertheless, no mention of the vision theory is made either in his original lecture or in the notes added later.

In his "Anthropology" lectures, Warfield was dissatisfied with both explanations of the origin of Eve: that it was a miracle or that it was intended to teach only the general fact that Eve was the same kind of being that Adam was. He felt that he had not found a satisfactory explanation of the Eve narrative which was also compatible with the evolutionary derivation of her body, and so it was for him "a very serious bar in the way of a doctrine of Creation by Evolution."[2] Later, commenting on Orr's raising of "the difficulty created for a purely evolutionary theory by the necessity of the production of not a single instance, but a pair of human beings,"[1] Warfield wrote:

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[1] John D. Davis, Genesis and the Semitic Tradition (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894), pp. 50-53. Davis pointed out the similarity of this narrative to the visions of Abraham (Gen. 15:12-18) and Peter (Acts 10:9-17; 11:11, 12), and that the Greek translators understood it as a vision. Although he wrote that it is "distinctly and decidedly in accord with old Babylonian tradition, as well as with biblical history, for divine revelation to be made by symbolic dreams" (Ibid., p. 53), he questioned whether this rather than a real event was what the originators and early transmitters intended to teach (Ibid.).

[2] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 23.

> Nothing is more common in the experience of breeders than the origination of a new type through an individual sport. And what is the difficulty of obtaining a pair or more of the same fundamentaltype? . . . And nothing is commoner in the experience of breeding than the production from the same parentage of a succession of individuals of the same or nearly the same "sporting" characters.[2]

Warfield was willing to suggest a "scientific solution" to the problem of the origin of the body of the first woman as well as that of the first man, but, as far as his writings indicate, this insight never lead him to grapple with the problem of the origin of Eve as presented in Genesis 2. It should be noted, also, that this is an exegetical problem rather than a theological or scientific problem and if he or anyone else became convinced that some interpretation of the text such as the vision theory "seems natural,"[3] then the way would be open to accept it as a probable solution.

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[1] Warfield, PTR, IV (October, 1906), 558.

[2] *Ibid*. It should be noted that Warfield's father was a cattle breeder.

[3] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 23.

Antiquity of the Human Race

Ever since the development of geology there has been a conflict between the age of the earth and man as determined by science and the traditional interpretation of the biblical account in the early chapters of Genesis. This was made more acute by the advent of Darwinism which, in order to provide time for evolution to develop from the lowest form of life into the higher forms of life, had postulated vast expanses of time. Nevertheless, Warfield did not even mention this point either when he considered conflicts between evolution and the biblical statement or elsewhere in his lectures. Years later, when he wrote an article on the antiquity of man, he flatly stated that "the question of the antiquity of man has of itself no theological significance. It is to theology, as such, a matter of entire indifference how long man has existed on earth."[1]

Theologians, he said, became interested in the subject only because certain schools of scientific speculation assigned such enormous periods to the life of man that they appeared to conflict with the Scriptures. The conflict, according to Warfield, is illusory.

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[1] Warfield, PTR, IX (January, 1911), 1; cf. "Editorial Notes," The Bible Student, IV (November, 1903), 241-51.

> The Bible does not assign a brief span to human history: this is done only by a particular mode of interpreting the Biblical data, which is found on examination to rest on no solid basis. Science does not demand an inordinate period for the life of human beings on earth: this is done only by a particular school of speculative theorizers.[1]

He admitted that the impression is readily received that the Bible indicates that man has been on this earth little more than six thousand years, but this is because the pre-Abrahamic genealogical records are wrongly used for calculation. He cited his late colleague William Henry Green as having shown that each of the two genealogies of ten recorded links in Genesis 5 and 11 may "represent an actual descent of a hundred or a thousand or ten thousand links."[2] The ages given at the birth of the "first" son, Warfield concurred with Green in insisting, were not intended to give us chronological information and cannot be added up to give a figure for the lapse of time between Adam and Abraham. He concluded on the basis of this that "something like two hundred thousand years may have intervened."[3] While he noted that, as far as Scriptural statements are concerned, the question is a purely scientific one, Warfield did feel that some evolutionists in the interests of their theories had demanded unreasonably large amounts of time, amounts which were rejected by physicists and which were really not required for evolution.[1] "Once allow the principle of modification by leaps," he wrote, "and the question of the length of time required for a given evolution passes out of the sphere of practical interest."[2] In fact, he wrote that in that day (1911) the general tendency among scientists was to accept a moderate estimate of the time required for the process.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 2.

[2] Ibid., p. 4. Green's article was published in the Bibliotheca Sacra, (April, 1890).

[3] Ibid., p. 11. Warfield, in The Bible Student, VIII (November, 1903), 248, also indicated the same age.

Conclusions

In spite of his reservations concerning the origin of Eve, Warfield concluded his lectures with the following generalization:

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[1] Ibid., p. 15. Earlier Warfield had ridiculed the suggestion that the newly discovered properties of radium might provide a source of energy in the sun so that the estimates of its age could be greatly increased and so provide more time for the existence of life on the earth. (Review of Darwinism Today, by Vernon L. Kellogg, PTR, VI /October, 1908/, 644).

[2] Ibid., p. 18.

[3] Ibid.

> The upshot of the whole matter is that there is no necessary antagonism of Christianity to evolution, provided that we do not hold to too extreme a form of evolution. To adopt any form that does not permit God freely to work apart from law and which does not allow miraculous interventions (in the giving of the soul, in creating Eve, etc.) will entail a great reconstruction of Christian doctrine and a very great lowering of the detailed authority of the Bible.[1]

He went on to say that if the theory of evolution were conditioned "by allowing the constant oversight of God on the whole process,"[2] that is, providential government, and also "his occasional supernatural interference for the production of new beginnings by an actual output of creative force, producing something new,"[3] then one could "hold to this modified theory of Evolution and be Christians in the ordinary orthodox sense."[4] However, he was not inclined to recommend even this modified position to his students, but deliberately left it an open question as to whether it should be accepted.[5]

In summary, while Warfield insisted upon the absolute creation of matter, he left it to science to determine where, if any, divine interferences should be postulated in the providentially guided evolutionary development of plants and animals up to, but not including, man. In the case of man, he would allow the evolutionary development of his body, but insisted on a divine intervention for the production of his soul. Because he felt that no satisfactory evolutionary interpretation of the Eve narrative had been found (this is an exegetical rather than a theological problem), he was obliged to call for a divine intervention for the origin of her body and therefore of the body of Adam.

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[1] Warfield, "Anthropology," p. 23.

[2] Ibid., pp. 23-24.

[3] Ibid., p. 24.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

Other than these, Warfield insisted on no other instance of divine intervention, i.e., mediate creation, outside the history of redemption as recorded in the Scriptures. Within the framework of the Bible, he would insist that God had intervened in revelation, miracles, and the incarnation. The latter happened only once and, according to Warfield, revelation and miracles were restricted to the Old Testament and Apostolic times.[1] Thus, Warfield severely restricted the range of the category of mediate creation and the number of divine interventions related to the physical world.

On the other hand, Warfield was a vigorous opponent of those who would de-supernaturalize Christianity. He insisted that the Christian God not only acted in revelation and redemption, but that He still acts in bringing men to repentance, in regeneration, and in guiding them today.[1]

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[1] B. B. Warfield, Miracles: Yesterday and Today (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1954), p. 28.

Although he spoke of "the creative operations of the Holy Spirit upon the heart" and of the Christian as a new creation, "not an 'evolution' out of the natural man,"[2] these are distinctly "spiritual" phenomena intimately related to the ongoing spiritual life of the church and would hardly involve conflict with anything which, he felt, could be rendered probable by biological science.

Although he held the same chair of theology and essentially the same theology as did his seminary professor, Charles Hodge, Warfield's views as to the compatibility of evolution with orthodox Christian doctrine were much closer to those of his college professor, James McCosh, than to those of his predecessor.

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[1] Warfield, "Christian Supernaturalism," PRR, VIII (January, 1897), 73. This article, which was written for the opening address to the students and faculty of the Seminary, shows more rhetorical effort at eloquence than do his other writings or lectures, which are more moderate in tone.

[2] *Ibid*.

CHAPTER VI

C. W. HODGE, JR. AND EVOLUTION

Education and Publications

When B. B. Warfield died on February 16, 1921, his position was filled by Casper Wistar Hodge, Jr. (1870-1937), son of Caspar Wistar Hodge, Princeton's professor of New Testament from 1860-1891 and grandson of Charles Hodge. C. W. Hodge, Jr., like his father, uncle and grandfather before him, took his degree at the College (1892), but rather than going to the Seminary he studied for two years at universities in Heidelberg and Berlin and was granted the Ph.D. by Princeton for a dissertation entitled The Kantian Epistemology and Theism.[1] He instructed in philosophy at Lafayette College before following his ancestors' example of attending the Seminary (1898-1901). After graduation he became Warfield's assistant for a few years (1901-1907) before being promoted to assistant professor of Didactic and Polemic theology. In 1915 he was promoted to Professor of Dogmatic Theology, a post which he held until Warfield's death when he became the Charles Hodge Professor of Systematic Theology.

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[1] Caspar Wistar Hodge, Jr., The Kantian Epistemology and Theism (Philadelphia: MacCalla and Company, 1894). The last half of this, Kantian Theism, was printed in the Presbyterian and Reformed Review, V (July, 1894), 478-502.

C. W. Hodge wrote eleven articles and over eighty book reviews for the Princeton Theological Review, two articles for its predecessor, the Presbyterian and Reformed Review, and contributed a chapter to Biblical and Theological Studies (1912), the centennial volume of the Seminary. None of the articles directly involved problems relating to evolution but some of the reviews were concerned with books which considered theology and evolution. The most extended discussion to be found in C. W. Hodge is his manuscript anthropology lectures which form part of his series on theology.[1]

Bible and Science

C. W. Hodge felt that the statement of the relation of the Bible to modern science that "the Bible does not teach science, but is religious in its aim," was true in a general sense but that it needed to be carefully qualified because of the extremes to which it had been carried by the Ritschlian theologians who sought to separate Christianity not only from metaphysics but from both scientific and historical facts.[1] Both Christ and his Apostles cited historical facts and accepted the view of the origin and nature of man as given in the Old Testament. These along with the teaching of Paul concerning the flesh, soul and spirit are, according to Hodge, subject to scientific investigation.[2]

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[1] These are located at Speer Library of Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey.

Hodge also cautioned his students about accepting the idea that while the Bible does teach a definite view on anthropology "its teaching is so general that any scientific hypothesis will fit in with it."[3] It was certainly clear, he felt, that the Bible was sufficiently definite to bring it into conflict with many speculative views on the subject.

About 1922 he added to his notes an example in Professor E. G. Conklin (1863-1952) who held that

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[1] Caspar Wistar Hodge, Jr., "Lect. I. Lects. on Anthropology" /sic/, p. 2. These are found in his manuscript "Systematic Theology; Lecture Notes for Junior and Middle Courses." Princeton Theological Seminary. Hereafter these lectures will be cited as "Anthropology, Lecture--." For any other works by Caspar Wistar Hodge, Jr., the name C. W. Hodge, Jr. will be used. The original draft of this lecture appears to have been written about 1907.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

> there can be no conflict between Science and Religion because science deals only with the mechanical and causal relations between phenomena and can never penetrate to ultimate problems; while Religion is a matter of emotion and feeling and of ideas growing out of those feelings.[1]

Hodge objected to this definition of religion as inadequate because he felt that the doctrinal content of religion determines these feelings rather than vice versa. However, he did agree with Conklin that "there should be no conflict between religion and theology, and natural science because, as Professor Conklin says, natural science is limited to causes between phenomena."[2]

Hodge went on to say that "if natural science maintains its proper limitations, it will not conflict with Christian theology."[3] He felt that if care were taken, it might "be possible to show that a view based upon truly ascertained results of science need not conflict with the Scripture teaching."[4] He also agreed with Conklin that theology too must be restricted for it "cannot invade the sphere of natural science and settle scientific questions."[5] However, he went on to claim, theology may "affirm that some events have happened which cannot be explained by natural science."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 4 back.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 4 back.

Hodge wrote that it was unfortunate that many writers, including Conklin, did not observe these limits of natural science but went beyond them to deny the supernatural.[2] In doing so they were making use of a naturalistic philosophy which by its nature denied the power of God to act in the world. To "this all-engulfing speculative philosophy," Hodge gave the blame for conflicts between natural science and Christian theology.[3] Although the advocates of the "new theology" claimed that it was "determined by the modern scientific movement," Hodge insisted that it too was "the product of a philosophical dogma rooted in Kant and Darwin."[4]

Throughout his career, Hodge found in many opposing views an anti-Christian philosophy which made use of evolution as a guiding principle in areas of thought beyond that of natural science.[5] He criticized Rees of Wales for applying the "evolutionary scheme" to Scriptures by asserting that "ethical monotheism is a late development, and that the Old Testament conception of God evolved from a primitive polytheism and animism, through henotheism, to monotheism."[1] He applied strictures to Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) for changing "Christian doctrine into a chapter in the evolution of religious ideas".[2] The application of naturalistic philosophy to Christian doctrine not only undermines the authority of the Bible, but it changes the Biblical doctrine of sin by the abandonment of the doctrine of the fall.[3] This in turn will affect the personal responsibility of man, the doctrine of redemption, the need of the cross of Christ as an atoning sacrifice and finally the Gospel itself.[4]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "The Significance of the Reformed Theology Today," PTR, XX (January, 1922), 11.

[4] Ibid., p. 3.

[5] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "The Finality of the Christian Religion," Biblical and Theological Studies, By the Members of the Faculty of Princeton Theological Seminary (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912), p. 458.

In his criticisms, however, Hodge was careful to distinguish between "the naturalistic philosophy which dominates all spheres of thought, including theology"[5] and the evolutionary hypothesis of natural science. The natural sciences, when their proper limits are observed, will not conflict with Christian theology. However the Christian should always be on the alert for the importation of a naturalistic philosophy under the guise of science.

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[1] C. W. Hodge, Jr., Review of The Holy Spirit in Thought and Experience, by T. Rees, PTR, XIV (October, 1916), 670. Cf. Review of A Century of Anglican Theology, by Clement J. Webb, PTR, XXIII (January, 1925), 155.

[2] C. W. Hodge, Jr., PTR, XX (January, 1922), 7. Cf. Hodge's article, "Fact and Theory," Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels, ed. James Hastings, I, (1920), 567.

[3] C. W. Hodge, Jr., Review of "A Plea for a Positive Evangel," by Alexander Stewart, PTR, XXV (January, 1927), p. 146.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

Creation, Mediate Creation, and Evolution

To develop the relation of theology to the natural sciences, C. W. Hodge used the three categories of creation, mediate creation, and evolution in much the same way as Warfield had used them.[1] Creation is an originating activity of God alone which gives rise to something which has substantial existence. He was referring primarily to material substance which, he held, was not eternally co-extensive with God but was created ex nihilo.[2] This originating activity of God is contrasted with evolution or divine providence in which God preserves all things in their being and guides the activity of second causes. In this he follows the Reformed doctrine of concursus.[1] Like Warfield he insisted that "Creation and Evolution or Providential control are 'mutually exclusive,'"[2] in the sense that what is created, e.g., matter, cannot be evolved, and any element which is evolved was there potentially in the beginning of the evolving series and is not something new.[3] However, he did not want to be understood as asserting "that in any specific product, such as man, both these forces may not have been at work."[4]

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[1] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "Anthropology, Lecture II," pp. 1-4. He cited B. B. Warfield's "Notes" in The Bible Student, IV (July, 1901). This is also included in Hodge's article, "What is a Miracle," PTR, XIV (April, 1916), 258-261.

[2] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "Systematic Theology: Lecture Notes for Junior and Senior Courses," in notebook entitled "Attributed of God," p. 20, Speer Library.

By such distinctions between creation and evolution and between the Creator and the created substance, he was able to defend super-naturalistic Christianity against "modernism," which used the three dominant ideas of "pantheism, immanence, and evolution" to refashion Christianity.[5] This new theology has "done away with any real distinction between God and the world, and the contrast between the natural and the supernatural, fundamental for the old theology, has vanished."[6]

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[1] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "Anthropology, Lecture II," p. 2.

[2] Ibid., p. 2; cf. "What is a Miracle?" PTR, XIV (April, 1916), 258.

[3] C. W. Hodge, Jr., PTR, XIV (April, 1916), 258.

[4] Ibid.

[5] C. W. Hodge, Jr., Review of The Way of Modernism and other Essays, by J. F. Bethune Baker, PTR, XXVI (April, 1928), 321.

[6] C. W. Hodge, Jr., PTR, XX (January, 1922), 4.

This distinction also opposed those, such as Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), who would substitute evolution for creation and do without God altogether.[1] Hodge used the category of divine providence to oppose those who like Darwin conceived of a deistic evolution which held that "God created simply the original world stuff, and then as a machine--apart even from the Divine Control, this machine in a purely naturalistic manner brings forth everything including man and all the highest forms of his life development."[2]

Like Warfield, Hodge also felt that some theologians and apologetes had presented a weak defense of supernatural Christianity by forgetting the mutually exclusive character of creation and evolution and calling evolution "God's method of creation" and by speaking of "gradual creation," "creative evolution," and "creation by means of second causes."[3] He cited Warfield as saying that Asa Gray, James McCosh, and the Duke of Argyll had such methods of harmony.[4]

He was not, however, satisfied merely to maintain this distinction, for one could accept both creation and providence while still denying any direct intrusion of God after the original creation. One would then "have a truly theistic evolution; but by no means necessarily a Christian evolution."[1] Such a denial of "the direct intrusion of the Divine activity apart from second causes" would eliminate the doctrines of incarnation and resurrection of Jesus and the regeneration of the believer.[2]

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[1] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "Anthropology, Lecture II," p. 13.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 4, cf. *PTR*, XIV (April, 1916), 259.

[4] *Ibid.*

To make a provision for a truly "Christian view of the world"[3] it is, according to Hodge, necessary to introduce a third category between those of creation and evolution, mediate creation.

> It is the insertion into the already developing phenomenal series--or series of second causes, of something entirely new, and which although joined on to the series, yet is not within their power to produce even under Divine guidance. The second causes may be acting--but they are not acting in the production of this new product. It differs, therefore, from absolute or immediate creation only in that the new product is joined on to the series. It does not, however, exclude a genetic connection of the total product with the preceding links in the chain--but it implies that in regard to what is new in the total product, the second causes had no part in the production of it.[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 5, cf. *PTR*, XIV (April, 1916), 259.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

The doctrine of mediate creation not only enabled Hodge to defend the doctrines of the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus Christ and that of regeneration and miracles, but he also used it as a possible category of what the Scriptures required on the origin and development of the biological world and especially on the origin of man. "It is quite possible that this activity may have entered in the production, say of life from the inorganic, or, say of consciousness from the unconscious; or in the origin of man either in regard to his body or his soul."[1] The question of "the mode of origin of the different species of organic beings," he regarded as a scientific question to be settled by science and saw no need to bring in mediate creation for their accomplishment.[2] The cases of the origin of life, consciousness, and self-consciousness were, he felt, still too much a matter of pure speculation and disagreement among the scientists to require a solution of the metaphysical problem as it relates to evolution.[3] Still, he held in principle that evolution could be "conceived in harmony with Christian Supernaturalism," if evolution were held to be equivalent to a divinely guided process and if mediate creation were allowed.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 8.

[2] Ibid., p. 11.

[3] Ibid., p. 12.

[4] Ibid., p. 15.

Scientific Evidence for Evolution

In Lecture III of his series on Anthropology, Hodge turned to "evolution as a hypothesis in natural science" to show the state of the evidence in his day and the "largely hypothetical character of the evolution theories."[1]

His subject was broken down into three basic questions involving the origin of species by fiat creation or descent, by small variations or by mutations, and whether Lamarck's inheritance of acquired characteristics or Darwin's survival of the fittest by means of natural selection was "the mode of this gradual evolution."[2]

Hodge told his students that it "is most generally regarded as fairly well established, i.e., that some kind of evolution of organic forms has taken place."[3] He cited Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902), DuBois-Reymond (1818-1896), Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) and Albert Fleischmann (b. 1862) to support his thesis that the "theory of Descent has not been traced out in all parts of organic nature, and perhaps it should not be regarded as absolutely proven so much as a hypothesis."[1] While his original discussion of this point is less than two pages long, over the years he added eight pages of quotations and notes taken from Vernon L. Kellogg (1867-1937) on the state of evidence of Darwinism and evolution,[2] from George McCready Price (1870-1963) on the theory and significance of Mendelism and geology,[3] from William Bateson (1861-1926), an English biologist, on the sterility of hybrids,[4] from Thomas Hunt Morgan (1866-1945) on the relation between similarity of character and common ancestry,[5] from Harold Christopher Morton on evidence from paleontology, rudimentary organs, embryology, and anatomy,[6] and from Byron Nelson (1893-) on evidence from some of these same areas and also geology.[1]

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[1] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "Anthropology, Lecture III," p. 1. The original draft of this lecture appears to have been written in 1907 for he wrote "during the past year '05 and '06." The word "past" was crossed out in pencil, very likely at a later date when the word would be an anachronism (_Ibid_., p. 7).

[2] _Ibid_., p. 2.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 3.

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[1] Ibid., p. 4.

[2] Ibid., on sheet following page 4, he has a lengthy quote from Vernon Lyman Kellogg, "The Modern View of Evolution," Atlantic Monthly (April, 1924).

[3] Ibid., on torn sheet number 1 and on the back of the following sheet number 3, he has notes from Price's Phantom of Organic Evolution, 1924.

[4] Ibid., on back of torn sheet number 1, he quoted Bateson from Science (January, 1922), Toronto edition but relied on Price for most of the page.

[5] Ibid., on torn sheet number 2, he has material from Morgan which he later crossed out, but he cited no book.

[6] Ibid., on torn sheet number 2 and on the back are notes from Morton's Bankruptcy of Organic Evolution, 1925.

While some of these men from whom added notes were taken were recognized scientists (Bateson and Morgan), Hodge seems to have relied most heavily on those whose scientific pedigree was questionable (Price and Nelson). These notes all tended to question the evidence for the support of the descent of species. His conclusion was that evolution should probably be considered a working hypothesis.[2]

The next question which Hodge considered was that, assuming the descendence theory to be true, was it accomplished by gradual evolution or by sudden changes?[3] In favor of the first, he explained Haeckel's recapitulation theory but cited Karl von Baer (1792-1876) against it. He cited Rufolf Schmid (1828-1907) as saying that geology and paleontology gave no definite answer to the question.[4] In response to the claim of Hugo De Vries (1848-1935) that he had "produced a new species of plants [evening primrose] by sudden leaps,"[1] Hodge observed that "the whole question as to what constitutes a new species or a difference of species, is quite uncertain."[2] He did not share James Orr's confidence that the mutation theory is "so much more favorable to Scripture Anthropology,"[3] and concluded that it did not make much difference to the Christian theologian which of the two methods was preferred by science because the causes of the leaps "could be entirely natural" while with gradual evolution one "might have to postulate a transcendent factor at certain points."[4]

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[1] Ibid., on sheet number 3 after torn sheets are notes from Nelson's After Its Kind, 1927. This was written as a master's thesis for Princeton Theological Seminary.

[2] Ibid., p. 4.

[3] Ibid., p. 5.

[4] Ibid., p. 6, citing Darwinischen Theorien. He later added to the back of the sheet notes from Price on geology.

The third question to be considered was that if evolution were gradual, was it accomplished through the influence of environment on a very large number of chance variations or were there "adjustments by the activity of the organism more or less adapted to begin with?"[5] He wrote that neo-Darwinism makes it easier "to explain the fixing of differences of closely related species according to their geographical location," but he felt that there were still many difficulties with the theory.[6]

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[1] Ibid., The brackets are mine.

[2] Ibid., p. 7.

[3] Ibid., p. 1. This paragraph was later crossed out.

[4] Ibid., pp. 7-8.

[5] Ibid., p. 8.

[6] Ibid.

The first was the actual constancy of species during historical times. The causes which originated the species should, according to the selection theory, be still at work and giving rise to new species.[1] The second objection was that it did not account for the origin of useful characteristics but only for their preservation. Those organs which are functionally the most important are the most difficult to account for on this theory. In their early stages of development, they could hardly have been useful at all, and yet this is a necessary condition for them to be preserved by natural selection.[2] Hodge reviewed Henry Fairfield Osborn's discussion of the argument between Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) who opposed natural selection and August Weissmann (1834-1914) who favored it[3] and concluded that, while the matter is still uncertain, "it is not so vital a question to the Christian theologian"[4] because both methods may show a guiding intelligence. Either theory of evolution could, according to Hodge, be Christian or anti-Christian depending on whether it left room for mediate creation.[5]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 9.

[3] Ibid., pp. 9-10, citing Psychological Review, I (1894), 312 ff.

[4] Ibid., p. 10.

[5] Ibid., p. 11.

Scientific Evidence for Evolution of Man

The next problem which Hodge considered was the teaching of natural science on the method of man's origin. He cited Huxley on the immense differences in the weight of the brain and the shape of the human skull when compared with those of any known ape.[1] Even the highest ape skulls were so far below the lowest human forms, Hodge held, that paleontologists were unable to point to any transitional links. He noted the claim that the Pithecanthropus erectus was such a link but cited the disagreements on the part of scientists.[2]

Hodge told his students that "man's descent from some form of anthropoid ape has been assumed by men like Haeckel, Huxley, and Weismann"[3] but claimed that the difficulties of this position has led more recent scientific opinion to seek man's ancestry in the lemur or some earlier form which was held to be the common ancestor of both.[4]

Later he added notes from Henry Fairfield Osborn (1857-1935) listing and evaluating the "supposed ancestors of man" such as the Cro-Magnon race ("at least our equals in mental power"), the Neanderthal race ("may be a degeneration"), Heidelberg ("many say it belongs to Genus homo and is not a missing link"), and the Pithecanthropus erectus ("Prof. W. B. Scott . . . declared it human").[1]

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[1] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "Anthropology, Lecture III," p. 12.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

Although Hodge may have been willing to allow the acceptance of a large amount of evolution, when it came to evaluating the evidence for missing links or a lower animal ancestry of man, he was very critical of the evidence.

After dealing with the scientific evidence of the evolution of man's body, Hodge turned to "the results of modern science on Mental Evolution." Here, he wrote, "strict science stops, and speculation begins. Of course many Evolutionists assume that the human mind is an evolution pure and simple from the animal mind."[2] Naturalistic monists like Haeckel held this position, and Darwin had tried to prove it, but A. R. Wallace and many philosophical writers on evolution drew "the line at the human mind."[3] Hodge raised the question as to "whether there is a genetic connection of man's mind with that of the animals"[1] and insisted that this should be settled independently of the question as to "whether consciousness in some form is coextensive with organic life."[2] He opposed the attempt to use analogies between human mental operations and the "very simple forms of conscious reaction to external stimuli"[3] to prove such a genetic relation. He then presented Orr's suggestion that there were separate spheres of existence which could be arranged in a hierarchy with each successive sphere containing something new that required for its origin a higher cause. He cited in support of this DuBois Reymond who gave seven such points including human consciousness.[4] Apparently he was satisfied to leave the decision of any genetic connection of the human mind to science because he pointed out that such a position would not rule out the need of mediate creation for what was specifically new in man and that the Christian "has nothing to fear from the legitimate results of scientific research."[5]

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[1] Ibid., added smaller sheet after p. 11, the introduction of the second part of Lecture III, but it fits in logically on p. 14, where he has a penciled note referring to Osborn.

[2] Ibid., p. 15.

[3] Ibid.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[5] *Ibid.*

The Scriptural View of the Mode of Man's Origin

C. W. Hodge discussed the theory of evolution on a subhuman level only as a background for the topic, "The Mode of Man's Origin." He began his series on Anthropology with a study of the biblical doctrine on this subject, centering on the first two chapters of Genesis. On the question of the two documents J and E, he referred his students to W. H. Green's Unity of Genesis; and the charge that it contains two contradictory accounts of creation, he countered by listing a series of contrasts showing the different purposes of the two narratives.[1]

He compared the different phrases used in Genesis 1 for God's commands, "Let therebe . . . " and "Let the earth (waters) bring forth . . . " with "Let us make man . . . " and concluded that the difference in phraseology suggests a certain amount of divine deliberation on the part of God so that apparently He was more directly involved in man's origin than He was in the rest of creation.[2]

References to dust of the ground and the breath of God in Genesis 2:7, Job 27:3, 32:8 and Ecclesiastes 12:7 led him to his second conclusion:

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[1] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "Anthropology, Lecture I," pp. 4-5.

[2] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

> In regard to man's body it was dust from the earth, i.e., it was made out of _preexisting material_; and _whether_ the _immediately_ preceding link in the genetic series was a clod of earth or an organic form, the important thing _seems_ to be, according to the Scripture account, to recognize that in the production of _man as a whole_--i.e., body and soul, the _preceding_ link in the series--or the second causes did not contain the potency of producing man.[1]

While Hodge insisted that a divine intrusion or mediate creation rather than mere divine guidance of second causes was necessary "_somewhere_ in the origin of man,"[2] he allowed several alternate possibilities which permitted evolution to have a part. Even if it were held that mediate creation did enter into the production of man's body to produce what could not be done through providentially guided second causes, this still need not exclude a genetic connection of the new product with some preceding organism.[3] However, Hodge admitted that it would still be compatible with Scripture to hold that man's body was evolved from lower organisms with no mediate creation but simply due to second causes under God's control.[4] If this were held, Hodge would insist, there must still be at least a mediate creation in the case of the first man's soul so that man as a whole would be due to God's creative, as well as controlling, activity.[1] However, even this divine intrusion need not exclude "a genetic connection with lower forms of soul life."[2] Hodge then concluded, "We think that the Scriptural account of the mode of man's origin leaves room for these alternatives."[3]

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[1] _Ibid_., pp. 11-12.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 12.

[3] _Ibid_.

[4] _Ibid_.

Conflict on the Mode of Man's Origin

It was at this point, that is, at the mode of man's origin, that Hodge saw the first conflict of Scripture with "modern anthropological speculation" because there was a tendency to think of man as having evolved from lower forms of life "*solely* by forces *intrinsic* to the evolving series, to the exclusion of every transcendent cause."[4]

He was sympathetic with the attempt to reconcile evolution and theism by holding that there is no need for the evolutionist to insist that the causes in the production of man were blind and no need for the Christian to exclude all natural forces. However, he felt that this resolution of the problem still leaves some conflict, for "the

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 13.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 14.

[4] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "Anthropology, Lecture II," p. 9.

Scripture does not represent man as the product of mere second causes acting under God's providential control."[1] There is something in man which is new and is not contained even potentially in the preceding forms of life. Hodge felt that science could not, without transcending its limits, deny the possibility of a transcendent cause in the production of man. If the scientist did so, it was because he was dogmatically anti-supernaturalistic and not because he was a scientist.[2] Hodge followed Orr in holding that this something new in man was the image of God which constituted him a personal, self-conscious being with personality and the powers of conceptual thought, abstraction, and generalization. Man can reflect on his experience, himself, and God and so have ethical and religious ideas.[3]

Many conflicting systems of metaphysics have been developed to account for this unique capacity of man. Hodge was aware of these as he sought to avoid the peculiar dangers, e.g., of Platonism by affirming:

> The Bible asserts the unity of man's nature. The body is an essential part of man's personality--it is no mere dwelling place of the soul or hindrance to the soul--but body and soul make the man.[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[3] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "Anthropology, Lecture V, The Nature of Man," p. 6.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

On the other hand, he tried to avoid monism, whether materialistic or idealistic, by saying:

> The Bible does not teach that the soul is merely a product of the nervous system, i.e., it is not materialistic; nor that the body is a mere product in some way of the soul life. It is not monism but a dualism. . . . The Bible teaches the duality of human nature. Man is composed of two parts--separable, and diverse in origin, nature, and destiny.[1]

Such a being, he felt, could not be accounted for by evolution alone, but requires a supernatural cause (mediate creation). If this be allowed, "no conflict with the Bible account need arise."[2]

The Christian doctrine of sin, especially original sin, is one which has been drastically influenced by the doctrine of evolution. Hodge used D. C. MacIntosh of Yale as an example of one who applied the idea of race evolution to the doctrine of sin.[3] MacIntosh taught that the first human beings were not created mature, but that the whole race began in a state of infancy, inheriting tendencies and developing habits appropriate to animal life, but which "could not be regarded as satisfactory to the gradually increasing insight of developing humanity."[1] Consequently, a struggle developed between the old impulse and the new ideals which gave rise to sin and evil.[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[3] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "Lect. XIII Hist. of Doct. of Sin" (*sic*), p. 15. This is part of his "Doctrine of Sin Lecture Notes," Princeton Theological Seminary.

An evolution acceptable to Christian theology would, according to Hodge, allow a divine intrusion at the origin of man. This would make it unnecessary to deny man's creation in a state of perfection or to insist that man was initially in a savage or half brutish state and that he is gradually ascending to a higher level.[3] This would protect the doctrine of the Fall. Mankind's resulting degeneration into sin would account for the barbaric conditions of many tribes.[4]

Conflict on Antiquity and Unity of Man

The problem of the antiquity of the origin of man which had often involved a sharp conflict between theologians and scientists was, according to Hodge, "not necessary, at least in its acute form."[5] In dealing with the problem, he divided it into two questions: the age of the earth and the age of man. Since he held that the Scripture gives no data on the age of the earth, his discussion of the Biblical data is confined to the age of man.[1]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 16.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "Anthropology, Lecture V, The Nature of Man," p. 8.

[4] *Ibid*.

[5] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "Lect. IV. Script. and Science on the Time of Man's Origin" (*sic*), p. 2. This is part of his Anthropology lectures in his "Systematic Theology; Lecture Notes for Junior and Middle Courses," Princeton Theological Seminary.

He relied largely on Princeton's Old Testament Professor W. H. Green, as had his predecessors in the chair of theology, for the refutation of Ussher's interpretation of Biblical chronology.[2] The gist of this was that while Ussher had assumed that the pre-Abrahamic genealogies were complete, a study of the post-Abrahamic genealogies and its use of the phrase "son of" indicated that the pre-Abrahamic genealogies were most likely not complete, and hence were not intended for, and so were useless for, the calculation of chronologies.[3]

He concluded that the Bible leaves room for almost any reasonable antiquity for man and quoted Warfield to support this position.

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[1] _Ibid_.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 3. He cited William Henry Green's _The Pentateuch Vindicated from the Aspersions of Bishop Colenso_ and his article in _Bibliotheca Sacra_ (April, 1890).

[3] _Ibid_., pp. 4-6.

> It does not appear extreme, Dr. Warfield concludes (Bible Student) to say that 200,000 years instead of 2,000 may be the time covered by this genealogy so far as its statements go; and indeed Dr. W. calls attention to the fact that this has been said by judicious men.[1]

Later Hodge crossed out with pencil the 200,000 and replaced it by 20,000, but with no other changes in the text. A check with Warfield's text in The Bible Student indicates that the original was:

> It does not appear extreme to say therefore, as has been said by judicious men, that for all that appears from these genealogies, from the creation of Adam may have been nearer 200,000 years than 2,000 years.[2]

While Hodge's original statement implied a longer time than did Warfield's, yet his change of numbers from 200,000 to 20,000 without a corresponding change in the text appears to be unjustified from the viewpoint of scholarship and even that of honesty.[3]

However, Warfield did write another article on the same subject in 1911 probably after Hodge had written his own lectures.[1] In this article, Warfield wrote of the genealogies of Genesis 5 and 11 as follows:

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 9. No quotation marks appear in the manuscript.

[2] B. B. Warfield, "Editorial Notes," *The Bible Student*, New Series, VIII (November, 1903), 248.

[3] Just when this change was made is unknown, but the fact that a pencil was used while the original copy was in ink indicates that it was probably made after that had been completed.

> Their symmetrical arrangement in groups of ten is indicative of their compression; and for ought we know instead of twenty generations and some two thousand years measuring the interval between the creation and the birth of Abraham, two hundred generations, and something like twenty thousand years, or even two thousand generations and, something like two hundred thousand years may have intervened.[2]

In this quotation note that Warfield did give 20,000 years as a possible length of time as well as the 200,000 which also appeared in The Bible Student. Since Hodge undoubtedly read the later article and probably felt that 200,000 years was simply too long a period and noted that Warfield also gave the more conservative period of 20,000 years, it is likely that he simply revised the number in his lecture notes from 200,000 to 20,000 and still claimed that he had Warfield's support. If this happened, it would seem to exonerate Hodge's honesty, but from a scholarly standpoint he still should have given his students the new citation from the Review. Possibly he did do this orally, but there is no indication of it in his manuscript.

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[1] B. B. Warfield, "On the Antiquity and Unity of the Human Race," PTR (January, 1911), 1-25.

[2] Ibid., p. 11. Underlining supplied.

After discussing what the Scripture allowed on the antiquity of man, Hodge then turned to the data of science and found that, while the scientists were not agreed, "many of the very best scientists are asserting an antiquity for man and for the earth, which the believer in the accuracy of the Scripture can very well allow."[1]

Ethnological discoveries in Egypt and Babylonia gave dates of the former civilization at 3000 B.C. and the latter at 5000 B.C.[2] Geologists and paleontologists, according to Hodge, demanded enormous lengths of time extending up to 400 million years for life on the earth and 100,000-200,000 years for man.[3] However, he proceeded to cite geologists who questioned the accuracy of their methods and noted that Wright had come to the conclusion of 16-20,000 years for the antiquity of man.[4]

Biology, according to Hodge, mainly because of the Darwinian theory of gradual evolution, had demanded great lengths of time. However, since the recent theory of mutations made much smaller demands, no estimate was given as to the requirements of biology. Physicists had originally allowed too little time for the age of the sun to satisfy the biologists, but Hodge noted that this limit had been largely eliminated by the discovery of radium.[1] All this showed the general uncertainty on the age of the earth and the tendency to reduce this period to one which, for Hodge, was entirely acceptable to Scripture.

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[1] C. W. Hodge, Jr., "Anthropology, Lecture IV," p. 10.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 11.

[4] Ibid., p. 12. George Frederick Wright's article in Bibliotheca Sacra, 1903, is cited, but this information is also given in Warfield's article.

For the scientific teaching on the age of man, Hodge cited Orr on the "very general agreement on part of geologists that the earliest traces of man are in the glacial epoch."[2] Wright and other geologists were cited as holding that the antiquity of man would date "from 20 to 25 thousand years."[3] He also cited Dawson as holding mankind to be no older than 10,000 years.[4] All of these came within or very close to Hodge's downward revision of the age allowable by Scripture.

The other point of conflict between Christian theology and anthropology is the unity of the human race. According to Hodge this is taught in the Bible and lies at the foundation of the doctrine of sin and redemption. Such scientists as Agassiz had held to polygenism which postulated distinct ancestors for different races of mankind, Hodge credited Darwin and the evolutionary hypothesis with moving scientific opinion to monogenism or the unity of the human race.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 13.

[2] Ibid., p. 14.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

To support monogenism, Hodge listed the facts of the interfertility of the different races, their similarity of skeleton, normal temperature and pulse rate, and length of life.[2] He claimed that their differences in shape of skull and color of skin could be accounted for by great differences of climate. Differences of language may also be accounted for by separation of peoples along with the natural changes which languages tend to undergo. The prevalence of certain primitive religious traditions both in the Old World and the Americas, along with the capability of Christianity in acting as a civilizing force among modern savages and uncivilized races all indicated to Hodge both the unity of species and a common origin of mankind.[3] Therefore, according to Hodge, modern scientific opinion gives one no reason to doubt the Scriptural doctrine of the origin of the human race from a single pair.

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[1] C. W. Hodge, "Note on the Unity of the Human Race," pp. 1-2. These are in manuscript in his "Systematic Theology: Lecture Notes for Junior and Middle Courses," Princeton Theological Seminary.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 3.

[3] *Ibid*., pp. 4-6.

In summary, it is clear that C. W. Hodge followed closely in the footsteps of B. B. Warfield, his teacher and colleague, in his attitude toward the relation of evolution to Christian theology. He developed the same categories: absolute creation, mediate creation, and evolution (a divinely guided process). He was equally insistent that a divine intervention was required to originate, at least the human soul of the first man, but he went on to consider that this first human soul might also have had some genetic connection with some lower animal soul.

Warfield seemed more willing than Hodge to argue that the body of the first man required no divine intervention but only divine providence to produce it from some lower animal. There was agreement on the demand of Christian theology on the unity of the origin of the human race, but Hodge was more conservative in his allowances for the antiquity of the race.

In general, it seems that C. W. Hodge was a less vigorous and less able thinker than was Warfield and he was less willing to take positions which might bring forth criticisms from the more conservative wing of the church.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

After completing this detailed study of the Princeton theologians, it is now possible to get an overall view of the change in their attitudes toward evolution and Darwinism over the seventy year period from the publication of the Origin of Species (1859) until the reorganization of Princeton Theological Seminary after which many of the more conservative members of the faculty, but not C. W. Hodge, left the Seminary.

By his study of earlier science-theology conflicts, notably that of the heliocentric theory of astronomy, Charles Hodge had developed a set of principles for the resolution of such conflicts. He held to a distinction between fact and theory in science such that a theologian should accept well verified facts but has the right to criticize or reject a theory developed from these facts. He also recognized that the theologians' interpretations of Scripture are not infallible and, when challenged by the verified facts of science, may have to be revised. Even a scientific theory when it has been sufficiently verified may be used to guide or revise the interpretation of Scripture.

Hodge's opposition to deism had led him to place an emphasis on the immanence of God and the divine goverance of the world which could have incorporated evolution as part of God's method of producing the plant and animal world. However, when he was confronted with a new scientific theory, i.e., Darwinism, he took the position that it was atheism because Darwin consistently sought to exclude design from the evolutionary process and this meant to Hodge the exclusion of God's providential guidance of natural laws. However, even according to Hodge's own definition, Darwinism should be classed as deism, an unscriptural form of theism, rather than atheism.

Hodge had admitted that evolution could be and had been interpreted in a non-deistic theistic manner, that is, in a way that admits providential guidance of natural laws but allows no divine intervention. He rejected this approach but did not condemn it as atheism. However, he did not seek to use his own principles to develop an interpretation which would make evolution compatible with Christian theism, but sought to disprove evolution because to do so would be to refute Darwinism. Furthermore, he pointed out that he did not see how evolution could be reconciled with Scripture. As a result he reinforced the idea that one could not accept evolution without endangering one's Christian faith.

While the study of the early thought of A. A. Hodge shows that he was somewhat more open than his father to the acceptance of new scientific theories in astronomy and geology, he followed his father in rejecting both evolution and Darwinism. His later works (1878-1886), however, show a significant change of attitude toward evolution. This change was facilitated by the application of many of the same principles which his father had advocated for other conflicts with science but had failed to use with evolution. His change of attitude did not apply to Darwinism which he also relegated to atheism because it denied design and the providential working of God to guide the evolutionary process. In this the younger Hodge had the support of Warfield who, though he described himself as a "Darwinian of the purest water" in his younger days, later agreed with Charles Hodge that a Darwinism which denied design and providence is atheism. C. W. Hodge, Jr., although he did not make the explicit statement in his manuscript lectures or in print, would probably have agreed. All the Princeton theologians were agreed in rejecting evolution when it was combined with a materialistic or pantheistic or any other philosophy which sought to account for the world apart from the work of a theistic God.

All three successors of Charles Hodge, however, were willing to accept as compatible with Christian theology a theory of evolution which was properly limited. In the first place, they felt that evolution should be limited to the natural sciences and should not be applied to the religious realm and used to rearrange the Old Testament in the light of supposed development of ideas about God. It should not undermine the authority of the Bible nor lead to the abandonment of such theological doctrines as original sin or the fall of man.

They further limited the theory of evolution by insisting that God had created the material substance of the world ex nihilo, that he had created the first form of life, and that he had created man in his own image. They also agreed that the whole process must be under the providential guidance of God made possible by his immanence in the world, but they seemed to be in less agreement as to whether the origin of sensation and consciousness could be accomplished merely by divine providence or whether these too required a divine intervention.

Although A. A. Hodge was willing to accept the evolution of plants and brute animals, he was reluctant about admitting that the body of the first man had a genetic connection with some lower animal because he feared that this would conflict with the teaching of Scripture.

However, he offered no theological objection to the idea. Warfield, who considered the question in more detail, found that the narratives of the origin of the body of man in Genesis 1 and 2:7 could be interpreted in the light of evolution but not, however, the detailed story of the origin of Eve (Gen. 2: 18-25). Although in his anthropology lectures, this led Warfield to back up and hold that the body of man, too, was by special creation; later on he pointed out that the body of man could have been produced by way of mutation from a lower primate even apart from a divine intervention. C. W. Hodge, who in his manuscript lectures or in print never faced the problem of the origin of Eve, was also willing to grant that the body of man, as far as Christian theology is concerned, could have a genetic connection with the lower animals apart from a divine intervention.

All the Princeton theologians appear to be "creationists" rather than "traducianists" on the origin of the human soul, so even though the later ones may have accepted as compatible with Christian theology the evolution of the body of man, they still held to the creation of the soul of the first man as well as every other human soul. However, C. W. Hodge went further and considered the possibility of a genetic connection of the first human soul with an earlier animal soul. This, he felt, was still compatible with Christian theology if it were admitted that a divine intervention or mediate creation was also involved. A divine intervention at the origin of the soul of man was felt necessary in order to be in accord with the Scriptural doctrine of man made in the image of God, to preserve the immortality of the soul, and to account for man's reason, his moral nature, and his capacity of self-consciousness.

In studying their discussions on evolution a distinction should be maintained between what these theologians thought would be compatible with Christian theology or with Scripture, and what they believed actually occurred as far as evolution is concerned. None of them believed that evolution had been proved, and their writings leave one in doubt as to the extent that they believed that evolution had actually taken place. All three, along with the eldest Hodge, compiled evidence from scientists against evolution, but this was part of their task as teachers to show their students the present state of the question. C. W. Hodge did this more than the other two, probably because he taught during a period of reaction against evolution and especially Darwinism. Warfield seemed to be the most willing of the three to defend evolution, as he did against James Orr~~,~~ and to align it with Christianity, as he did when he proclaimed

John Calvin as a thorough-going evolutionist.

All the Princeton theologians were agreed on the necessity for holding to the unity of the human race. Charles Hodge had faced the problem of its denial in the pre-Darwinian period while the others credited Darwin with supplying scientific support for the unity of the race.

On the antiquity of man, all were in debt to the work of W. H. Green for releasing them from the bondage of Ussher's chronology which had been based on the assumption that the genealogies of Genesis 5 and 11 were complete. However, Charles Hodge, though admitting that the Bible does not teach the extent of man's antiquity, felt that only ten thousand years could readily be granted. With A. A. Hodge the age became sixteen thousand years but he did not seem concerned if science should go beyond that age. Warfield speculated on an age of about 200,000 years from Adam to Abraham, while C. W. Hodge put it back to 20,000 years for the same period.

The conflict between science and theology in general and with the Princeton theologians in particular is related to the problem of the claims to authority of science and of the Scripture.

The Princeton theologians, while they may have differed at minor points in their statements as to the inspiration and authority of Scripture, firmly held that God had revealed himself to the prophets and the apostles and that he had inspired the writers of the Scriptures so that the product was an infallible guide in faith and practice. They also acknowledged that truth, in fact most truth, came by way of observation and the scientific method. Along with the acknowledgement of two sources of truth came the possibility of conflict between the two, should they overlap. The Princeton theologians were convinced that ultimately, these two sources would not yield conflicting truths, for God is the God of all truth. He not only created the world and all that is in it, but He also revealed knowledge to man in Scripture. Truth, they were convinced, would not conflict. If there is conflict this simply meant that man had wrongly interpreted either the Scripture or the data of natural science.

Knowledge derivable from Scripture was more important to them than was scientific knowledge because the former involves man's eternal destiny while the latter pertains only to this life. Since this was the case, there was always the temptation in case of conflict to preserve revelational knowledge by claiming that the scientists had erroneously interpreted the data. This was made more plausible, of course, when they could find some scientist who could be cited as opposing the alleged scientific fact or theory.

However, this policy would defeat their aims for they were seeking to win the minds and hearts of men to Christianity. They could not win men if they appeared to be denying facts. After all, they also claimed to be searching for truth. To deny what men believed to be true would contradict their own claims.

To admit that Scripture was in error would, they felt, undermine its position as an authoritative guide in faith and practice. To admit that their interpretation of Scripture was wrong at some point would sometimes be the best way out of the predicament, especially when the erroneous interpretation could be shown to have been guided by an erroneous scientific belief which science has since repudiated. This would allow them to accept a new truth-claim of science without undermining the authority of Scripture.

This was the policy that the later theologians followed and it was even suggested by Charles Hodge. But the elder Hodge was over sixty when the Origin was published and over seventy when he wrote on the subject. His successors were younger men with more flexible minds, more scientific training, and with more awareness of the disastrous consequences of Hodge's policy. However, they by no means threw the doors wide open to alleged scientific truth as a guide to the reinterpretation of Scripture. They too were concerned with the authority of Scripture. Some points, such as the nebular hypothesis, the antiquity of man far greater than 6,000 years, and the evolution of plant and lower animal life could be admitted without undermining the Scripture or theological doctrines based thereon. In other cases it was different. How could one accept that Adam and Eve's bodies had come by evolution and still hold Genesis 2 literally? How could one hold that the soul of man evolved from the lower animals and still hold that man is made in the image of God and that the soul of man is immortal? These are questions that demand answers and made the later theologians cautious in handling these issues. They wanted to accept the authority of science but not at the expense of the authority of Scriptures nor of important theological doctrines. They admitted the truth of scientific conclusions at several points where they could by careful reasoning show that they were compatible with Scripture and important Christian doctrines. By doing this they were able to maintain a view of the authority of Scripture and a theology which was essentially that of their predecessor Charles Hodge.

There was, however, an essential difference in their strategy. Back in 1885, F. L. Patton, then professor at the Seminary but later president of the college, noted that there are two ways to defend Christianity against assaults by anti-Christian thought. On the one hand, "it may be shown that the hypotheses which are alleged to be contrary to the claims of Christianity are not warranted by fact." On the other hand, "It may be shown that even supposing that they were true, they would not discredit revealed religion."[1]

In the previous decade Charles Hodge had taken the former path while James McCosh, the president of the college, had led his students down the latter path. The successors of Charles Hodge, though loyal to his basic theological position, followed the lead of James McCosh. The elder Hodge had staked his case for his confidence that there could be no conflict between Christianity and true science upon the eventual disproof or lack of proof of evolution while his successors accepted the idea that the theory of evolution was here to stay, and developed a doctrine of God's relation to the process, so that their followers could contribute to the progress of science rather than fighting it and still have a Christian faith in an orthodox sense which could maintain its vitality by the confidence that man can have a personal encounter with God and that He can control the universe so as to bring about His purpose for this world.

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[1] Francis Landley Patton, "Evolution and Apologetics," Presbyterian Review, VI (January, 1885), 138.

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